On 11 September, a human chain was formed by people in Catalonia to demonstrate support for the territory’s independence from Spain. Joan Costa i Font writes that Catalan independence is not simply an internal Spanish issue, but has the potential to spill-over into the European arena. He argues that with the Spanish government reluctant to allow either an independence referendum or a constitutional reform, the European Union should now take an active role in the debate.
The Catalan question has overshadowed modern Spanish politics for more than a century. The latter includes a forty-year dictatorship followed by a ‘peculiar’ transition to democracy and a subsequent Constitutional settlement in 1978 which most Catalans interpreted as a route to a federal Spain. However, as early as 1981, a failed coup, a list of subsequent recentralisation attempts, cast doubts over any serious federal transition.
Two decades later in 2005, a new statute of autonomy attained the majority support of both Catalan and Spanish Parliaments, and the democratic legitimacy of a referendum, but it was finally frustrated in 2010 by the ruling of a heavily politicised Constitutional court (today chaired by a militant conservative known by its anti Catalan views). These gave rise to long lasting debate over what can de labelled as the ‘law v democracy’ dilemma, whereby the constitutional references to both an ‘indissoluble unity of Spain’ and the need of a ‘Spanish-wide referendum’ prevail over the people of Catalonia’s preferences. As a result, Catalans are trapped within Spain, after the new interpretation of the Constitution after the 2010 ruling.
The federalist majority in Catalonia realised after 2010 that a federal agreement was an impossible mission given the weakness of federalists in mainstream Spain. Perhaps, their view was that only joining those who support a project of secession could either force a federal Constitutional reform or, as a second best deal, create an independent state. This can explain the huge demonstration in 2012, and the recent massive participation in the human chain for independence on 11 September, which involved more than 1.5 million participants. Both phenomena express the dissatisfaction about how Spanish politics works, and the hope that a new successful state would do better.
Next steps…
The next steps include an unlikely scenario of a negotiated referendum, even though 45 per cent of Spanish citizens and 80 per cent of Catalans support it. Failing this, a ‘tolerated’ referendum promoted by the Catalan government could be another alternative solution, but the chances are it will be outlawed by the Spanish government (after another Constitutional ruling) given that the polls indicate that 52 per cent of Catalans support independence. The next step is therefore likely to be that a plebiscite regional election will form a parliament with a separatist majority (and polls also show that the separatist Republican Left Party would win the next election) with a mandate of a unilateral declaration of independence. As I argue below, if this does happen, it might force the European Union to step in to avoid both a political and economic crisis that would spill over to other member states.
So far, the strategy of the Spanish government and, implicitly, most of the political opposition, is to do nothing (or very little) and live on in ‘denial of the Catalan question’. The assumption, perhaps foolish, is that at some point independence supporters will give up, worn out by harsh spending cuts, which are far more severe than those which Europe imposes on Spain. Yet, such a strategy can backfire as the economic crisis makes people more aware of regional redistribution. While Catalan solidarity is close to 10 per cent of its income; the poorest region in Spain, Extremadura, manages to afford welfare benefits that Catalans do not enjoy, and reduce tax rates. In the meantime, the ‘lock in’ position of the central government serves the cause of independence very efficiently.
Should Europe take part?
Traditionally, the European Union has regarded the Catalan conflict as an ‘internal affair’. However, this assumes that member states can resolve the conflict peacefully by themselves, and that solutions will not exert external effects on other member states. Yet, there are a few reasons why Europe should change its traditional position, and take a more active role (beyond the legalistic reminder that Catalan independence would require the new state to formally re-apply for accession to the EU).
These include the following: First, unlike in the UK (with regards to Scotland), the potential moderators of the process (the Spanish government and its head of state) are neither trusted, nor believed to be neutral. In addition, the credibility of mainstream political parties as conveyors of change is heavily damaged. The latter can be exemplified with the reaction to the rushed pseudo-federalist proposal of the socialist party (PSOE), which was disregarded in a matter of a few hours by all other parties.
Second, a unilateral declaration of independence would create obvious legal and economic turmoil, with inevitable knock on effects on the euro insofar as the credibility of the Spanish recovery plan would be undermined. Third, the Spanish constitution states explicitly that the military guarantees the ‘unity of Spain’. Hence, a unilateral declaration of independence can be a potential risk to the attainment of peace within the territory of the European Union. There have been a handful of members of the military making threatening comments of an eventual military intervention to appease Catalan aspirations. The number one mission of the European Union would have failed if the latter was allowed to happen.
Last, faced with the abovementioned ‘law v democracy’ dilemma, Europe as a ‘project of political liberalisation’ should be expected to “err on the side of democracy” and force Spain to hold a referendum. Possibly, as explained in an earlier post both unionists and secessionists should explain not so much their position, but what a Spanish or independent Catalonia would look like, and more specifically how the welfare state and the wellbeing of the Catalan people will be affected by each project. The European Union should in turn define what the rules are that govern an implicit ‘internal enlargement’, to avoid Catalonia becoming the next Switzerland of Southern Europe.
Today, both Spanish and European federalism have to confront the same common problems, namely that federalism requires federalists at the central and regional level. Paradoxically enough, fragmenting non-federal states in Europe can be a strategy for accelerating the formation of a European federation. In any event, it’s about time for the European Union to step in.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/15eMcHL
_________________________________
Joan Costa i Font – LSE European Institute / Department of Social Policy
Joan Costa i Font is Associate Professor (Reader) in Political Economy at LSE. His main research interest is in political economy (theoretically grounded ‘economic and public policy analysis’) and applied economics (more specifically in the areas of health and social economics).
The vocabulary used in this article undermines its credibility: “‘law v democracy’ dilemma” or “As a result, Catalans are trapped within Spain”. Most political analyst and political theorists think that democracy and law are not incompatible (but the opposite).
Once I was shocked when I read a comment of Dr Costa i Fons in a forum exchange in which he argued that “constitutionalism was one of the evils of the twentieth century”. That premise which underpins Dr Costa i Fons argument here is questionable to say the least (and inappropriate coming from someone who has taught politics at the LSE). Well fortunately most people do not equate democracy with the tyranny of the majority.
The problem here goes beyond what Dr Costa I Fons refers as “legalism”. Let me put it in plain terms. In democratic systems with commonly agreed (constitutional) rules any major change in the status quo would require a certain amount of negotiation and persuasion.
In the case of Catalonia, if independentists want to change the current (constitutional) status quo they need to convince the rest of Catalans and Spaniards that this is a viable option. This means showing that those that are not particularly in favour of independence will gain or at least will not be worse off if that option is decided.
Unfortunately Catalan nationalist don’t seem very enthusiastic about this usual democratic path of persuasion and negotiation. Rather than convincing the rest of Spaniards of the need and benefits of a change in the status quo, they are trying to impose a unilateral solution (internal consultation and unilateral declaration). They are using the popular clamour in the streets to legitimize their (illegal or at least extra-legal) process of independence. Flags, uniforms, propaganda and popular nationalist fervour are good to grow visibility and gain more support but also create alienation and frustration among those that do not share their nationalist ideology or do not embrace one-dimensional identities.
Catalan nationalists have a big problem now: they are reaching a dead end in their strategy. International actors are not very happy with processes that do not respect legality within democratic states. So they are asking Catalan nationalist to try to convince or persuade the rest of Spaniards (including the non nationalist Catalans) within the framework of Spanish laws and usual democratic practice. The idea of unilateral imposition defended by Dr Costa i Fons and many others is not considered acceptable or democratic by most international actors and allies (including the EU, USA, etc.). In sum Catalan nationalists have the will to secede from Spain and but don’t have the means to do so unilaterally (neither legal or military means). The logic would dictate that they go back to the democratic path which includes convincing the rest of Spanish that they would all be better off (or at least not worse off) with a division of the country (as the Scottish did with the rest of the UK). Unfortunately for them in their pro-independentist “crusade” although they have gained great deal of support they have also polarised society and alienated a great part of the citizenship within Catalonia and the rest of Spain. To a great extent because their tactic to gain support has been primarily demonising and ridiculing the rest of Spain. Catalan nationalists know that right now, after all the blame campaign, dialogue and persuasion are now much more difficult to reach. This is why many independence activists are now questioning constitutionalism and legality (and even the declarations of EU dignitaries). Constitutionalism and legality would force them to negotiate and convince the majority of Spaniards and they know that in the short term they cannot do so.
The pro-independence majority (52% according to one poll) is definitely a landmark for nationalists. But it should not be taken out of the context. For the last 40 years at least (since there are records) the anti-independence feelings have been clearly predominant in Catalonia and they are still in Spain. Democracy is not just about the rule of the majority (and Catalan nationalist would be a minority if the if the whole of Spain is taken into consideration). Laws and in particular constitutions exist in democracies precisely to avoid temporary moods of majorities. After all Catalan nationalist should be also grateful to these laws and constitutions which have enabled Catalonia to have such a high great level of autonomy and so many “devolved” powers (in comparative terms with other European regions). This constitution and laws they renege from now have allowed the Catalan government, for example, to use public funding and institutions in the last 35 years to reinforce the Catalan nationalist sentiment. Surely the majority of Spaniards would disapprove those decisions but the constitution and some laws in this case have prevented them from interfering in Catalan affairs.
In sum, the problem is not that of democratic principles (as nationalist want to make us believes) but simply that of territorial units. The project of state they have is basically exactly the same that Spanish has right now but with smaller territorial units.
(sorry for the length, this reply will be partly object to a blog post in Eurocrisis in the Press)
“For the last 40 years at least (since there are records) the anti-independence feelings have been clearly predominant in Catalonia and they are still in Spain.”
The implication here is that no election result may be accepted if it appears to contradict the historical trend of opinion for the 40 years leading up to the vote. An absurdity.
Added to which, you criticize the vocabulary in the article and then immediately use the term ‘Catalan nationalists’ with astounding frequency, presumably aware of the way this term will work with English speakers. You’d have done better to stick with the less emotive ‘independentists’.
And the argument that independence for Catalonia ‘should be a decision for all Spain’ is also absurd and has no precedence in history. It’s as if I demand the right from Barcelona to vote for the mayor of Madrid because that office might have an effect on Spain in general. No, when a region or colony wants to vote on its status, that region or colony alone must be allowed to decide.
The PP regularly pleads that a referendum can’t be held ‘because it would be illegal’, and that Catalan MPs should bring the matter before Congress in Madrid if they’re serious. This, with the full knowledge that a PP absolute majority will never allow the Catalans to vote. Thus, the plea of legality carried out by the Spanish right is actually meaningless and is designed to thwart rather than to foster democracy.
I am just stating a fact about the pro-independence feeling. Since there are statistical records the majority of the people did not want independence. The constitution was approved by more than 90% of the Catalans voting. Maybe the absurdity you refer to comes from the fact that the mood of the people in Catalonia is changing so fast. But this is not absurd if you take into consideration the strong pro-independence campaign institutional
You may not like the term Catalan nationalist, but this is the term they use. CiU and ERC declare officially to be nationalist parties. The term “national” and “nation” is pervasive in Catalonia. I however agree that some people in favour of independence are not really nationalist but simply angry at the Spanish central government or people that see that independence would made them pay less taxes. However the nationalist parties and organisations that are pushing the pro-independence process (such as ANC, Omniun Cultural, etc) are clearly nationalist (and Catalan).
You say that it is absurd that Spain has a say in the independence of Catalonia. Well the secession of Catalonia would have very serious (probably negative) consequences for the rest of Spain. Many Spanish people from other regions live, spend holidays, own property in Catalonia. Many other Spanish are married or have family in Catalonia. I think that the absurdity would be dividing a country into two without asking to one of the parts. By the way even in the case of Quebec and Scotland, the people from the rest of the UK and Canada had to give their approval to the referendum through their parliaments. ERC, ANC and many others reject that the Spanish parliament give the approval to the referendum.
The Spanish constitution can be changed, the independentists should rather try to follow the legal democratic means and convince the rest of Spain that independence would not be as bad for them (as Scottish and the Quebequois did)
The Spanish Constitution was approved 35 years ago by 25-30% of people that nowadays are still alive. The great majority of the citizens in Spain are remaining under the framework of the post-franquism they didn’t vote. But the lack of mobility of the Spanish government in proposing (even discussing) any Constitutional change (except when is an European mandate) is undoubtely a signal of weakness of their own institutions, incapable to handle changes and respond to their citizens demands. Don’t you think that, for its own sake, the Spanish state needs an injection of democratic legitimacy?
This is not a very strong argument (unless is meant to be a general attack on constitutionalism). Constitutions are often created or voted in the aftermath of an authoritarian regime. The German Constitution was approved in 1948 in the aftermath of the Nazi regime and WWII and under supervision of foreign powers. Do you consider it to lack democratic legitimacy? The US Constitution was voted in the aftermath of a colonial occupation in the Eighteenth century. Nobody who voted the US constitution is alive. Does it make it something undemocratic or illegitimate? The logic of constitutions is actually to provide stability to regimes and to set rules and boundaries to the action of citizens. These common rules were approved to bind future generations. We can of course reform the constitution. But this needs to be agreed by the large majority of Spaniards and cannot be imposed unilaterally by a minority (in this case those who seek the independence of Catalonia). In fact the majority of the arguments that attack the Spanish constitution for lacking democratic legitimacy are either anti-democratic or based on a misunderstanding of what democracy means (at least in the modern western sphere).
I am very disappointed by the populst tone of Mr Costa’s post and by the lack of sceintific background and arguments, which should be inherent to a blog belonging to LSE. First of all, it is not true that the 2005 Catalan Statute was stroke down by a Constitutional Court presided by a anti-catalan magistrate. In 2010, the President of the Spanish Constitutional Court was Prof. Dr. María Emilia Casas- nominated for the position as a magistrate at the Constitutional Court by the Socialist Party and elected President with the votes of the so called ‘progressist’ magistrates. She was also in charge of drafting the judgment on the Catalan Statute. Second, I find it very disappointing to read in a blog post prentending to have a certain academic level that “the poorest region in Spain, Extremadura, manages to afford welfare benefits that Catalans do not enjoy, and reduce tax rates”. Well, Mr Costa, the reason is that every Spanish Autonomous Community is free to allocate its bedgetary positions in an autonomous way, so that while Catalonia has 6 public televesions, embassies, etc., Extyremadura has chosen to invest its economic resources into education and the social system.
No, the reason is that Catalonia suffers what is relatively a far higher budget deficit from Madrid which makes it impossible to offer certain benefits. Equally, Extremadura is responsible for relatively very little trade or exports and so there’s not much need for them to have offices in foreign countries (Acció offices and cultural centres are not embassies. That you would use such a term implies readership of El Mundo, La Razón etc, and ignorance of the fact that such offices exist based on agreement with ICEX and the Spanish government, as well as cross-party support in Catalonia, which the PP is now backing away from).
Regarding the constitutional court, you’re right. But that doesn’t make criticism of that judgement perfectly valid. Large sections of the Estatut were re-written (even after it was cut prior to the referendum, on the PSOE’s promise that it would go through in that form), and the court was miserably set up (1 person dead, 3 others expired, and no effort to correct this prior to a vital constitutional ruling).
Wow! Talk about lack of scientific background and arguments! Everyone who knows something about Catalan history knows the utter disrespect that most Spanish “progressists” have for Catalonia. Yes, catalanophobia is widespread in Spain. As for Casas’s Court, doesn’t the result of its deliberations speak for itself? You also forgot to mention where Extremadura’s budget comes from.
As a quick reply to Jose and Jan’s points ( unfortunately I don’t have the time to read every single comment):
a) Needless to say that I have never made any comment in any forum as suggested by Jose,as far as I remember. In the blog article above I mean that when a constitution is reinterpreted in a radical way, as it was the case of the Spanish Constitution after the 2010 Constitutional ruling, then it cannot be regarded anymore and conveying the original democratic legitimacy, very much on the contrary it iscloser to being a ‘democractic fraud’. So the dilemma in Spain is indeed bluntly that of ‘law v democracy’.
b) Regarding the question mentioned by Jan, all I can say is that perhaps the post should indeed include the adjective ‘today’ before the reference to the chair of the Constitutional court ( I did add this minor refernce to stress that today the court is even more politicized than it was during the 2010 ruling). I will ask EPP blog editors to update this. Thanks for the remark though!
c) Finally, Jan : on the question of social generosity of poor regions, the point here is that given the unparalleled regional fiscal imbalance in any non-capital region ( and includes a very generous funding of the Spanish govermental agencies known for not promoting seriously any other culture than the Spanish or Castillian one), it seems unfair that the poorest region in Spain happens to be more generous than Catalonia. More generally, it is telling about how absurd the parameter of Spanish regional funding are (even the current PM seems to agree with his point). Of course you and others are entitled to think otherwise, but all I am saying is that most Catalan people disagree.
Hope this helps!
Discussions in Facebook are sometimes read by unexpected audiences.
Constitutions can sometimes be interpreted in different ways but we cannot call a ‘democratic fraud’ to a ruling we do not agree with (even if the law passed the parliament). Rulings against decisions of parliaments happen in democracies. I don’t think we want to enter the discussion of the separation of powers here.
Jose, this is not a simple ruling on a law, but a change in model of state. In no advanced democracy, the political organisation of a state is decided by (politically appointed) constitutional judges. This is an unprecedented case that calls for an unprecedented response,…
Dear Anselm,
1-Supreme and constitutional courts are in most democracies appointed by governments or political entities (e.g. the UK, USA, etc.).
2-The Catalan Statute attempted a change in the model of organisation of the state and it (in some parts) was declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has no capacity in Spain to propose any change in the organisation of the state. They are just call to certify the validity of changes introduced by politicians.
2-In 1983, a similarly “politically appointed” Spanish Constitutional Court ruled out the LOAPA that was a law voted by the Spanish parliament that aimed at re-centralising the state. You cannot support decisions only when they go in favour of your views/interest (in this case decentralisation) and claim they are outrageous or anti-democratic when they go against. These are the rules of the game and are the same for everyone.
I really cannot believe some of the things I read here. I would not be surprised if I would hear it in a pub or TV3 though
1. In no democratic country there is such a politicised constitutional court than in Spain.
2.A ruling that calls off a federal interpretation of the constitution is by all means a change in the political organisation of Spain.
3. The LOAPA ruling was a politicised one indeed, had it been in a different sign the true face of spanish federalist failure would have become evident sooner.
I am appalled by the need to disqualify other contributions buy people like Jose and Jan. Clearly this same attitude is the one underpinning the impossibility of an agreement on the Catalan question.
1.The level of politicisation of the Constitutional Court is difficult to compare or measure. I am not sure how you conclude that it is the most politicised one.
2. Spain is not a federation and the Constitution is not that of a federation. I may prefer the federal model over the current one, but It is important not to mix what are our wishes with the reality. So it is normal that the Constitutional Court ruled out a statute that was introducing an asymmetric federal system in Spain. A full constitutional reform would be required for that.
You clearly ignore the is a huge literature in law, politics, fiscal federalism both in English and Spanish on whether the Spanish Autonomies qualifies as a federal state in practice, even some well known American political scientists bought the idea of Spain as a country in transition to a federal state,… . The 2010 ruling on the Statue killed it all, and that is precisely the origin of all problems,..Catalans don’t fit in the current Spain,..and they wish to take a vote,…radical decisons, are matched by other radical decisions,…
A different view on the same issue: ‘The independence of Catalonia: jumping on a bandwagon’ https://blogstest.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2013/09/30/the-independence-of-catalonia-jumping-on-a-bandwagon/
You clearly ignore the is a huge literature in law, politics, fiscal federalism both in English and Spanish on whether the Spanish Autonomies qualifies as a federal state in practice, even some well known American political scientists bought the idea of Spain as a country in transition to a federal state,… . The 2010 ruling on the Statue killed it all, and that is precisely the origin of all problems,..Catalans don’t fit in the current Spain,..and they wish to take a vote,…radical decisons, are matched by other radical decisions,…
I know the literature. It usually terms Spain as a quasi-federal state. However it does not have all the supposedly required features to be considered fully fledged federal. Very importantly the Senate does not represent the regions. Moreover the Catalan Statute did not seek a federal solution. It aimed at establishing mechanism of bi-lateral relations with Madrid but not to engage with other autonomous communities in policy-making (which is the basis of federalism). In a federation the Lander, States or whatever unit you consider discuss among them policies and laws. Catalan nationalists do not want to discuss with other autonomous communities (just with Madrid). The Statute wanted to create an “asymmetrical” sort of arrangement which is clearly different than a federal organisation such as those you have in the USA, Germany, etc.
Anyway, the manipulation of the narrative of the Statute nowadays is really something. Only 40% bothered to vote the Statute and many of those that criticise the ruling of the statute now were not in favour of it. ERC (now almost becoming the first party in Catalonia according to some opinion polls) for instance declared from the beginning that the goal was independence and avoiding getting involved in its drafting. It was very obvious that some parts of it were not Constitutional. Everybody knew that parts of it would be ruled as unconstitutional (otherwise it would have been accepting a “back door” constitutional change). Thanks to the ruling of the Constitutional Court independentists have more ammunition now but it is not the Constitutional Court to be blamed for the radicalisation of positions within the political parties in Catalonia, which had started earlier.
Sorry for the typos and grammar mistakes
This last post is a much more sober and mush more polite than the others I must admit. So will offer some reply:
a) The Catalan status could not create a federal state for all regions, only for Catalonia and given that all other regions simply benchmark it or even copy it literally, it would have had the same consequences than a federal reform.
b) Your view on the lack of constitutionality of the Statue is in stark contrast with the Constitutional Commission of the Catalan and Spanish Parliament made of the most prestigious experts of the country.
c) I know arrogance has no limits but yours is quite over the top! Finally, delegitimising a referendum with 49% of turn out and 75% support is just dishonest. This is especially the case when ERC (or what you call nationalist) joined the Spanish conservative PP in their rejection or simply did not turn out to vote because they thought the government was making too many concessions.
In any event, it’s good that you accept the radicalisation argument because it makes your argument of public opinion or ‘mood change’ as the basis for the legitimacy of a constitution very weak, ir not negligible.
As prof Costa-Font argued in November, dissatisfaction with Spain and support for a federal reform have been always the ‘first best’ feeling of the majority in Catalonia, and it was not until the 2010 ruling that federalist gave up its cause and joined the independentist cause.
Anyhow, it feels like we are reproducing here the disagreements that are for politicians to solve, we all have better things to do!
a) You say: the Catalan Statute “would have had the same consequences than a federal reform”. Therefore you clearly admit it was a backdoor Constitutional reform. Which certifies the action of the Constitutional Court ruling out some of its precepts
b) my view about the constitutionalism of the estatute is in line with that of most constitutionalist experts and most importantly with that expeessed by the Constitutiomal Court, which I should not remind you it is the ultimate authority in Contstitution issues.
c) I just say that the rate of participation and approval of the statute was much lower than that of the Spanish Constitution. More than 67% part more than 88% approval (in Cat over 90%). If with a much lower turn out and approval you think Catalans should be outraged by the ruling out of a few of its articles, how should Spaniards feel when they see that the constitution they voted (much more intensively) was being somehowreformed without their consent by a regional statute?
Just give it a think
The only reason the Spanish Constitution got 90% approval in Catalonia is that it was interpreted in a federal way, Catalans though Spanirads were indeed ashamed of the nationalism exerted during 40 years of a cruel dictatorship, and hence the default to compare with was that of absence of a very basic democracy. In any event, it is simply an intellectual absurdity to compare referendums that are 30 years apart with such radically different contexts. In fact, the Constitution attained barely 30% in the Basque Country so following your argument one could then claim that the Constitution is simply an illegitimate imposition to the Basques then. But, unfortunately for you, the only way to test your argument is to hold a referendum on the Constitution today ( I would be surprised if it attained a 30% support in Catalonia). But in all honestly, lets not play dialectic games, and allow a referendum to decide,….the last Catalan election gave an absolute majority to the parties in favor of independence with a 70% turnout, do you really need stronger evidence than that?
Politicised, means that its politically appointed not appointed by the parliament. In Spain, the division of power is quite a joke, decision of judges are filtered to the media before they take place,..you don’t see this in the developed world! Certainty not in the US and the UK. The Constitutional court in Spain is one of the most discredited institutions these days,…
As I’ve been saying for a couple of years now, Spain (INCLUDING Catalonia), Portugal, Italy, Greece and, probably France, should be kicked out of the EU. They’re, mostly heavily subsidised, agricultural economies. They spend, don’t earn and cannot administer themselves. Northern Europe doesn’t need them.
Check this : member of the Advisory Council to the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology about Secession in the European Union published in Economic Affairs, with strategies on how best to secede and stating that there is not legal basis for EU withdrawal (as some LSE academics have stated already) of Catalonia and Scotland!!
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecaf.12028/abstract