LSE UPR

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ARTICLES

ABSTRACTS

Similarities and Differences in the Argumentative Characteristics of the Official Brexit Campaigns

James E. Sanders

This paper adds to the growing empirical literature surrounding the UK's vote to leave the European Union. Specifically, a series of quantitative and qualitative textual analysis tools are implemented on a corpus consisting of the websites of Vote Leave (VL) and Britain Stronger in Europe (BSE). By breaking down argumentative text into two components, this paper attempts to characterise how the two official campaigns differ in the information they choose to convey (or "focus"), and the style by which this information is conveyed. To analyse variation in focus, a structural topic model and thematic analysis of elementary context units are conducted with the inclusion of document-level metadata. This is then compared to survey data and their potential effectiveness is considered. To study the style of information transmission, an analysis of sentiment is used to calculate sentence-level polarity scores. An unambiguous thematic divide is uncovered with BSE employing a "focussed" approach by singling out topics related to the economy, whereas VL chose a "scattershot" approach by spreading their resources across a broader range of themes. The thematic analysis uncovers little reciprocity in most major areas — a notable exception being public services, which acted as a battleground. BSE's focussed approach allowed it to target the most influential topic for the electorate, but despite this, VL's approach led to a greater targeted proportion. A sentiment analysis yields two results: (A) the variability in sentence-level polarity scores was consistent across campaigns, and (2) BSE's website had a significantly greater mean score.

A Politics of the People: Comparing the Use of Populist Discourse in the 2016 US Presidential Election

Joel Pearce

The 2016 US presidential election saw Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders both being described as "populists", despite running for different parties and coming from different political traditions. This paper empirically assesses the validity of this claim by conducting computer-assisted thematic analysis of their speeches during the presidential primaries. It explores the puzzle of populism being associated with diverse political positions by mapping out the candidates' discourse, finding that both used populist themes but in strikingly different ways. Whilst Trump presented a divide between the American people and the perceived threats of Islam and immigration, Sanders contrasted the people with economic elites. They had a different approach to the campaign, with Trump framing it as a battle between him and his opponents and Sanders as an opportunity for people to come together against the powerful. Most interestingly, their discourse on trade showed little overlap: Trump presented it in both nationalist and populist terms whereas Sanders associated it with a broader theme of lost opportunities for young Americans. Existing theories account for different aspects

of this contrast but none provide a comprehensive explanation of varieties of populism on their own.

In Place of Labour: The Increased Localisation of Electoral Geographies in Competition Between UKIP and Labour
Jack H. Glynn
The emergence of UKIP out of the doldrums and into the limelight has irrevocably transformed politics in Great Britain. The party's newfound ability to challenge the Labour Party in what were thought to be its most secure strongholds, the industrial towns of the North, has, to date, been attributed to the resurgence of the "left-behind" voter with sociological structures such as class being seen as the most influential variables to model this change in electoral behaviours. This paper will challenge this near-monolithic assessment. With the use of local election data, it will demonstrate that regressions using these structural variables produce too much variation for us to simply declare this left-behind thesis as the sole model required for our understanding. Instead it will stress the importance of electoral geography to improve these explanations showing the necessity to integrate the local contexts of each town or city in order to better explicate why some are making the switch to UKIP while others are choosing to remain loyal. Interviews with local political activists in three case studies – Manchester, Liverpool and Rotherham – were then employed in order to begin to extract these local factors. The findings of this research indicate the increased localisation of British politics, denoting a major shift in how we approach electoral geographies as well as political campaigning. We can no longer rely on certain regions, such as the North West, and their constituent towns and cities, to vote in a uniform manner. Local contexts now play a much more authoritative role meaning that each town responds to the same pressures and phenomenon, such as in this study, the rise of UKIP, in a very un-uniform manner.

From Waterloo to Wembley: A Comparison of International Football and International Warfare in Building Nationalism
Guillaume Paugam
International football has often been described as a soft way for nations to go to war. This analysis is too simplistic, but the reference to warfare is not uninteresting and provides the starting point for this dissertation. Having noticed the national fervour surrounding international football, and recognised warfare's nationalist builder power, it seeks to explore the extent to which international football and international war are comparable in building nationalism. It adopts an ethno-symbolist perspective on nations and nationalism, hence seen as modern constructions rooted in more ancient cultures and groups. It argues that international football and international war are, indeed, using the same mechanisms to build nationalism, but that this comparison might evolve with globalisation, and, especially, the associated immigration flows and diasporas. More precisely, the first part of the answer argues that within the traditional framework of the nation-state, myth building, tradition shaping, and rivalry constructions are nationalist elements shared by international war and football. The

second part is more hypothetical and seeks to explore how football can be a new nationalism vector for diasporas, linking national groups no longer sharing a unique territory. This dissertation illustrates each point with two case studies: a small set of detailed interviews with Dutch people to analyse the importance of football myths in building their nationalism, and a questionnaire, carried online and in person near Paris, with 46 members of the Portuguese community in France, to understand how the role of football in building nationalism might evolve.

Brexit, Agenda Setting and Framing of Immigration in the Media: The Case of the *Daily Mail*

Deborah Sogelola

The result of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (henceforth the Brexit referendum) was historic as it signified the beginning of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. During the referendum campaign, newspapers played a key role in disseminating information and potentially influencing what topics were deemed more important in the public eye. This paper examines the portrayal of both the economy and immigration in the press before and during the Brexit referendum. Used as a data source for this examination is the *Daily Mail*, one of the most widely distributed newspapers in the United Kingdom both in print and online. The author undertook a media content analysis on over 40 articles published by the *Daily Mail* between April 2016 and June 2016 to discern patterns in coverage. This study seeks to offer insights as to how the topic of immigration surpassed that of economics as the most salient topic during the referendum due to agenda setting and media framing by the likes of the *Daily Mail*. While this paper speculates that these measures may have affected the outcome of the referendum, further data and investigation would be required to warrant such a conclusion.

Similarities and Differences in the Argumentative Characteristics of the Official Brexit Campaigns

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1. Introduction

This paper aims to better understand the nature of dialogue surrounding the UK's vote to leave the European Union. Specifically, to uncover differences in argumentative structure between the two official campaigns[1]—Vote Leave (VL) and Britain Stronger in Europe (BSE). Designated by the Electoral Commission on the 13th April 2016, `Vote Leave Ltd' and `The In Campaign Ltd' received a range of benefits, including an increased spending limit; one free distribution of information to voters; referendum campaign broadcasts; and the use of certain public rooms (Electoral Commission 2016).

Argumentative text has two components: what information the author is trying to convey, and in what style this information is conveyed. Hence, this paper uses a series of text analysis methods to analyse variation in *focus* and *sentiment* between these two campaigns. First, to examine campaign focus, two automated tools are employed to cluster text into distinct themes or topics — a structural topic model and a thematic[2] analysis of elementary contexts. By incorporating document-level covariates (or "tags"), these clusters can be used to examine how dialogue varied between the campaigns and hence uncover information regarding their relative strategies. Using these two algorithmically distinct, yet similar approaches, helps to (1) uncover more underlying information held within the corpus by utilising each method's unique strengths; and (2) act as a robustness check. By conducting multiple automated content analyses on the same corpus and identifying structures that re-emerge, we can be more confident that outputs are a result of the data's structure rather than methodological choice (Sanders et al. 2017). Then, using surveys conducted by

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[1] Throughout this paper, the term "campaign" will refer to the official designated campaigns unless stated otherwise. Someone's "camp", on the other hand, may refer to whether that individual or organisation wanted to remain a part of or leave the European Union.

[2] While this paper refers to these methods as "thematic", elsewhere it is also referred to as keyword-in-context, or KWIC (Illia et al. 2014)

YouGov, the congruency of public opinion and campaign focus is briefly examined.

Second, this paper builds upon work which explores social media sentiments in the build up to the referendum (Lansdall-Welfare et al. 2016, Cortina Borja et al. 2016, Howard & Kollanyi 2016, Hänska & Bauchowitz 2017). By utilising the `sentimentr` package, this paper studies how sentiment[3] (or "polarity") varies between the official campaigns. Beyond a purely academic exercise, the analysis of campaign sentiment became a major talking point during and after the referendum, with particularly notable colloquialisms including both "Project Fear" – first coined by Rob Shorthouse during the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum to describe the "Better Together" campaign, the phrase was later assigned to BSE (Iain 2016) — and "remoaners" (Borrelli 2017). Fear and moaning typically embody negative sentiment, and I can test whether the campaigns' distributions of sentence-level polarity scores differ in their mean or variance given a number of assumptions.

A clear thematic divide exists between the camps. BSE employed a predominantly focussed approach by concentrating their resources on economics, jobs and small businesses. VL on the other hand undertook a scattershot approach by spreading their resources across a broader range of policy areas while maintaining a common unpinning on maximising British sovereignty. A correspondence analysis shows little reciprocity for the majority of issues — one exception being public services, which acted as a key battleground. These findings are reinforced across methodologies. By comparing these results with various survey responses, I conclude that the broader-based approach of VL mobilised a larger proportion of the electorate despite the economy being an influential issue.

An analysis of sentiment yielded two observations. First, the variability in sentence-level polarity scores was not significantly different between the two campaigns, suggesting both campaigns were equally consistent in expressing their chosen sentiment. Second, the mean sentence-level polarity score was significantly

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[3] In this context, sentiment analysis is the process by which a researcher aims to establish how positive or negative a segment of text is. For example, "this food is bad" may be interpreted as negative, "this food is great" as positive, and "this food is okay" as neutral. More context-specific dictionaries can be employed to interpret the polarity of sentences in scenarios where standard dictionaries may be inadequate – i.e. when aiming to understand financial market sentiment.

higher for BSE than VL. This result continued to hold when varying a number of parametric assumptions, and implies that the remain campaign's website content was significantly more positive than its leave counterpart.

2. Data

The dataset contains all plain text from the official campaign websites (Vote Leave Ltd 2016, The In Campaign Ltd 2016). This includes all text directly hosted on the website, as well as all third-party newspaper articles, studies, speeches, and statements that are linked directly from the official websites and are written by a figure recognised as affiliated with the given campaign. It is reasonable to assume that this information accurately captures the discourse of the official campaigns during the EU referendum, or at least mirrors their key talking points. Each webpage, whether hosted on the website or elsewhere, constitutes a single document in our analysis and hence can vary considerably in length. Every document is assigned a list of covariates ("tags") which outline some basic document-level information about the text. The most crucial covariate for testing our hypotheses is the camp to which the document belongs ("leave" or "remain"). For completeness, the role of the author ("campaign staff", "MP", "Peer", etc), the date of publication[4], and the style of the text ("newspaper article", "study", "speech", etc) were also detailed at the document-level. Due to the corpus' heterogenous nature, these additional tags have little substantive use beyond control variables.

3. Structural Topic Model (STM)

The STM was introduced by Roberts et al. (2013), and builds off traditional topic models such as the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al. 2003), and the Correlated Topic Model (CTM) (Lafferty & Blei 2006). The STM is a generative model: its algorithm defines a random data-generation process for each document, and then observed word frequencies are used to find the most likely values for the model's parameters. The STM generates a number of topics (as defined by the user) that are

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[4] For many of the archived sources, the date of publication was not publicly available and hence this covariate was designated as NA. Due to a high proportion of documents being labelled this way, a time series analysis would likely have been fruitless.

conceived as joint probability functions over documents and words. Similarly, to other topic models such as the LDA, a single topic is defined as a mixture of words where each word has a probability of belonging to a given topic. A document is itself a mixture over topics, meaning that a single document can be composed of multiple different topics depending on its constituent words.

The STM differentiates itself by allowing the researcher to incorporate document-level meta-data (Roberts et al. 2015). Each document is assigned a list of covariates (as defined in Section 2), allowing the user to study relationships between these covariates and topics. Specifically, topical content refers to the rate of word use within a given topic, while topical prevalence refers the proportion of a document devoted to a given topic. Topical content is used for identifying the hidden semantic structures within the documents, while topical prevalences are used for analysing the relationships between topics and meta-data. We will use both of these approaches to further our understanding of campaign dialogue.

3.1   Model Selection

The STM is an unsupervised method that requires the researcher to designate the number of topics (or "K" value) used in the estimation. The STM package for R (Roberts et al. 2017) provides a number of useful metrics for choosing the most suitable value of K. The first is the "held-out likelihood estimation" (Wallach et al. 2009), which is the estimated probability of words appearing in a document after those words have been intentionally removed during the estimation step. The idea of this method is to find the number of topics which produces a model that can better explain the left-out set of words. The second is known as "semantic coherence". Developed by Mimno et al. (2011), it is maximised when the most probable words in a given topic frequently co-occur with one another in the text, and correlates well with the human judgment of topic quality. The final method of analysing topic quality is the exclusivity of words to topics, measured using the FREX metric (Roberts et al. 2016). There is no best number of topics to designate in an estimation, and these three metrics should only advise the researcher on a series of K values to study in more depth.

Appendix A shows the value of these three measures over a broad number of K values ranging from 5 to 100. Using these results, one can pinpoint a smaller number of

K values to analyse in more depth (designated as the grey area in Appendix A). *Figure 1* shows the held-out likelihood, semantic coherence, and exclusivity of estimations with integer K values between 10 and 25. Based on these statistics, I ran an estimation using 14, 15 and 21 topics and inspected the outputs. In the end, 14 and 15 topic estimations formed topics that were too general and lacked clearly defined substantive meaning. I will proceed with 21 topics.

Figure 1: Metrics measuring topic quality for *K* = 10, 11, …, 25

3.2 Topic Content

Once the estimation has converged, the researcher is provided with multiple sets of characteristic words for each topic, including: (1) highest probability; and (2) FREX words weighted by their overall frequency and how exclusive they are to the topic. As with all unsupervised clustering methods, it is now the responsibility of the researcher to assign meaning to these lists. I have assigned a short label to each topic which summarises the underlying semantic structure likely being uncovered by the STM. *Table 1* lists these labels alongside the top five most probable words for each topic.

There are three points to note. Firstly, some labels and most probable words in *Table 1* may not appear to correspond to one another. In that case, it is important to realise this is a small sample from one set of characteristic words. A more complete list of words for each topic is given in Appendix B. Secondly, the topic labelled "Climate Change and IOs*" contains an asterisk because its meaning is unclear. The most probable words include "world, leave, nato, european", whereas the most frequent words include "nato, gas, energi, electr". The topic was very general, but appeared to be picking up the ideas of international cooperation and climate change. Finally, the topic "(Discussion)" was formed from a series of words relating to the nature of the discourse — it was not a substantive topic but rather is formed as a result of the source data being argumentative and emotional.

Table 1: Topic Labels for 21 topic STM

Topic	Label	Top 5 most probable words
1	European Courts	european countri court control govern
2	EU Legal Framework	european deal court chang govern
3	Economic Consequences	trade famili job busi mean
4	UK Politics	gove vote say law britain
5	Farming and Agriculture	farmer must make fine farm
6	European Reform	countri vote make fundament reform
7	Sovereignty	control can nhs vote take
8	SMEs and Trade	busi market small trade singl
9	Trade Relations	europ britain leav agreement market
10	EMU and Workers' Rights	union european right countri want
11	NHS	leav vote nhs billion money
12	Defence and Turkey	european union defenc govern control
13	Climate Change and IOs*	world leav nato european can
14	(Discussion)	peopl thing think can britain
15	Terrorism and Warrants	european leav arrest britain economi
16	School Places	vote school leav place countri
17	European Values	countri european now chang peopl
18	IDS and Leave	said border leav duncan european
19	EU Customs Union	rule cost busi singl market
20	Immigration	immigr peopl control vote migrat
21	Trade Negotiations	trade agreement deal free negoti

3.3   Topic Prevalence

Having assigned meaning to the topic content, I can study the relationship between covariates and topics by isolating the differences in topic prevalence across the "leave" and "remain" tags. The STM allows the researcher to estimate the conditional probability of observing a particular topic in the text given some covariate being present. *Figure 2* shows the difference in the conditional probability of observing a

given topic in the text across the camp dimension. Topics with a significantly negative (at the 10% level) difference are those more likely to occur in documents tagged with the "remain" covariate, and vice versa.

Figure 2 illustrates stark differences in topic prevalence. BSE focussed disproportionately on economics and business orientated arguments, demonstrated through their focus on the topics: "Economic Consequences", "SMEs and Trade", and "Trade Relations". They also focussed on arguments surrounding "Terrorism and Warrants" more than their counterpart.

Figure 2: Difference estimation across camp

On the other hand, Vote Leave focussed on a more diverse set of arguments, incorporating: "European Courts", "Sovereignty", "Defence and Turkey", and "Immigration". These topics seem unrelated in nature, however all but "Defence and Turkey" fall under the umbrella of judicial and legislative sovereignty. The remaining

topic likely addresses the fear of Turkey's ascension to the EU and subsequent repercussions to the UK's security and immigration.

These results do not consider the overall proportions of the corpus associated with each topic. Rather the difference in the prevalence of those topics between documents tagged with the "leave" and "remain" covariates. This means that topics like the NHS, that despite there being no statistically significant difference across camp, may still have been a highly discussed topic.

4. T-Lab

T-LAB is a proprietary text analysis application (Lancia 2017). It provides the researcher with a number of options to modify the analysis to better fit the research question. This paper will utilise the software to cluster documents using a thematic analysis of elementary context units (ECUs), and use these "themes" to spatially analyse the relationship between ideas and tagged covariates in a correspondence analysis. These results will build upon, and provide a robustness check to, the STM findings.

4.1 Thematic Analysis of ECUs

T-LAB takes your input documents, and divides these into a number of short sentences or paragraphs known as elementary context units (ECUs). Each ECU has the same series of tagged covariates as the parent document, and are clustered in the thematic analysis of ECUs. As with the STM, we will be conducting an unsupervised (or "bottom up" approach).

T-LAB creates a matrix of ECUs and lexical units (words from the dictionary that reach a given frequency threshold) with presence/absence values. This matrix is normalised by using TF-IDF and taking the Euclidean norm of the row vectors. This allows for the clustering of context units using a not centred version of Principle Direction Divisive Partitioning (PDDP) (Boley 1998) to select the seeds for each K-means bisection. A contingency table of lexical units by clusters is formed, and a chi-squared test is applied to all the intersections[5].

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[5] For more methodological information, see Lancia (2012).

To understand the meaning of these clusters (or "themes") the researcher is provided with the most characteristic words and context units ranked by their chi-squared value. The resulting class labels are presented in *Table 2* along with the top five most characteristic lexical units for each topic.

Table 2: T-Lab class labels

| Class	Label	Characteristic Lexical Units
1	Single Market Access and SMEs	market business single small rules
2	Immigration and Border Controls	immigration take back control zone border
3	UK Politics and Critiques of Incumbent	prime think type interview minister look
4	Negotiations, geopolitics, and EU Expansion	accession negotiation united resolve Turkish
5	Defence and NATO	defence civil common nato servant
6	Real Economy	job family camp remain role strongerin low expert
7	Pressure on Public Services	nhs population spend school number
8	EMU and Fiscal Integration	union political eurozone monetary reform
9	Intelligence, Anti-Terrorism, and Human Rights	criminal intelligence influence arrest charter
10	Power of European Courts	court law justice european bind

4.2 Correspondence Analysis

Once the thematic analysis of ECUs has produced a set of stable classes, T-LAB then conducts a correspondence analysis (CA) of the contingency table of lexical units by clusters. A CA provides a means of displaying or summarising a set of data in graphical form, a categorical alternative to principal component. In the context of T-LAB, the CA estimates a spatial relationship between clusters and covariates. As a variant of factorial analysis, it extracts a lower number of unobserved variables called factors with the property of summarising significant information. Each factor can be interpreted as a spatial dimension that is represented by an axis, so that tagged covariates on opposite factorial poles are the most weakly associated. As such, the positions of variables are contingent upon their associations rather than coordinates, with the distance reflecting the degree of co-occurrence. The first factorial dimension (x-axis graphically) aims to account for the maximum variation, and the second factorial dimension (y-axis graphically) aims to account for the maximum of remaining variation, and so on.

Hence, the total variation is divided into components along principal axes. In general, the dimensionality of the system is one less than the number of identified classes in the profile (Greenacre 1993). The CA is a framework for the researcher to formulate their own interpretation, rather than providing concrete significance.

T-LAB provides two ways to visualise the spatial relationships between classes in a correspondence analysis, a simple two-dimensional graph or a three-dimensional alternative. Evidently, the latter can account for a higher degree of variation due to the inclusion of an extra factorial axis, but in return one loses the ease of interpretation present in a two-dimensional graph. Schonhardt-Bailey (2010) explores this trade off in more detail with reference to the alternative proprietary text-analysis software "Alceste" (Reinert 1998). The added complexity of the three-dimensional graph is only necessary when it conveys additional information that cannot be inferred from its two-dimensional alternative. In our instance, the extra factor provides little additional understanding, and hence I will focus on the two-dimensional graph from *Figure 3*. *Figure 3* reinforces our findings from Section 3.3. The covariate "CAMP REMAIN" is strongly associated with themes of business and economy, whereas "CAMP LEAVE" is closely associated with a larger number of themes including defence, immigration and European expansion. This process of showing robustness through holding the data constant whilst varying the clustering methodology has allowed me to be more confident the output is a result of the underlying structures of dialogue, rather than purely methodological choice. This idea is explored fully by Sanders et al. (2017).

Figure 3: 2-Dimensional Correspondence Analysis Graph

The other interesting insight the CA provides is the position of the "Pressure on Public Services" cluster in relation to both camp tags. We find it positioned almost equidistant from both tags, suggesting that both campaigns focussed a roughly equal proportion of their available resources on this theme. However, the way both campaigns tackled this issue is likely different. By analysing the most characteristic ECU in theme 7 tagged with "CAMP LEAVE", and the most characteristic ECU tagged with "CAMP REMAIN", we can better understand the arguments put forward. These are displayed below respectively, all tags associated with each context unit are displayed at the top, and any characteristic lexical units are in bold.

> ****** *IDnumber 24 *ROLE‑MP *TYPE‑ SPEECH *CAMP LEAVE**
> demographics meant that the **average household size** fell In recent **times** however **average household size** has changed little and the key factor driving the growth in **household numbers** has been **population** growth The total nonBritish net inflow of immigrants is close to 350000 with **migration** from the EU now accounting for about half of that figure The outcome of the recent renegotiation of benefits will

> ****** *IDnumber 44 *ROLE STRONGERIN *TYPE WEBSITE *CAMP REMAIN**
> **money** for public services including the **NHS** and better **schooling** and healthcare for
> your family Leaving the EU would damage our economy and would force government
> **spending** cuts of 40 billion meaning less **money** for the NHS Source The Institute
> for Fiscal Studies and longer waiting **times** for operations GP appointments and AE
> treatment NHS England chief Simon Stevens says Brexit would be very

These characteristic ECUs demonstrate that despite equal proportions of resources being dedicated to theme 7 by both camps, the dialogue within the class is diverse. VL focussed on the impact of increased immigration from the European Union on the demand for public services, whereas BSE looked at how the economic costs could impact the Treasury's ability to continue funding public services. There are two things to note: (1) the way in which public services are being discussed is related to the central themes of both campaigns, economics versus sovereignty and immigration; and (2) it demonstrates that for the majority of themes, even for those that appear equally associated with both camps, campaign dialogue was not reciprocal and each group focussed on their specific areas of interest.

Both the STM and CA show that campaign dialogue was very polarised. BSE focussed predominantly on issues of economics and business, whereas VL spread their argument across a broader set of policies. The campaigns exhibited little to no reciprocity, that is, they did not address arguments outside of their main focus. Even with those topics which appear equally associated with both camps, a deeper analysis of characteristic context units reveals a continuation of the economics versus sovereignty divide. The use of two similar, yet independent, methods shows the robustness of these results.

5. YouGov Survey Analysis

In the months leading up to the referendum, YouGov surveyed the British public on their preferences regarding a range of referendum-related subjects. These subjects included their opinions of British politicians, their voting intentions in the upcoming referendum, and the perceived consequences of leaving the EU. The same questions were surveyed roughly fortnightly from February until 22nd June (the day before

polling). By using the topics identified in Section 3 and 4, I can use survey responses as a signal for the potential effectiveness of each camp's approach. Campaigning decisions should be dependent upon the structure of public opinion, and hence a severe mismatch of the two may indicate an ineffective campaign.

Repeated throughout a large number of YouGov surveys was the following question: "Which ONE of the following will be most important to you in deciding how to vote in the referendum?". The respondents could choose answers from four areas: "which is likely to strike a better balance between Britain's right to act independently, and the appropriate level of co-operation with other countries"; "which is likely to be better for jobs, investment and the economy generally"; "which is likely to help us deal better with the issue of immigration"; and "which is likely to maximise Britain's influence in the world". From this point on, I will refer to these as sovereignty, economy, immigration and influence respectively. Respondents could also answer "something else" or "none of these"[6].

Figure 4: Survey responses on what is the most important issue when deciding how you vote in the referendum

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
[6] The difference between "something else" and "none of these" is unclear, they appear to imply the same thing. This contradiction is slightly baffling, and hence I ignore these options from here onward.

Figure 4 shows the percentages of respondents who chose each option in all surveys where the question was present. As demonstrated, responses stayed roughly consistent throughout the time period. The UK's economy and its sovereignty were the electorate's most poignant issues, with median percentages at 30% and 31% respectively. These two issues formed the backbone of BSE's and VL's websites and hence would lead to approximately equal numbers of targeted voters[7]. At around 18%, immigration was also an important topic for many voters. Analysis from Sections 3 and 4 revealed that immigration was more strongly associated with VL. As a result, VL may have been able to spread their reach to a larger proportion of the electorate than BSE. The statistics quoted in this section should be considered as descriptive, a causal explanation would require knowledge of the relative effectiveness of the two campaigns.

In sum, although BSE's focussed approach honed in on one of the most poignant issue for the electorate, VL's scattershot approach was able to draw on a much broader base whose aggregated proportion exceeded that of BSE.

6. Sentiment Analysis

The second characteristic of argumentative text is the way chosen information is conveyed to its audience. This can be done through webpage design, sentence structure, and other literary techniques. One of such method is the use of sentiment. Extensive research suggests the way an argument is phrased can significantly affect its persuasiveness – particularly the effect of negative (loss-based) arguments versus equivalent positive (gain-based arguments) arguments (Smith & Petty 1996, Kahneman & Tversky 1979). An analysis of sentiment is necessary to further our understanding of similarities and differences in the argumentative structure of the official campaigns.

I conduct an analysis of sentiment using the R package `sentimentr`[8] (Rinker 2017), which follows a dictionary-based approach to tag polarised words. `sentimentr`

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[7] Here I assume that in dedicating disproportionate resources on a given topic, the campaign is aiming to capture voters whose voting intentions are most sensitive to that topic.

[8] Popular alternatives to the sentimentr package include syuzhet, RSentiment and Stanford. sentimentr was selected as (1) it can utilise dictionaries from alternative packages; and (2) Kawate & Patil (2017) highlights the package's balance of accuracy and speed.

attempts to take into account valence shifters (negators, amplifiers, de-amplifiers, and adversative conjunctions) while still maintaining speed. Each article is broken down into its element sentences, treated as an ordered bag of words with all punctuation removed (except for commas, colons and semicolons which are treated as words). The words in each sentence are compared to a dictionary (this analysis uses the default dictionary from the `syuzhet` package, see Jockers (2017)) that tags positive or negative words with a +1 or -1 respectively. The polarised words form a "polar cluster" which is a subset of the sentence for added context — defaulting as two words before and after a polarised word. Words in the polarised context cluster are tagged as neutral, negator, amplifier, or de-amplifier depending on their grammatical relationship to the polarised word.

The polarity score of the polarised word (i.e. +1 or -1) is acted upon by valence shifters. Identified amplifiers increase the polarity, but may become de-amplifiers if the context cluster contains an odd number of negations. Importantly, some words can act as both a [de]amplifier and a negation. Last, each sentence's weighted context clusters are summed and divided by the square root of the word count yielding an un-bounded polarity score for each sentence. For more information on calculating polarity scores, see Rinker (2017). This process is conducted on all BSE and VL documents, arriving at two vectors of sentence-level polarity scores.

The kernel density estimation for the distribution of polarity scores for each website is displayed in *Figure 5*. Both follow a similar unimodal distribution centred around 0 (indicating neutral sentiment), with a small skew toward positive sentiment. The mean polarity score is 0.04914 for VL and 0.10754 for BSE.

Figure 4: Kernel Density of polarity scores

N = 2333   Bandwidth = 0.03987

Using the list of sentiment scores for each camp, I will proceed in conducting three tests. First will be a test for the homogeneity of variance using a simple Levene's test, followed by a generalised linear model with a normally distributed error testing for the homogeneity of mean polarity score across BSE and VL's websites. For completeness, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test will be conducted to provide a test for the homogeneity of median polarity score without any assumption of the underlying distribution.

To test the variability of the two samples of sentence-level polarity scores, I employed a Levene's test of homogeneity of variance. I find there to be no statistically significant difference in variance across the two campaigns (F = .21, P = .6457). This result (1) implies that the variability in sentence polarity by both campaigns were approximately equal, and (2) can justify assuming the homogeneity of variance in the following tests.

Next I use a generalised linear model (GLM) to test for differences in mean polarity score. The GLM allows a linear model to be related to the dependant variable through a link function and magnitude of the variance of each measurement to be a function of its predicted value (Nelder & Baker 1972). Using campaign affiliation as a dummy variable (V L = 0, BSE = 1), there is a statistically significant increase in

polarity score from VL to BSE (t = 4.359, P = 1.351 × 10−5 * * *)[9]. This shows that BSE's argumentative content tended to be more positive than its leave counterpart.

For completion, the Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal & Wallis 1952) is the less powerful non-parametric rank-based alternative to the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). This means that unlike the GLM, the Kruskal-Wallis test does not assume that errors are normally distributed. Once again we find a statistically significant difference in the two distributions (T = 15.76, P = 7.209 × 1005 * * *) — reinforcing our findings from the GLM.

Our analysis of sentence-level polarity scores finds that (1) the variability of sentiment is equal between BSE and VL; and (2) BSE achieved significantly higher polarity scores, implying a more positive argumentative style.

7. Concluding Remarks

This paper has uncovered a number of marked differences between the two official Brexit campaigns' argumentative styles, both in the information they chose to convey, and the style in which that is conveyed. BSE's focussed approach attempted to capture voters on the most poignant issue for the electorate — the economy. Despite this, by employing a scattershot approach VL managed to target a larger subset of the total electorate – providing an avenue by which a competent campaign could put itself at an advantage. Beyond this, neither campaign appeared to address the core policies of the opposing camp, and hence a correspondence analysis uncovered little reciprocity. There was a notable exception, but by delving deeper into public services I uncovered the continuation of broader trends. Finally, while the variability of sentiment stayed constant across camp, BSE's website had a significantly greater mean sentence-level polarity score.

When interpreting these results, it is important to consider that my analysis only took place in the context of the official campaign websites. It is by no means necessarily representative of broader Brexit campaign dialogue, which could vary in a number of ways. First, stylised live debates, radio and television may differ significantly in their sentiment from website text, this could impact both the range and

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[9] P < .05 *, P < .01 * *, P < .005 * * *

magnitude of polarity scores. Second, a number of other campaign mediums (i.e. question and answer sessions, and social media) include a degree of electorate-campaigner interaction. This would undoubtedly influence the topics emphasised in these texts, potentially emphasising those issues more important to the electorate. A larger-scale analysis of campaigning materials would be able to uncover many of these alternative trends.

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A Politics of the People: Comparing the Use of Populist Discourse in the 2016 US Presidential Election

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1. Introduction

When Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders were called the "yin and yang of America's present discontent" in Politico during the 2016 US primaries (Hirsh 2016), the phrase captured a zeitgeist amongst political commentators. They were widely described as "populists" and painted as the US expression of a wave of anti-establishment feeling spreading the West (Cassidy 2016; Lind 2016; Norris 2016). In a country supposedly more polarised than ever, two candidates running for the nominations of each of America's major parties were here granted the same epithet. This was fuelled by a belief that they talked in a similar way, about similar policy positions, to target a similar demographic.

The potential puzzle of applying this label to such different politicians is tempered by the history of populism in the US. It has been a recurrent theme in the country's politics, stretching back to the demands of the US Populist Party at the end of the 19th Century. Since then, there have been diverse accounts of populism, including Southern segregationist George Wallace's in the 1960s, the New Left movement of the same era, and deficit hawk Ross Perot's insurgency in the early 1990s (Kazin 1998). Populism therefore has a distinctive place in US politics, with its ideas permeating both left and right. Trump and Sanders provide a timely insight into how these traditions are expressed in contemporary politics.

However, it is important to treat populism in a precise way. In recent decades it has been the subject of a vast range of academic work, much of it centred on the apparent surge of left wing populism in Latin America and far right populism in Europe (eg. Hawkins 2009; Mudde 2004; Taggart 1995). This has been accompanied by what can be described as an 'empirical turn' in populist studies, with a growth in the use of textual analysis to measure the concept in practice (Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). The rigour of the discipline reflects the importance of using empirical evidence to support claims about the ideas that are being

communicated in politics. Bearing this in mind, this project seeks to apply such rigorous empirical analysis to the discourse of both candidates in order to examine widespread claims.

In doing so, it can contribute to the wider question of why populism has such different expressions. This has prompted one of the biggest theoretical disagreements in the study of populism: whether it is best understood as a thin-centred ideology (Mudde 2004) or a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015). Much of the empirical research has failed to fully engage with this debate and the different forms populism can take. Scholars measure populist discourse to examine how far politicians are communicating a set of ideas (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, p.323). But once it is accepted that there are different varieties of populism then measuring it as a unified phenomenon overlooks the divergence in these ideas. There is therefore a need to reconcile the theoretical literature that highlights difference in populism and empirical research that largely focuses on its overarching themes. In response to this, this project employs computer-assisted thematic analysis. By looking at words in context rather than measuring them in isolation, this provides an alternative approach to previous studies of populist discourse. It allows for a comparison of the specific political issues and policy areas that are presented in populist terms, providing an insight into how forms of populism differ.

This project therefore has a dual purpose: (1) to compare the use of populist language by Trump and Sanders through empirically mapping out their discourse; and (2) to use this to engage with the debate about different varieties of populism. The findings give evidence that both candidates used populist discourse but in very different ways. Overall, their language had little overlap and there was a sharp division between their themes. Trump used populist frames in his discussion of immigration whilst Sanders used them in relation to economic inequality and campaign finance reform. When discussing the election process, Sanders made appeals to the American people to unite against elites whereas Trump presented the campaign as a battle between him and his opponents. Most notably, they did not discuss trade in the same terms: the largest share of Trump's discourse (31%) presented the issue in essentially nationalistic rather than populist terms. Whilst Trump gave a separate populist critique of trade deals, Sanders instead discussed it in terms of a broader theme of lost job

opportunities. Altogether, the candidates' use of populist discourse is found to reflect a nuanced combination of differences in ideology, individual style, and the political context.

The next section examines the existing literature on populism, with a focus on explanations of different forms of populism. Section three then explains the data used and gives an overview of the methodology of computer-assisted thematic analysis. Section four presents the results of the analysis, initially looking at an overall comparison of Trump and Sanders before examining each candidate in isolation. Following this, section five assesses this in relation to the literature on populism and discusses the limits of existing theoretical approaches, whilst six concludes with an acknowledgement of the limitations of this study and proposals for further research.

2. Theory

2.1 Conceptualising Populism

Populism is an extensively studied concept in political science and in recent years has been the subject of a wide range of empirical studies (eg. Hawkins 2009; Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011; Taggart 1995) and theoretical work (eg. Aslanidis 2015; Halikiopoulou et al. 2013; Laclau 2005a; Mudde 2010; Müller 2016). This has led to a considerable amount of conceptual clarity, with broad agreement on its constitutive elements. Populism involves presenting 'the people' as a homogenous group in an antagonistic relationship with a similarly homogenous elite. This is a 'Manichaean divide' – an unambiguous conflict between good and evil – in which the people are virtuous and the elite are corrupt. Given a belief that the people should be sovereign, there is a need to wrest power from the elite and return it to the masses (Aslanidis 2015, p.99; Mudde 2004, pp.543–4).

These core elements produce a number of secondary phenomena, which are often associated with populism but should not be seen as distinct components of it. Scholars point to the role of crises in generating populism (Mudde 2004, p.547; Panizza 2005, p.9). Such events are important for fuelling populism as they provide a focal point illustrating the problematic power of elites and how this works against the interests of the people. In this sense, crises are simply a manifestation of the other elements. Similarly, populism is often discussed in relation to its scepticism of, or even

disregard for, liberal political institutions (Canovan 1999; Hawkins 2009). Though it can be argued that the logical conclusion of anti-pluralism is a rejection of liberal democracy, it is not dismissed out of hand. Liberal institutions are criticised insofar as they are seen to inhibit the unrestricted power of the people (Hawkins 2009, p.1044). Crises and a rejection of liberal institutions are not distinct elements of populism in themselves.

2.2 Explaining Difference

Much of the literature focuses on the very broad range of expressions of these combined elements (Canovan 1981; Kazin 1998). Populism has been used to describe a number of movements in different contexts: the agrarian interests of the 19th Century US Populist Party; the rise of socialist leaders in Latin America at the turn of the millennium; and the anti-immigrant right of contemporary Europe. Reflecting this, one author presents a typology of no fewer than 24 types of populism, united in their core outlook but divided by their political, historical, and geographic context (Wiles 1969, p.166). But this fails to go to the heart of the question of whether a concept so diverse can have analytical utility: does identifying someone as a populist say anything meaningful about the ideas that they are communicating?

Scholars have responded to the problem of populist diversity in different ways. A key theoretical divide has emerged between those who understand populism as a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015) and others who argue it is a 'thin-centred ideology' (Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008). Building on Freeden's (1998) approach to ideology, Mudde argues that populism is thin-centred in the sense of offering an interpretation of the world, but not one that is comprehensive enough to provide answers to all political questions (2004, p.544). The diversity of populism reflects the need to 'cohabit' with other ideologies to provide these answers. In contrast, Aslanidis argues that populism is better seen as a discursive frame: a collection of linguistic tools rather than a set of ideas in itself (2015, pp.98–100). This follows Laclau's theory of populist discourse, in which diversity is explained by the fact that any political demands can be articulated in populist terms (Laclau 2005b, p.44).

Much of this debate takes place at the theoretical level. However, these approaches to why populists differ in theory generate distinct expectations about how

they will differ in practice. All are rooted in the idea that populists can have radically different conceptions of the core elements of the people, the elite, and the divide between the two. The thin-centred ideology school suggests that leaders will communicate in different ways reflecting their primary ideological differences. For example, a Marxist populist may attack the capitalist economic elite whilst a right-wing reactionary populist focuses on the liberal social elite. The latter is developed in theories of right-wing populism, which have identified a distinct tradition that has emerged as a backlash against liberal reforms. Right-wing populists are also said to employ "conspiracism", presenting the idea of a vast insidious plot by minorities against the unified people (Berlet & Lyons 2000, p.5).

By separating language from ideology, the discursive frame theory underpins approaches that highlight the strategic uses of populism. Scholars argue that populism is a pragmatic tool to attract supporters and win political power (Weyland et al. 2013, p.20). In terms of explaining difference, this suggests that forms of populism will not reflect ideology but political expediency. This is relevant to the debate about the presence of populism in the political mainstream. Some argue that populism is fundamentally incompatible with mainstream politics due to its radicalism and rejection of the establishment (Hawkins 2009, p.1058). However, others have found populist language to be used by politicians such as Tony Blair (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011, p.1274) and George Bush (Panizza 2005, p.7). If populism is indeed a political tool with no underlying ideology then it follows that any actor can exploit it. This generates the expectation that actors will use populist discourse differently in accordance with their strategic needs.

Both of these contrast with those emphasising the similarity between populists in the same national context. Canovan's theory of the 'shadow of democracy' argues that populism develops in political contexts where democracy has failed to live up to its promise of bringing people together to achieve their collective aspirations (Canovan 1999, p.4). By regarding populism as a reaction to established power structures, this proposes that expressions of it may vary extensively across time and place but minimally within the same context.

Finally, there are additional theories about differences in populism resulting from individual attributes. These focus on political style over policy substance. A

regular theme in studies of populism is the importance of charismatic leaders (Canovan 1981; Panizza 2005). Panizza (2005, p.18) argues that populist leaders are often the embodiment of the ideas they represent – they cultivate a direct relationship with the people in order to take on the elite by presenting themselves as "an ordinary person with extraordinary attributes" (Panizza 2005, p.21). However, it is widely accepted that this is not a universal theme and populist groups can mobilise without them (Mudde 2004, p.545; Pauwels 2011, p.99). Consequently, this suggests that populist discourse will differ between actors in the extent that they focus on themselves as individuals. This is a factor independent of ideology, strategy or political context, and instead reflects individual style.

2.3 Measuring Populist Discourse

Recent decades have seen a something of an 'empirical turn' in studies of populism. This has been accompanied by debates about how best to operationalise the concepts at the heart of it. Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011, p.1276) highlight the challenge of constructing valid measures. This is because terms expressing populist sentiment are highly ambiguous – it is not clear if words such as "we" and "they" are referring to a homogenous people or elite (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011, p.1280). There is also the question of the intensity of populist themes. Whilst there is a division over whether populism is a dichotomous or continuous concept (Aslanidis 2015, p.93), both require a measure of intensity. In the former this is to assess whether someone has crossed the boundary and in the latter to judge their place on the scale. The focus on comparison of populist discourse means that this paper adopts a continuous approach: leaders can use more or less populist language.

Another disagreement relates to the use of computer-based techniques. Given the ambiguity of words associated with populism, it can only be established by analysing them in context. It is therefore argued that populism cannot be captured by automated analysis (Hawkins 2009, p.1048). Rooduijn and Pauwels resolve this by using a mixed method in their analysis of party manifestos in Western Europe, cross-referencing human coding with computer-based topic modelling (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). However, these critiques of computer-based techniques are not entirely convincing. First, ambiguity is a universal problem with measuring populism and any

method, including human coding, struggles with the problem of misinterpretation. Second, the issue of ignoring context is specific to topic modelling, a form of textual analysis where text is classified based on the proportion of words from a certain vocabulary. This does not apply to thematic quantitative content analysis, which looks at words in context and allows for human interpretation. It is the latter method that this project adopts.

Whilst a number of studies have already used automated techniques (eg. Armony & Armony 2005; Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Pauwels 2011), many of these have failed to engage with the question of varieties of populism and simply focused on assessing its overall presence. Pauwels has shed some light on this with his analysis of party manifestos in Belgium, which found a distinction between neoliberal populism and radical right populism in the ideas that they express (Pauwels 2011). Although this provided evidence for the thin-centred ideology theory, it only examined the difference in language in terms of broad outlook. Looking beyond studies of communication, others have compared how different kinds of populist parties act in legislatures (Otjes & Louwerse 2015; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014). However, there remains a lack of empirical work comparing how populist discourse is used in relation to specific political issues and policy areas.

2.4   US Context

It is suggested that institutions and traditions make the US particularly susceptible to appeals to the masses. The primaries system is said to leave party elites unable to mediate between populist leaders and committed supporters (Pildes 2016). A tradition of populism is at the heart of Hofstadter's (1965) seminal theory of the 'paranoid style': the prevalence of a dual belief in the greatness of Americans and the risk of their persecution. Others highlight the recurrent theme of producerism, a discourse championing the so-called productive elements of society at the expense of economic elites (Berlet & Lyons 2000, p.8). Therefore, whilst recent work on populism has focused elsewhere, there is a long and winding history of populism in the US.

Scholars identify divergent strands of this on left and right, with the former focused on demands for greater participation and attacks on corporate power (Mudde 2004, p.1179) and the latter on fighting liberal reforms with theories about minority

conspiracies (Berlet & Lyons 2000, p.5). But whilst this provides a wealth of traditions that Trump and Sanders could have drawn on, the question of whether they did so is yet to be sufficiently examined. Existing analyses of populist communication in the 2016 election have come to different conclusions. Kazin argues that both Trump and Sanders showed evidence of the influence of populism in their discourse but failed to present a clear conception of "the people" (2016, pp.4–5). He even suggests that homogenising the people may be impossible with the need to communicate to modern political coalitions (Kazin 2016, p.5). Others have found Trump to express elements of the 'paranoid style' (Pruessen 2016) and appeal to the people in anti-establishment terms (Serazio 2016). Whilst the latter comes closest to a systematic textual analysis of discourse, all of these studies rely solely on human interpretation and only examine a small selection of the candidates' speeches.

Quantitative textual analysis has been used to examine the discursive themes of a number of recent US presidential candidates: the foreign policy of Bush and Kerry (Schonhardt-Bailey 2005); the optimism of Obama (Coe & Reitzes 2010); and the role of gender in Hillary Clinton's communication (Bligh et al. 2010). The lack of empirical research into the 2016 election therefore stands in stark contrast to this. Whilst partly reflecting the fact that the election only took place a few months prior to the time of writing this paper (April 2017), it highlights a gap in the existing literature. Given the contradictory conclusions of existing studies, an empirical analysis of Trump and Sanders' discourse can give more weight to judgements about their populism. In the process, comparing two supposed populists in the same context will foster a greater understanding of the concept.

3. Methodology

3.1 Computer-Assisted Thematic Analysis

This project employs Alceste, a piece of computer-assisted content analysis software. Starting from the assumption that words acquire meaning based on their context, Alceste analyses the co-occurrences of words. It uses these to form classes of words that are commonly associated with one another and rarely with the rest of the text (Illia et al. 2014, p.353). These classes can be said to have maximal internal similarity and maximal external difference. Alceste has the advantage of being highly reliable given

that the software acts blind, providing an objective mapping of the language free of the risks of human coder bias. Only after this does the researcher provide their interpretation of the output, bringing their knowledge of the subject to give the analysis meaning. Alceste can process a large amount of text quickly (Illia et al. 2014, p.356), allowing for an analysis of the entirety of the archive of speeches rather than a sample of them.

This method of thematic analysis offers specific advantages in the study of populist discourse. Scholars using topic analysis have been able to provide an overall judgement about the use of populism by assessing the frequency of words associated with the concept. However, Alceste's technique breaks the text down and thus facilitates an examination of the specific issues and policy areas that are presented in populist terms. It therefore provides a method for a close comparison of the use of discourse by the two candidates. As discussed, no method is able to fully overcome the problem of ambiguity in populist discourse and Alceste is no different. Despite this, looking at words in context overcomes the traditional problems of establishing meaning in automated analysis. As an illustration, finding repeated references to both the "people" and "elite" in combination would provide a stronger indication of populist framing that just an overall assessment of the number of references to each term. The role of the researcher in interpreting the output gives the opportunity to highlight and discuss any ambiguity in the use of words.

3.2   Data Selection and Modification

The corpus is comprised of transcripts of the candidates' speeches published in the Federal News Service (FNS) archive[1]. This is the most comprehensive source of transcripts of campaign speeches available, including all of the speeches shown in full on major news channels. Ideally an analysis would include every speech delivered by each candidate but these records are not available. However, given that the corpuses include all speeches given significant broadcast media coverage, it reflects those that had a wide reach amongst the public. Whilst not giving a complete picture of the

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[1] I am very grateful to Professor John Woolley at UCSB for directing me towards this data.

candidates' discourse, this gives a good indication of their discourse as seen by the vast majority of the electorate.

The combined corpus includes every speech in the archive delivered by each candidate between the announcement of their candidacy and their party convention. This is 36 by Trump between 16th June 2015 and 17th July 2016 and 24 by Sanders between 26th May 2015 and 24th July 2016 (a full list of these is given in Appendix 1). By including all available speeches made by both candidates over the same time period, this allows for a comparison of their discourse in the same context. It is worth noting that the primaries for each party took a different path. Trump was declared the presumptive nominee following the Indiana primaries at the beginning of May (Nussbaum 2016), whilst Sanders did not concede to Hillary Clinton until June (Sanders 2016). Nevertheless, this project examines the formal time period of the primaries. There is an argument that the de facto end of the primaries came before this. However, using an earlier cut-off date would require a contentious definition of this end, given that Trump was the only competitive candidate before he was declared the presumptive nominee. Furthermore, scholars argue that candidates 'pivot' to the general election campaign at the convention (Holbrook 1996, p.70), so it makes sense to use this as a focal point for determining different stages of the campaign.

The texts are direct transcripts of recordings of the speeches delivered by the candidates and the responses from crowds. Consequently, the corpus had to be modified to remove references to the crowd, such as applause or audience hecklers. A number of other modifications were made to facilitate the Alceste analysis: all words were made lowercase, uses of the dollar sign were replaced with "USD" (US dollars), and apostrophes were replaced with underscores. Alceste recognises words individually and without preconditions. Phrases were therefore altered to ensure accurate analysis (eg. "supreme_court" replaced "supreme court") and multiple references to the same person or place were standardised. See Appendix 2 for details of these modifications.

Contextual tags known as "passive variables" were also added to each speech to facilitate later analysis. For example:

**** *name_trump *yr_2015 *yrmon_2015Jun *aud_dem

This indicates a unit of text spoken by Trump in June 2015 in a state that voted strongly Democrat in the general election, as further explained in Appendix 1.

3.3   The Model

Whilst acknowledging the ambiguity of populist language, it is important to set out what can be taken as evidence for its use. The exploratory and inductive nature of Alceste means that it does not start with a dictionary of words to test. However, certain terms would indicate populist discourse in the American context, for example: *people, workers, elite, establishment, Wall Street, American, corrupt, threat*. Their presence alone is not sufficient, but the combined use of a number of these could indicate a populist theme. Following a continuous approach to populism, the consistent use of such a frame to present political issues will be taken as evidence that a candidate is to some extent populist.

The theories discussed in the previous section generate different expectations about how this populist discourse will compare between Trump and Sanders. The national context approach suggests that they will use similar discourse as they are both responding to the same crisis and set of elites. Populism as a thin-centred ideology indicates that it will be very different. Contrasting issues and policy areas will be presented in populist terms, reflecting the divergent political ideologies that populism is cohabiting with. The strategic discourse approach also predicts difference, but that this will depend on when populist language can be used for political gain. Finally, the literature on leaders suggests that the candidates' discourse may differ dependent on the extent to which they focus on themselves as individuals.

4. Results

4.1   Overall Comparison of Discourse

Table 1 (below) gives a basic summary of the statistics from the combined analysis of all speeches by Trump and Sanders. The corpus included a total word count of 254, 539 across 60 'Initial Context Units' (ICUs). These are the pre-existing divisions of text as inputted by the researcher. Here, each ICU corresponds to one speech. More speeches were analysed by Trump than Sanders, reflecting the distribution of the Federal New Service transcripts. The 25 passive variables (contextual tags) include the candidates'

name along with information about the date and location of where speeches were delivered, although not all of these gave results significant enough to discuss in detail. Alceste breaks down the original ICUs into 'Elementary Context Units' (ECUs): short passages of text that become the focus of the classification process. Two analyses are conducted with different lengths of ECUs and the one that successfully classifies the highest proportion of ECUs is used. The classification rate is 78%, which is above the 70% rate that is deemed desirable (Illia et al. 2014, p.360).

Table 1: Basic Statistics for Trump and Sanders' Combined Discourse

	Combined (C): Trump and Sanders
Total word count	254,539
Unique words analysed	7,646
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	60
- Trump	36
- Sanders	24
Passive variables (tagged indicators)	25
Classified E.C.U.s	4,650 (=78% of the retained ECU)
Number of lexical classes	5
Distribution of classes (%) and discursive content	*1.* (26%) US global position (trade and borders)
	2. (21%) Economic inequality and its effects
	3. (20%) Campaign finance and the "political revolution"
	4. (22%) Trump vs. opponents and the press
	5. (11%) Campaign strength

The final rows of the table outline the classes that Alceste has identified, their size in terms of the proportion of ECUs classified within them, and their discursive content. Five classes are identified in this analysis. It is important to note that these content labels are not assigned by the program but by the researcher, who qualitatively analyses the most characteristic words and ECUs within each class in order to establish meaning. These interpretations are of course subjective, so a detailed justification of them is provided below. *Table 2* (below) presents the top 12 most characteristic words for each class along with their phi value, a measure of the strength of association where a higher value indicates a higher association with the class. It also shows the three most characteristic ECUs for each class and the contextual tags for candidates that were associated with them.

Table 2: Characteristic Words and Phrases for Trump and Sanders' Combined Discourse

Class (Size) Tag (phi value)	Top words (phi value)	Top 3 characteristic phrases (E.C.U.s) (Characteristic words in bold)
C1: US global position (trade and borders) (26%) *Trump (.46)*	mexico+ (.24) build+ (.24) deal+ (.23) china+ (.20) trade+ (.20) iran+ (.19) border+ (.17) japan+ (.17) iraq (.15) take+ (.15) oil+ (.15) wall+ (.15)	**barack_obama** is a **disaster**. and you **look take** a **look at** our **trade deals**. **these** are **deals** that are the **worst**. **we_re going to lose** USD 500 **billion**, **trade deficits**, **with china**. and you **look at** what **they_re** doing not only on the **border**, but **with trade**. **nabisco**, from **chicago** no more **oreos**, **folks nabisco** is **moving to they_re moving** their **big plant** from **chicago**, **they_re moving** it **to mexico**. you **look at countries** like **mexico**, **where they_re killing us** on the **border**, **absolutely** destroying **us** on the **border**. **they_re** destroying **us** in terms of economic development. **companies** like **carrier air conditioner** just **moving into mexico**. **ford**, **moving into mexico**. **nabisco**, **closing** up shop in **chicago** and **moving into** mexico.
C2: Economic inequality and its effects (21%) *Sanders (.58)*	income+ (.28) healthcare (.23) pay+ (.22) wealth+ (.22) kid+ (.21) wage+ (.21) work+ (.21) educat+ (.21) high+ (.19) percent+ (.18) earth+ (.18) college (.18)	so you **ready for a radical idea**? **why not**. what about **creating an economy that works for working families** and **not for** the **one percent**? but **when we talk** about the **economy**, it **is not only** the **grotesque level**, and it **is a grotesque level** of **income** and **wealth inequality**, it **is** also about **jobs**. we have the **highest rate** of **childhood poverty** of **almost any major country on earth**. **today in america**, 29 **million** americans have no **health insurance** and even **more are under insured** with **outrageously high** co_payments and **deductibles**. we **should not** have women **earning** 79 **cents on** the **dollar**. we **should not** have **young people** leaving **school USD** 50,000, **USD** 100,000 **in debt**. we **should not** have **a crumbling infrastructure**. we **should not** be the **only major country on earth that does not guarantee healthcare** to **all or paid family** and **medical** leave.
C3: Campaign finance and the "political revolution" (20%) *Sanders (.44)*	campaign+ (.25) political+ (.23) democrac+ (.20) american+ (.19) climate_change (.18) democrat+ (.17) voter+ (.17) gay+ (.16) together (.16) fossil_fuel+ (.16) billionaire+ (.16) communit+ (.15)	**what this campaign** is about is **bringing** people **together** with **the understanding** that if we do not **allow ourselves** to be **divided**, if we **stand together as black and white and** hispanic, **native american**, **men and women**, **straight and gay**, is that we can no **longer continue** to have a **campaign_finances system** in which **wall_street and the billionaire class** are able to **buy elections**. **americans**, no matter **what** their **political view may** be, **understand** that that is not **what democracy** is about. that is **what oligarchy** is about, **and** we **will** not **allow** that to **continue**. **the united states must lead the world** in **combating climate_change and transforming our energy system away from fossil_fuels and** to **energy efficiency and sustainable energy**. **republicans must** start worrying about **the planet** that they **will** leave to their kids **and** their grandchildren, **and** worry less about **the campaign contributions** they **may** lose **from the koch brothers and the fossil_fuel** industry.

|		
C4: Trump vs. opponents and the press (22%) *Trump (.37)*	say+ (.28) guy+ (.24) donald_trump+ (.22) know+ (.22) nice+ (.17) thing+ (.15) press+ (.15) call+ (.15) true (.14) speech (.12) i_ve (.12) ok (.12)	**i think he_s** probably a **nice guy but he_s** been so **nasty**. **i watch him**, **i say**, **man**, does **he hate donald_trump**. and **i watch him** and, **you know**, **if you think about it**, every single **person that_s** attacked **me** has gone **down, ok? i don_t want** to **mention names**. so **do you think** they were there for **jeb_bush** or rand_paul? rand_paul, **i_ve** had **you up** to **hear**. **it** is **funny though because** rand_paul **sit down i_ll ask you** a **question**. **you_re** fabulous, **ok? but politicians** are all talk and **no action. it_s true**. they_re **tired**. **you know i_ve** been **watching jeb_bush** on the border. **he_s** in a seersucker suit. **he_s** talking **about** yes, oh yes, the **anchor** baby. oh, **i shouldn_t say anchor** baby. **he** puts out a **report saying do** not **use** the **term anchor** baby.
C5: Campaign strength (11%) *Trump (.18)*	thank+ (.35) amazing+ (.26) win+ (.24) incred+ (.20) evening+ (.19) love+ (.17) tonight (.17) delegate+ (.17) florida (.16) indiana (.16) new_york (.16) victor+ (.16)	and we_ve **won** another state. as you know, we have **won** millions of more **votes** than **ted_cruz**, millions and millions of more **votes** than **john_kasich**. we_ve **won**, and now **especially** after **tonight**, **close** to 300 **delegates** more than **ted_cruz**. we_re **really**, **really** rocking. we **expect** we_re going to have an **amazing number** of **weeks** because these are **places** and they_re in **trouble**, they_re in big **trouble**. **thank** you, **everybody**. **great honor**. **great honor**, **thank** you. this is a **wonderful day**. on a saturday morning yet. isn_t that nice? **thank** you, all. and we_re going to have an **incredible convention**. it_s **really** going **well**. we_re going to have an **incredible convention**. wow. whoa. that is **some group** of people. thousands. **so nice, thank** you **very much**. that_s **really** nice. **thank** you. it_s **great** to be at **trump tower**. it_s **great** to be in a **wonderful city**, **new_york**. and it_s an **honor** to have **everybody here**. this is **beyond** anybody_s expectations.

For Class C1, the words *mexico+, build+, deal+, china+, trade+, iran+, border+, japan+, Iraq, take+, oil+,* and *wall+,* along with characteristic phrases referring to competition with other countries, indicate a theme of the *US global position (trade and borders)*. This is highly associated with Trump (phi value of .46) and frames policy in terms of American success relative to other countries. Interestingly, issues relating to trade and border control are consistently linked together in this class ("look at what they're doing not only on the border, but with trade"). Terms relating to Trump's proposal to build a wall on the Mexican border are highly associated with this class, reflecting a policy issue covered extensively in the media during the campaign (see Walsh 2016; Woodward & Costa 2016).

Interpreting the other results in a similar fashion, Class C2 is a polemical attack on *economic inequality and its effects*. Economic and social issues are framed in terms of the gap between those at the top and the majority of citizens and the impact of this on healthcare, education and wages. Top words indicate that the US is presented as

being exceptional in this regard ("the only major country on earth…"). It is strongly associated with Sanders (.58), with the highest phi value of any class. Also associated with Sanders, Class C3 consists of *campaign finance reform and the "political revolution"*. The former reflects Sanders' repeated claim that the dominance of economic elites in the election process is undermining democracy. The ECUs indicate that words relating to climate change here form Sanders' argument that the political system is undermining attempts to move towards sustainable energy production. The "political revolution" is Sanders call to arms bringing together a diverse group of Americans to challenge the status quo. Class C4 involves framing the campaign as *Trump vs. opponents and the press* and, unsurprisingly, is associated with Trump. Interestingly he consistently refers to himself in the third person (note that "donald_trump" is a characteristic word) in his criticism of other candidates in the Republican primaries and the media. Finally, Class C5 refers to *campaign strength,* including the thanking of audiences and discussion of electoral success. It includes a large number of state names given references both to the location of rallies and recent primary results. Whilst associated with Trump, this association has the lowest phi value of any class.

C1 is the largest of the five classes with all the others of similar size other than C5, which is by far the smallest. This indicates a greater focus on policy, the candidates and campaigns as opposed to the election process. The fact that the combined size of classes associated with Trump is larger than those associated with Sanders reflects the larger number of his speeches that were analysed. Given that each class is associated with one and only one of the candidates, we can see that there was a clear distinction in their use of language. Whilst simply confirming what we would expect – that overall each candidate uses distinct language – it is reassuring that the analysis corroborates this.

Figure 1: Tree Graph of Trump and Sanders' Combined Discourse

The analysis so far has produced an empirical classification of the language used by both candidates. However, Alceste also provides tools for examining the linkages between these classes. *Figure 1* shows a tree graph of the structure of the themes discussed in the speeches. Following this from the right to the left, it is shown that the greatest division in language was between classes associated with Sanders and those associated with Trump. Previous direct comparisons of presidential discourse have not found the biggest divide to be between the two candidates (Schonhardt-Bailey 2005, p.707), so this is a notable distinction between Sanders and Trump. As discussed, Sanders' language is then divided into a policy focus on economic inequality and campaign focus on the power of elites. Trump's language divides into the frame of America's global position and a branch of classes related to the campaign. The latter subdivides into his attacks and discussion of the process and results.

Alceste also gives a spatial depiction of the relationship between words and classes. This depiction is shown in *Figure 2*, which can be found in the online appendix that accompanies this journal. *Figure 2* presents a map showing correspondence analysis of the combined speeches of Sanders and Trump. Like other aspects of the software, this provides a tool for interpretation by the researcher rather than indisputable results. Here, the distance between different points reflects their degree of co-occurrence between two themes. The percentage association listed indicates the amount of variation in speech that is accounted for by each dimension of the map (Schonhardt-Bailey et al. 2012, p.501). Here, the first (horizontal) dimension accounts

for 38.5% and the second (vertical) for 25.1%. The relatively low cumulative association indicates that there are multiple cleavages in the overall discourse, which are not all represented here. Despite this, the map illustrates the clear divide between the discourse of Trump on the right hand side and Sanders on the left, as shown both by the speaker contextual tags. This is corroborated by the position of the classes, with those associated with each speaker clustering around the respective contextual tag. The vertical axis can be tentatively interpreted as demonstrating a broad distinction between political process-related discourse (in or near the upper half of the map) and policy-related discourse (in the bottom half).

Thus far, the Alceste analysis has suggested that Trump and Sanders' discourse showed considerable difference. However, a combined analysis of their speeches only allows us to go so far in examining the themes in their language. Though each class is associated with one candidate, it does not solely comprise their speech. To overcome this, the speeches of Trump and Sanders were separated and re-analysed to give a sharper picture of their themes.

4.2 Trump's Discourse

Table 3 (above) gives a basic summary of the statistics from the Alceste analysis of Trump's speeches alone. The corpus included a total word count of 164,389 and 6,064 unique words across 36 ICUs. The classification rate of 80% is a high one. Four classes were identified, with *Table 4* (below) presenting the top characteristic words and phrases for each.

Table 4: Characteristic Words and Phrases for Trump's Overall Discourse

Class (Size)	Top words (phi value)	Top three characteristic phrases (E.C.U.s) (Characteristic words in bold)
T1: Past failures and threats (20%)	american+ (.29) hillary_clinton+ (.26) Islam+ (.23) radical+ (.23) terror+ (.22) america+ (.20) polic+ (.18) foreign_policy (.18) communit+ (.17) foreign (.15) immigr+ (.15) support+ (.14)	**she will** undermine **the wages of working** people with uncontrolled **immigration**, **creating** poverty **and income** insecurity. **hillary_clinton_s wall_street agenda will** crush **working families**. **she_ll put** bureaucrats, not **parents**, **in charge of our lives, and our children_s education**. can_t have it. **she_ll be** trapping kids **in failing schools**. **america_s police and law enforcement** personnel are what **separates civilization from total chaos and the destruction of our country as** we know it. we **must** remember **the police** are **needed the most** where **crime** is **the** highest. **politicians and** activists **who seek to** remove **police or policing from** a **community** are hurting **the poorest and most** vulnerable **americans**. **hillary_clinton** can never claim **to be** a friend **of the gay community as** long **as she continues to support immigration policies** that **bring islamic** extremists **to our country and who** suppress **women, gays and anyone who** doesn_t **share their views or values**.
T2: US global position (trade and borders) (31%)	mexico+ (.26) build (.24) china+ (.20) billion+ (.20) deal (.20) japan+ (.17) negoti+ (.17) go+ (.17) wall+ (.16) trade+ (.16) iran+ (.14) ford+ (.14)	**nabisco** is **moving** into **mexico**. can you **believe** it, their **big plant**. **they_re leaving chicago**, which means i am never **going** to **eat another oreo** again. nobody is i_m **serious**. never. never. **ford** is **building** a **USD** 2.5 **billion plant** in **mexico**. **how** does that help **us**? **they_re closing** in **michigan** all **these plants** and **they_re going** to **build** this **massive plant**. it_s **peanuts compared** to some of **these massive trade deals**. and **we have** people that **should** never be **negotiating trade deals**. just like **we have john_kerry negotiating with iran** and what **they** did to him and you because he has no **idea** what the **hell** he was doing and what he **gave** away. you **believe** that? **with japan**, **USD** 70 **billion**, **with mexico**, who will by the **way**, **pay** for the **wall**. **with mexico**, **we have** an **imbalance** of **USD** 45 **billion** and growing all the time, because **ford** is **moving there**, **nabisco**, **they make oreos**, **they are moving** to **mexico**.
T3: Trump vs. opponents and the press (28%)	say+ (.23) donald_trump+ (.21) guy+ (.17) know+ (.17) see+ (.14) thing+ (.13) true (.13) camera+ (.13) question+ (.13) press+ (.12) show+ (.12) person (.12) jeb_bush (.12)	so **do you think** they **were** there for **jeb_bush** or **rand_paul**? **rand_paul, i_ve had you up** to **hear**. **it is funny though because rand_paul... sit down** i_ll **ask you a question**. **i said you didn_t see that**? **no**. they **focus** on your **face**, they **never show**. **but** the **thing i** love **about** the **protesters**, and **i thought** the **cameras were** in **like** in **a fixed position**, they **don_t** move, **right**? **you know**, **what do i know about this** stuff? **somebody** else **i won_t mention but** they **were nasty** to **me**. they took USD 25 million on **negative ads**. **can you believe it**? USD 25 million **one guy** USD 25 million, and **then i_m supposed** to **say** **he_s a nice person**, **right**? and they **were phony ads**.

| T4: Campaign strength and supporters (21%) | thank+ (.33) win+ (.28) incred+ (.22) amazing+ (.22) republic+ (.19) vote+ (.18) florida (.17) love (.15) evangelical+ (.15) endorse+ (.14) special (.14) great+ (.14) | **you_ve been great friends**. **thank** you. **thank** you. **so**, this was **very exciting tonight**. but **i_ll tell** you. it looks like we **won** by a **lot evangelicals**. we have **some real talent** in the **republican party** and the rnc and. we **want** to **thank everybody**. **thank** you **very much**. we yes right, right. **well**, **i_ll tell** you what. **i_ll tel**l you what. i **love** the **evangelicals**. and i have to **tell** you, **pastor** jeffress has **been so incredible** on television and elsewhere. he has **been great**. and as you know, **liberty university**. do we **love liberty university**? **jerry** falwell junior, **an unbelievable** guy. and he has **been** with us and with us from the **beginning**. |

The classes are similar to those found to be associated with Trump in the combined analysis, but are not identical. Class T1 includes a broad range of negative references to terrorism, crime, foreign policy and Hillary Clinton. This suggests a general frame of *political failures and threats* that was not picked up in the combined analysis. The diverse range of issues grouped together here suggests a lack of focus in Trump's language. Consisting of only 20% of his speech, it is the smallest class in the analysis. "Americans+" is the most characteristic word is here linked to internal threats as well as apparent anti-elitism ("Hillary Clinton's Wall Street agenda…"). Whilst this indicates a potential populist theme, the lack of focus makes it hard to establish this. As such, it is subjected to a further analysis below to examine this in more detail.

Class T2 combines references to trade deals, other countries and the proposed Mexican wall, so is labelled as relating to the *US global position (trade and borders)*. This is the largest of all of the classes with 31% of ECUs and, despite covering multiple policy areas, is more focused than T1. Trump connects trade and border policy, framing them both in terms of the global position of the US relative to other countries. Class T3 focuses on *Trump vs. opponents and the press*. "Donald_trump" is the second most characteristic word, indicating that he repeatedly refers to himself in the third person in his attacks other Republican candidates, the press, and protesters in the crowd. This includes 28% of ECUs indicating that a large amount of Trump's time was spent discussing the division between him and others. Class T4 focuses on *campaign strength and supporters*, reflecting the points in speeches where Trump thanks the audience and supporters as well as discusses the outcome of primary elections. The positive tone of the top words suggests that here Trump is highlighting his success as a rallying cry to his supporters.

As discussed, there is more to be discovered about the patterns of discourse within the broad frame of Class T1. Fortunately Alceste provides a secondary analysis tool whereby all of the ECUs from a specific class can be subjected to a separate analysis, which was done for T1.

Table 5: Basic Statistics for Secondary Analysis of Trump Class 1 (T1) – Political Failures and Threats

	Trump 1 (T1): Political failures and threats
Total word count	27,237
Unique words analysed	3,133
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	29
Passive variables (tagged indicators)	22
Classified E.C.U.s	485 (=74% of the retained ECU)
Number of lexical classes	5
Distribution of classes (%) and discursive content	1. (16%) Public services 2. (43%) Trade deals 3. (15%) Foreign policy 4. (14%) Islam, terrorism and crime 5. (12%) Immigration and attacks on US values

Table 5 shows the results of the secondary analysis of Class T1 (*political failures and threats*), with a total word count of 27,237 and a 74% classification rate. Five classes were found within the broad *political failures* and *threats* frame, corresponding to perceived threats across different policy areas: *public services*; *trade deals; foreign policy; Islam, terrorism and crime*; and *immigration and attacks on American values*. Full tables of characteristic words and phrases for this analysis and all subsequent ones are available in Appendix 3. Whilst there is not space here to discuss all of the classes in detail, Class T1.2 and Class T1.4 are particularly relevant for this project. The top characteristic words and phrases for these are shown in *Table 6.*

*Table 6:* Characteristic Words and Phrases for Selected Sub-Classes of Trump Class 1 (T1)

Class (Size)	Top words (phi value)	Top three characteristic phrases (E.C.U.s) (Characteristic words in bold)
T1.2: Trade deals (43%)	trade (.29) million+ (.25) job+ (.24) bill_clinton+ (.21) american+ (.21) foreign (.20) dollar+ (.20) deal (.19) veteran+ (.19) work+ (.18) agree+ (.18)	and they are going to go **up,** because we_re going to thrive **again as** a country. the **trans pacific partnership** is the **greatest danger** yet. the **tpp, as** it is known, **would** be the **death** blow **for american manufacturing. it would give up** all of our **economic leverage** to an **international commission** that **would put** the interests of **foreign countries above** our **own** it was also **bill_clinton** who lobbied **for china_s** disastrous **entry into** the world **trade organization,** and hillary_clinton who backed that **terrible, terrible agreement. then as secretary** of **state,** hillary_clinton stood **by** idly **while china cheated** on its **currency,** added **another trillion dollars** to the **trade deficit,** and **stole** hundreds of **billions** of **dollars** in our intellectual property but have no doubt that she **will** immediately **approve** it, **if** it is **put** before her. and that is **guaranteed. guaranteed.** she **will** do this, just **as** she has **betrayed american workers for wall_street** and throughout throughout her **career**
T1.4: Islam, terrorism and crime (14%)	radical+ (.39) islam+ (.35) terror+ (.34) gun+ (.33) criminal+ (.25) crooked (.24) enem+ (.23) name+ (.22) deal+ (.22) intelligence (.22) san (.22)	**i don_t know** if you **know** this, but **just** a **few weeks** before **san bernardino,** the slaughter, **that_s** all it was was a slaughter, **hillary_clinton** explained **her** refusal **to say** the **words radical islam** and yet, they have body guards that have **guns.** so, **i think** that in addition **to calling** for them **to name judges,** we_ll also **call** them and **let** their body guards **immediately** disarm and **i tell** thank you. **i tell** the **same** story on **san bernardino.** here_s **two** people. **i** guess **she radicalized** him. who **knows?** who **knows?** it_s a mess. we_re in a mess, folks, a mess. **radical islamic terrorism.** we have a **president doesn_t** mention the **words, doesn_t want to talk about** it

The *trade deals* class was by far the largest, comprising 43% of the text. Trade featured heavily in Class T2 of the initial analysis where it was framed in terms of the national interest. In T1.2, this continues but is accompanied by populist themes. The fact that "American" is a top word does not in itself demonstrate the presence of populism; indeed, looking at the ECUs shows a number of times when it is not used to refer to the people as a whole. However, there are other elements of populism. The combined presence of "work+" and "wall_street" indicate that this class could contain a discourse of producerism, with Trump claiming to speak for the ordinary people who create wealth as opposed to the elite. The top ECUs corroborate this, with "work+" consistently referring to the idea of a homogenous group of American workers. They also show that the prominence of "bill_clinton" reflects an attempt to link the Clintons to economic elites and Wall Street as Trump highlights their combined threat.

Class T1.4 is interesting given that the perceived threats of *Islam, terrorism and crime* are grouped together. Not only are "radical and "Islam" the top two words, but the Alceste analysis found that they were often used one after another. The combination

of words related to crisis, threats and Islam show an element of conspiracism: Trump conjures up an image of on-going plots by "radical Islam" to subvert the common good. This reflects theories of right wing populism (Berlet & Lyons 2000, p.5). The class also shows an attempt to link this to a failure, and even corruption of the elite – "crooked" is a prominent word.

Figure 3: Dendodiagram Showing Full Breakdown of Trump's Discourse

To provide a clearer overview of these classes and how they interact with each other, *Figure 3* shows a dendodiagram of these analyses. Each branch represents a division identified by Alceste. The first division in the initial analysis was between Class T1 (*political failures and threats*) and all of the others, indicating that it was the most distinct class. Given that the next division was between Class T2 and the others, we can conclude that Classes T3 and T4 are more related to each other than to T1 and T2. This makes sense given that the former both refer to aspects of the election campaign. Class T1 first divided between failure of *public services* and everything else. The next division was between trade and a branch of the other issues, which broadly related to foreign policy and homeland security. A final distinction is found showing that Classes T1.4 and T1.5 are more similar to each other than the other classes.

Correspondence analysis allows for a further examination of how these themes relate to one another and how their use changed over time. *Figure 4* (see online appendix) shows a spatial map of the classes and month and year contextual tags for Trump's discourse, accounting for a cumulative 75.5% of variation in the corpus. Reflecting the divisions shown in the dendodiagram above, the horizontal axis indicates that the greatest divide in the discourse was between the *political failures and threats* frame on the right hand side and the other three classes on the left. The vertical axis shows a division between the two years: the 2016 contextual tag and all 2016 months are in or very near the bottom half, whereas the 2015 contextual tag and all 2015 months are in the top half. The distance between points indicate a moderate association of 2015 with Classes T2 and T3 as well as 2016 with Classes T1 and T4. This is corroborated by the phi values, which show an association with the 2015 tag of .20 for T2 and .17 for T3. Similarly, the analysis found an association with 2016 of .25 for T1 and .22 for T4. It shows that Trump spent more time discussing *US global position* and *attacks on opponents and the press* earlier in the campaign, with a shift towards *election process* and *supporters and failures and threats* in 2016.

4.2   Sanders' Discourse

Table 7: Basic Statistics for Sanders' Overall Discourse

	Sanders (S): overall discourse
Total word count	90,150
Unique words analysed	4,285
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	24
Passive variables (tagged indicators)	21
Classified E.C.U.s	2,058 (=93% of the retained ECU)
Number of lexical classes	2
Distribution of classes (%) and discursive content	1. (52%) Economic inequality and its effects
	2. (48%) Political process

Turning to a similar analysis of Sanders' speeches alone, *Table 7* (above) shows a summary of the basic statistics. This corpus had a total word count of 90,150 across 24 separate speeches. The 93% classification rate was the highest of any analysis. This initial analysis divided into just two classes. Class S1 broadly focused on *economic inequality and its effects* and comprised 52% of his speech. The fact that over half of

Sanders' speech refers explicitly to economic inequality indicates how significant this issue was in his campaign. It focused on the problems of income and wealth inequality, as well as words relating to the associated issues of jobs, education and healthcare. Class S2 comprised 48% of his speech and discussed the *political process*, with references to other candidates, the general election and the importance of maximising turnout. Sanders is therefore found to be considerably more focused in his patterns of speech, as demonstrated by the single clear division between policy-related and campaign-related language and high classification rate. However, the broad frames discovered by this initial analysis do not allow for an examination of populist language. As a result, both classes were subjected to a secondary analysis.

Table 8: Basic Statistics for Secondary Analysis of Sanders Class 1 (S1) – Economic Inequality and Its Effects

	Sanders 1 (S1): economic inequality and its effects
Total word count	44,398
Unique words analysed	2,745
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	24
Passive variables (tagged indicators)	21
Classified E.C.U.s	793 (=74% of the retained ECU)
Number of lexical classes	4
Distribution of classes (%) and discursive content	1. (20%) Healthcare 2. (18%) Income and wealth inequality 3. (45%) Jobs and lost opportunities 4. (17%) Wages and social security

Table 8 (above) shows a basic summary of the secondary analysis of Class S1. The *economic inequality and its effects* frame had a total word count of 44,398 and a 74% classification rate. It splits into four classes, each relating to a different policy aspect of economic inequality.

Class S1.1 centres on healthcare, framing the failure of existing policy both as a matter of inefficiency and the injustice of Americans being denied a basic right. Class S1.2 presents a clear and consistent focus on *income and wealth inequality*. Both the characteristic words and phrases show an unambiguous distinction being drawn between the interests of economic elites and the other Americans – particularly the top 0.1% and the rest. Class S1.3 is by far the largest class at 45% of ECUs, with a focus

on *jobs and lost opportunities*. The characteristic words suggest an amorphous class spanning jobs, young people, and education policy. However, a close examination of the characteristic phrases indicates that it is in fact a coherent frame of the limits to Americans pursuing their ambitions, as discussed below. Class S1.4 relates to *wages and social security*, again presenting current social policy failures as a denial of rights. Characteristic words and phrases for the two most relevant classes for the discussion of populism are listed in *Table 9* below.

Table 9: Characteristic Words and Phrases for Selected Sub-Classes of Sanders Class 1 (S1)

Class (Size)	Top words (phi value)	Top three characteristic phrases (E.C.U.s) (Characteristic words in bold)
S1.2: Income and wealth inequality (18%)	wealth+ (.68) percent+ (.58) top (.55) bottom (.42) owns (.37) income (.36) inequality (.36) wealthiest (.34) new (.31) see+ (.24 rigged (.24) grotesque+ (.22)	**today,** in **america,** and i_d like you to **hear** this. you **don_t see** it on **tv. you_re** not **going** to **read** it in **the papers often. today,** in **america, the top** 1/ 10 **of one percent** now **owns almost** as **much wealth** as **the bottom** 90 **percent. today,** in **america, the** 20 **wealthiest people** in our **country own more wealth than the bottom** 150 million, **bottom half of america** **unbelievably** and **grotesquely, the top one tenth of one percent today owns** nearly as **much wealth** as **the bottom** 90 **percent. one tenth of one percent owns** nearly as **much wealth** as **the bottom** 90 **percent.** that **is** not **the** kind **of america** that **we** should **accept** it **is** not **acceptable** to me that in **america today we** have **more income** and **wealth inequality than any** other major **country** on earth. it **is worse** now **than at any time since** 1928. it **is** not **acceptable** that **the top one tenth of one percent** now **owns almost** as **much wealth** as **the bottom** 90 **percent**
S1.3: Jobs and lots opportunities (45%)	job+ (.27) educat+ (.26) young (.21) school+ (.21) invest+ (.20) leave+ (.19) debt+ (.19) jail+ (.17) college (.17) best (.15) union+ (.15) kid (.15)	**trillion deficit** and i **find** it **interesting** republicans complain **they_re** only **growing** 250, 000 **jobs** a **month. well,** it_s a hell of a **lot better** than **losing** 800, 000 **jobs** a **month** **that_s** wrong. we_re going to change **that.** we are going to **invest in our infrastructure, create** millions of **good paying jobs.** and by the way, not only do we **need** to **create** millions of **good paying jobs,** we **need** to stop the **loss** of millions of **jobs through** a **disastrous trade policy that allows corporate** america to **shut down plants** here and **move** to **low** wage **countries abroad** my **father worked** everyday of **his** life, and **he never** made a **whole lot.** my **mom** and **dad,** and brother and i **grew up in** a **small three** and a half **room, rent** controlled **apartment in brooklyn, new_york**

The combination of words in Class S1.2 shows the clearest populist element. The ECUs show that references to "top" and "bottom" are drawing a divide between

economic elites and others, reflecting an anti-elitist discourse. Here, the economic interests of both groups are homogenised and presented in opposition to one another – even if it is not clear whether Sanders is homogenising them in other ways. Other top words in this class, such as "rigged" and "grotesque", indicate a sense of crisis and corruption. These come together to imply an overall populist message: normal people need to work together for their unified interest to overcome the dominance of the wealthy elite.

In contrast, Class S1.3 is notable because of its lack of populist themes. Like Trump, the ECUs show that Sanders rejects existing trade policies. Indeed this was one of the factors initially identified by those drawing comparisons between the two (Hirsh 2016). Whilst not in the top list, "trade" is a characteristic word for this class and the ECUs show that the prominence of "jobs" reflects a repeated criticism of outsourcing. But the words and phrases do not show a populist frame. It is instead one aspect of the wider theme about lost opportunities in employment and education. Interestingly, a number of the ECUs present the life story of Sanders' parents: he uses his back-story as an illustration of American opportunities and contrasts this with those available to the situation of young people today. However, this is not presented as a division between the interests of American workers and economic elites. Despite the large size of the class, the fact that it does not solely comprise the issue of trade indicates that Sanders did not give it as much of a clear emphasis as Trump. He also diverges from Trump in the lack of nationalist language or clear populist discourse.

Table 10: Basic Statistics for Secondary Analysis of Sanders Class 2 (S2) – Political Process

	Sanders 2 (S2): political process
Total word count	39,871
Unique words analysed	2,966
I.C.U.s (= number of speeches)	24
Passive variables (tagged indicators)	21
Classified E.C.U.s	636 (=65% of the retained ECU)
Number of lexical classes	4
Distribution of classes (%) and discursive content	1. (8%) Minority rights 2. (19%) Campaign finance reform 3. (54%) "The political revolution" 4. (19%) Campaign strength, donations and opponents

The analysis of the *political process* frame had a total word count of 39,871 and a 65% classification rate (see *Table 10* above). Given that this was the lowest rate of any analysis, it indicates that Sanders' discourse relating to this frame was less focused than others. However, the results are still worth exploring. Class S2.3 is by far the largest, comprising 54% of speech, and refers to "*the political revolution*". This reflects a theme of the importance of the campaign in bringing people together and engaging the disenfranchised. Class S2.1 is the smallest (8%) and is somewhat incongruous given its policy focus on *minority rights*. However, its small size means this lack of fit is not a major worry. The other two classes are identically sized, each comprising 19% of ECUs. Class S2.2 discusses different aspects of *campaign finance reform*. Class S2.4 covers *campaign strength, donations and opponents* – the words indicate a theme of Sanders talking up his chances in terms of recent primary results, how his polling compares to Trump and Clinton, and individual donations to the campaign.

Table 11: Characteristic Words and Phrases for Selected Sub-Classes of Sanders Class 2 (S2)

Class (Size)	Top words (phi value)	Top three characteristic phrases (E.C.U.s) (Characteristic words in bold)
S2.2: Campaign finance reform (19%)	system (.47) citizens_united (.40) fossil_fuel (.37) democrac+ (.36) campaign_finance+ (.25) corrupt+ (.33) supreme_court (.31) koch (.30) spend+ (.30) overturn+ (.29) undermin+ (.29) industry (.27)	the united states must **lead** the **world** in combating **climate_change and transforming our energy system away from fossil_fuels and to energy efficiency and sustainable energy. republicans** must start **worrying about** the **planet that** they **will leave to their kids and their grandchildren, and worry** less **about** the campaign contributions they may **lose from** the **koch brothers** and the **fossil_fuel industry** we **have a moral responsibility to future generations to** stand up **to the fossil_fuel industry, to transform our energy system away from fossil_fuel to energy efficiency and sustainable energy** we must be **focused on campaign_finance** reform **and** the need for **a** constitutional amendment **to overturn** this **disastrous citizens_united decision.** i **have** said it **before and** i_ll say it again. i **will not** nominate any justice **to the supreme_court** who has **not** made it **clear that** he **or** she **will move to overturn that disastrous decision which is undermining american democracy**
S2.3: "The political revolution" (54%)	people (.25) turnout+ (.18) young+ (.18) thank+ (.17) political+ (.17) voter+ (.16) great+ (.15)	**ordinary people, working people, young people don_t vote.** we have an **economic** and **political crisis** in **this country** and the **same old, same old politics** and **economics** will not **effectively address** those crises i **don_t** trust anybody and **young people who** have **never been involved** in the **political process. it_s bringing people** together by the millions to **stand up** and **say** something very **simple,** and

economic+ (.15) politic+ (.14) countr+ (.14) process (.14) think+ (.13)	that is that the **government** of **this country belongs** to **all** of **us,** not **just** a few **thank you all.** but **let me** also **say this. let me give you** an **important** a **political** reality that i **think all** of **you understand.** that is republicans **win** elections when **voter turnout** is **low. that_s** a fact. democrats **win** when **voter turnout** is **high.** our **job,** and **what** we **try** to do in public policy and in **politics** is to encourage more and more **people** to **participate**

Classes S2.2 and S2.3 contain populist elements so are presented in detail in *Table 11*. Whilst the prominence of "corrupt" and "undermine" in S2.2 suggests a sense of systemic crisis, populism in this class is nuanced and requires some exploration. Characteristic words relating to campaign finance indicate a perceived dual threat of the fossil fuel industry and economic elites buying influence in the political system. References to the "supreme_court" and "citizens_united" reflect the 2012 Citizens United ruling that allowed for the formation of Super PACs and Sanders' pledge to nominate a Supreme Court justice who will overturn it. This has been a key target of proponents of campaign finance reform (Azari & Hetherington 2016, p.104). In this class the elite is more clearly identified than at any other point in Sanders' speech, with individuals such as the Koch brothers present in the top word list. Whilst the ECUs listed focus on the aspect of climate change, another top ECU demonstrates how these themes come together to form a populist frame:

> "The **american** people are **sick and** tired of **billionaires** running **our economy and our** political **lives**. together, we are going **to overturn** this **disastrous citizens_united supreme_court decision, and** we are going **to move** toward **public funding** of **elections**"

This class contains the most severe tone of crisis in Sanders' discourse. The campaign finance system is used to illustrate the problem of the power of elites, who are presented as fundamentally corrupting democratic institutions.

Class S2.3 makes a broader argument for the importance of Sanders' campaign in returning power to the people. It is summed up by "*the political revolution*", a phrase he repeatedly returns to, reflecting the need to bring a movement of people into politics in order to challenge entrenched power. "People" is a top characteristic word and looking at this in context shows that Sanders is repeatedly using this in a homogenous sense: the campaign represents the unified interests of the disenfranchised masses.

Other top words relating to the political process indicate that this is presented in opposition to a system that works against them. The campaign becomes the embodiment of Sanders' populist vision: its diverse support and radical outlook demonstrates the ability to challenge elites and return power to ordinary people. The sheer size of this class reflects that Sanders spends far more time presenting the campaign as a movement than discussing opponents and the election process in Class S2.4. This contrasts sharply with Trump's continual framing of the campaign as a battle between him and his political opponents.

Figure 5: Dendodiagram Showing Full Breakdown of Sanders' Discourse

Figure 5 presents a dendodiagram of all of these classes and again allows us to see how they are structurally related to each other. Its shows that *healthcare* is the most distinct element of Class S1's *economic inequality and its effects* frame. The specific policy areas discussed in Classes S1.3 and S1.4 are more similar to each other than the general discussion of inequality in Class S1.2. Within the *political process* frame, the initial division of Class S2.1 from the other classes supports the intuition that it is something of an outlier. Discourse then divides between the substantive policy proposals in Class S2.2 and the others focusing on the election campaign.

Given that the initial analysis of Sanders' discourse only produced two classes, Alceste does not produce a spatial map of the relation between themes and contextual tags.

5. Discussion

Considering the initial theoretical perspectives, there are some general findings that can be drawn from this analysis. Alceste has given empirical evidence to substantiate claims that both Trump and Sanders used populist discourse, with the classes showing issues and policy areas that were repeatedly framed in such terms. However, they also show that the candidates' use of populist discourse was marked more by difference than similarity. Very little overlap in their language was found in the initial combined analysis. Whilst it is not surprising that two candidates use different language, this demonstrates that any resemblance between them should not be overstated. The way that they communicated was more reflective of their political positions and individual styles than any overarching populist theme, confirming the consensus that there are divergent varieties of populism and that the label only gives a partial understanding of their ideas.

A large amount of this difference can be explained by the candidates' contrasting ideologies. Trump used populist discourse to frame the issues of immigration and terrorism, reflecting a right-wing populism with appeals to the people used to advance a broader ideology of social conservatism. The threat of "radical Islam" that he repeatedly referred to in T1.4 indicates an element of conspiracism, which was discussed as a distinctive feature of populism on the right (Berlet & Lyons 2000, p.5). In contrast, the clearest populist themes in Sanders' discourse were used to frame his policy agenda relating to economic inequality (S1.2) and campaign finance reform (S2.2). These appeals reflected a classic left-wing attack on economic elites couched in explicitly populist terms. This challenges the national context theory, which argues that populists in the one country will target the same power structure (Canovan 1999, p.4). Instead, such differences support the assumptions of the thin-centred ideology school: their divergent strands of populism reflect that populist ideas cohabit with other ideologies to form a comprehensive approach to political questions. They had different conceptions both of the elite and of problems with the status quo that

require the return of power to the people. Trump attacked a liberal elite facilitating the conspiracies of "radical Islam" whilst Sanders attacked billionaires and corporate America.

However, this ideology explanation only tells part of the story. Trump and Sanders' broad agreement on trade policy shows an issue where their ideologies overlapped. It could provide some support for Canovan's argument about similarity in the same national context. But this predicts that both candidates would frame the issue in similar populist terms. Contrary to this, the analysis found a very large difference in their discourse surrounding trade. Class T2, the largest share of Trump's discourse (31%), discussed the combined issues of trade and the border in essentially nationalistic terms. They were issues of collective US pride and self-respect rather than a division between the interests of the elite and normal Americans. The secondary analysis found a smaller but still significant share of his discourse (T1.2) presenting trade deals through a populist frame – particularly in an attempt to link the Clintons to economic elites. Whilst S1.3 also showed a large share of Sanders' discourse referring to trade, this was linked to education policy and presented in terms of lost opportunities for young Americans rather than a homogenous American people.

The ideology approach does not explain why Trump would frame the issue of trade in populist terms but Sanders would not. This suggests that differences between varieties of populism are more nuanced than just ideological disagreements. Given that Trump's discussion of trade deals linked the Clintons to the failure of economic elites, this could indicate a strategic use of populism to make a partisan attack. Similarly, Sanders' failure to present the issue in populist terms could reflect a strategic reluctance to explicitly attack other Democrats as members of the elite.

The candidates' discourse surrounding the campaign also shows that differences in populism cannot be explained by ideology alone. Whilst Class T3 indicates that 28% of Trump's discourse presented the campaign as a battle between him and his opponents, S2.3 found around a quarter of Sanders' overall speech (54% of Class S2) that was a populist call to arms, bringing together diverse America against political and economic elites. As mentioned, populism often includes a focus on a charismatic leader. In a sense, Trump's repeated focus on himself could therefore reflect the previously-discussed idea of the "ordinary leader with extraordinary attributes"

(Panizza 2005, p.21). However, the analysis found little evidence of Trump discussing his ordinary qualities. Either way, the contrast in how they framed the campaign shows that differences in populism reflect individual style and personality, as well as ideology and political context.

Finally, the analysis has uncovered some general points about the candidates' communication. Trump moved from a nationalist focus on trade and borders prior to the primaries towards discussion of the campaign process and political threats later in the campaign. Unsurprisingly, this shows that campaign speeches reflect the context of the election process. Sanders' discourse was found to be considerably more focused than Trump's: not only did the analysis initially find a single clear division in Sanders' language, but his classes tended to focus on a more unified set of issues.

6. Conclusions

In using computer-assisted thematic analysis this project has proposed an alternative method of measuring populism based on an automated examination of the context of words. This expands on the empirical turn in populist studies in order to explore the nature of differences between varieties of populism. The empirical analysis has compared Trump and Sanders' use of populist discourse and how this framed different policy areas and issues. In doing so it has demonstrated that identifying someone as a populist only captures part of their political outlook. Key theories account for aspects of difference in populist discourse but none provide a comprehensive theory of it.

The focus on the US means it is important to be careful about generalising from this study. The element of difference explained by ideology could well reflect the divergent strands of US populism and might not be found elsewhere; other countries may not have the same diversity of populism on left and right. Regardless, as a case study in populist communication, the findings are notable in demonstrating the limitations of existing theories. In this sense the counterintuitive result about their discussion of trade is the most important in highlighting the need for a more nuanced account of how populism interacts with other ideologies. Further research could explore whether this difference in populist communication by actors who broadly agree on an issue is replicated elsewhere.

It is important to bear in mind some general limitation of using Alceste to study populist discourse. First, as discussed throughout, a proportion of each corpus could not be classified. Whilst the classification rate was almost universally above 70%, this leaves 20-30% of speech overlooked in each analysis. Second, given that populist discourse tends to be dispersed throughout the text, Alceste does not give a clear answer to the overall intensity of populism used by each candidate. Although the project has taken the consistent use of certain discourse as evidence for populism, it has not fully engaged with how much of this would be needed before the populist label is justified. This reinforces the assumption that Alceste is suited to treating populism as a continuous rather than dichotomous concept. Third, it remains limited by the ambiguity of populist language. Whilst Alceste provides an alternative method of attempting to overcome this, it is not perfect and the findings remain reliant on the researcher's interpretation. The detailed explanations of how these interpretations have sought to be transparent in this but could still be challenged.

Whilst further work is needed to test theories of difference, the analysis has given a comprehensive and rigorous mapping of the discourse of Trump and Sanders in the 2016 presidential election. "The yin and yang of America's present discontent" describes an element of how both communicated, but does not capture the nuanced differences in their language.

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In Place of Labour: The Increased Localisation of Electoral Geographies in Competition Between UKIP and Labour

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1. Introduction

From "*fruit cakes, loonies and closet racists*" (Cameron 2006) to "*the most significant new party in politics*" (Ford and Goodwin 2014: i), UKIP's emergence from the fringes to the mainstream of the political arena has had profound effects on the shape of British politics. The most successful party in modern times in challenging the dominance of the UK's traditional parties, UKIP, while under the leadership of Nigel Farage, managed to completely alter political discourse in the UK in their favour including successfully campaigning for a referendum on Britain's membership in the European Union. Equally notable about their rise has been the party's ability to challenge both of the main political parties in the UK making advances with Eurosceptic Conservatives while also challenging Labour's dominance in the formerly industrial towns of the North. It is this latter aspect of UKIP's rise which will be the primary focus of this paper.

This study aims to challenge the sociological models which currently direct our understanding of the electoral force of UKIP in relation to Labour. Rooted in post-industrial social change, these authors emphasise voters who have been "left-behind" by the modern economy and abandoned by the political establishment especially the Labour Party resulting in them embracing the anti-elite rhetoric of UKIP. Nevertheless, such studies – which argue that structural factors such as class, education and ethnicity are the most effective explanatory variables for UKIP's encroachment in Labour heartlands – can be seen to have major deficiencies. Using local election data from the regions of the North West and South Yorkshire, this paper will demonstrate that areas with high levels of the variables stressed by studies such as that by Ford and Goodwin (2014) do not all uniformly vote for UKIP and the spread of support for the party is far too varied for us to be declaring the current models as the single authoritative source required to explain the rise of UKIP in the North. The ability to explain why some people vote UKIP while others remain loyal to the traditional party of the workers is a

gap in our understanding and, as such, further research is required to compliment these current models.

This paper will argue that geography is extremely important in helping to explain these divergent responses to UKIP in the region. That is to say that variations occurred, predominantly, on a town by town basis indicating that the local contexts of each place, and how they relate to broader structures, should be seen as vital to our full understanding of the UKIP phenomenon. In this way, this essay will emphasise the need to integrate the practices of electoral geography into current methods of modelling UKIP support.

From such a conclusion, the remainder of the paper's findings covered three case studies undertaken in Liverpool, Rotherham and Manchester to begin the process of lifting these local contexts to explain why these areas have very different relationships to UKIP despite similar structural characteristics. These studies, exploratory rather than definitive in nature, were based on interviews with prominent figures in local branches of both parties and are used to point to a varied array of factors which can be seen to have a significant impact on the nature of the UKIP/Labour battle in each respective place. Such factors lifted from those interviewed include the extent of political competition, the importance of local cultural norms, as well as spatial economic imbalances within a city.

In this way, therefore, it should be seen that geography plays a key role in explaining why some towns in the North West and South Yorkshire exhibit patterns which align with the "left-behind" thesis while others defy such logic. However, the implications of the findings of this paper are seen to be much broader than this. Beyond this UKIP/Labour dimension, it will argue that politics as a whole in Britain is becoming increasingly localised. We can no longer refer to the industrial towns of the North-West as one conflated geographical region with uniform characteristics and relatively uniform electoral behaviours. Instead, we show that there is great diversity within these regions indicating that competition is determined on a much more local scale than previously recognised.

The paper will be ordered as follows: beginning with a brief narrative on the rise of UKIP, it will proceed with an assessment of the current literature on the rise of UKIP in relation to the Labour party as well as on British electoral geography. From

this the paper moves to a discussion of the methodological processes of the research, before progressing onto the key findings from the research. After showing the results of the initial aggregate regressions of UKIP support against so-called "left-behind" structural factors, it will present the findings from each of the case studies considered. The paper will finally conclude with a discussion of the increased localisation of politics observed from this research as well as indicate the implications of such findings.

2. Context

While existing as a political force for over twenty-five years, UKIP has only affirmed a position of any significance in the British political arena within the last decade. As shown in *Figure 1*, the party stagnated in political wastelands for a considerable amount of time following its conception at the London School of Economics in 1993. Plagued by internecine conflict and failing to progress from a single-issue group, early media assessments were derisive placing them alongside the Monster Raving Loony Party, where they were "doomed to spend their lives in the fringes of politics" (Daily Record 1997). It is these dreadful beginnings which makes the party's later breakthrough even more notable. Electorally, the party made its initial breakthroughs in the European Parliament elections – second tier elections where their anti-EU message held some relevance among voters. However, these strides into the double figures were isolated and short-lived moments in the sun. It was not until 2013 that UKIP enjoyed domestic successes after a series of local election victories and unprecedented by-election results - including two victories in Thanet South and Clacton-on-Sea – propelled them into the centre of British politics where they would completely re-direct public debate towards immigration and the EU including forcing David Cameron to hold a referendum on the nation's membership of the Union.

Figure 1 *UKIP vote share in European Parliament Elections, General Elections and Welsh Assembly Elections, 1991-2016*
Source: Electoral Commission

What is also very notable about UKIP's very sudden invasion of the political mainstream has been their geographic expansion away from coastal suburbs in Southern England where they would collect the votes of Conservatives exasperated by their party's persistent shifts towards the centre and into the industrial towns of the North of England where they would directly contest elections with the Labour Party. Indeed, the new threat which UKIP poses for the Labour Party can be seen in *Tables 1* and *2*. Though the first-past-the-post electoral system has inhibited them from ousting Labour candidates from their seats, the growing number of UKIP second-places in seats won by Labour demonstrates their new-found ability to take votes from them in their own heartlands. This encroachment into the poorer, industrialised Labour core is even more pronounced if you isolate the cases of the North-West and Yorkshire – the focus of this paper – in which UKIP were able to claim second in nearly three-tenths of Labour's victories in 2015. As such, it can be seen that these former heartlands of the Labour Party are quickly becoming intense battlegrounds where they must fend off the appeals of UKIP; a development which demands further enquiry.

	2010		2015	
	Seats	%	Seats	%
Conservative	148	57.8	170	73.3
UK Independence Party	0	0	44	19.0
Liberal Democrats	73	28.5	8	3.4
Others	35	13.7	10	4.3

Table 1 Second place positions in constituencies won by the Labour Party in the 2010 & 2015 General Elections by party
Source: Electoral Commission

	North West		Yorkshire/Humber		Overall	
	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
Conservative	37	72.5	16	48.5	53	63.1
UK Independence Party	10	19.6	14	42.4	24	28.6
Others	4	7.8	3	9.1	7	8.3

Table 2 Second place positions in constituencies in the North West and South Yorkshire won by the Labour Party in the 2010 & 2015 General Elections by party
Source: Electoral Commission

3. Literature Review

Given this very recent emergence from the peripheries, literature surrounding the ideology, narratives and electoral strength of UKIP is fast-growing but ultimately nascent. Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus arguing that one primary reason to explain the rise of UKIP voters in low socio-economic areas lies in a major dilemma which has faced the Labour Party – along with all social democratic parties in Western Europe – since the 1970s. Seminally introduced in their work *Paper Stones* (1986), Przeworski and Sprague argue that the ultimate difficulty of electoral socialism lies in the fact that it cannot be successful as merely a party of the workers – its ideological bedrock – as their size as a proportion of the population has never been large enough to gain a majority solely off their backs. As such, social democratic parties, including Labour, have been forced to compete for votes within the middle classes. Nevertheless, this new broad spectrum which adds to industrial workers white collar professionals, public sector employees, students and the petit bourgeois – estimated to reach out to nearly 80 percent of a developed nation's population (Wright 1976) – provides more problems than solutions (Kitschelt 1994). Such breadth generates so many divergent needs and interests within its support bases that it becomes impossible to sustain the

support of both classes. That is to say that by positioning themselves to appeal to the middle masses, social democratic parties neglect the interests of their original support networks and, over time, workers lose faith and cease their support. Herein lies the major electoral dilemma for the Labour Party in the UK according to Przeworski and Sprague; they cannot win elections without the middle classes but by appealing to them they trade away the support of the workers. It is from this electoral trade-off for the Labour Party that UKIP's potential in the North has been seen to have emerged.

The initial, albeit limited, electoral successes of UKIP from its conception to the early 2010s consisted primarily of disaffected middle-class, eurosceptic Conservative voters who became concerned by the prominent liberal wing of the party – represented by Cameron and Osborne – who were seen to be steering their party too far towards the centre (Bush 2016). While such voters continue to be a significant target population– as well as being very well represented in much of the party machinery – it is extremely difficult to sustain that UKIP remains merely a party of *Purple Tories*, as some commentators have attempted to maintain (Oborne 2011; Montgomerie 2012). Instead, it now more commonly argued that what has been central to UKIP's exponential growth in recent years has been its ability to gain mass backing among lower socioeconomic voters.

Such a move in the literature towards underlining the importance of the working-class vote was triggered by Ford and Goodwin's pivotal work *Revolt on the Right* (2014). The first substantial analysis of UKIP and its electoral appeals, the writers emphasise the role of "left-behind" voters in explaining support for the radical right party. As they see it, as the proportion of working classes in the British population collapsed – from nearly half in the mid-1960s to less than a third by the mid-1990s (Heath and Macdonald 1987; Crewe 1991) – it became increasingly imperative that the Labour Party expanded its bases and appealed to middle-class voters. Returning to the *Paper Stones* argument, therefore, as Labour, predominantly under Blair, did this, they moved themselves further and further away from the needs and interests of the workers ignoring concerns over immigration and threats to British cultural traditions as well as apparently failing to protect working class groups as they faced the harsh costs of economic restructuring on their communities. The consequences of this, Ford and Goodwin argue, are the creation of a significant constituency in British society who

feel completely disenchanted not only by the Labour Party but by the political system in general. While such a group of "left-behind" voters posed little threat for New Labour in the short-run such an abandonment of blue-collar workers and lower-level employees offered an unprecedented opportunity for a radical right party in the United Kingdom in the years to come. Using the European Union as a symbol of the ills of modern society, UKIP were able to use its anti-elite, anti-immigration rhetoric in order to place itself in the vacuum in working-class groups created by the Labour Party (Harrison and Bruter 2012).

In this way, therefore, UKIP are argued to have shifted from merely a party of revolting Conservative voters to one which is a stalwart among working class votes and, in doing so, placing themselves firmly on one side of what political scientists see as a new cleavage in European party systems: that between the beneficiaries and champions of globalisation and those – especially former industrial workers – attempting to resist such pressures (Ignazi 2004). Such a transition also mirrors that of many of the most successful radical right parties in Continental Europe. Hans-Georg Betz (1993) noted how many insurgent parties in the 1980s were becoming serious contenders as a direct result of being flooded by poorer, working class voters who had once been loyal social democrats. The Freedom Party of Austria was able to grow in twenty years from 4 percent of the vote share to 49 after pivoting itself into a party of the workers, while the Progress Parties of Denmark and Norway can both track their notable ascents to the point where they shifted from campaigning to rural conservatives to broadening their base and beginning anti-immigration, anti-Islam rhetoric (Oesch 2008; Evans 2005; Andersen and Bjørkland 1990). Thirty years on, Betz and Susi Meret now describe these well-entrenched radical right parties as being "the new parties of the working class" (2013: 108).

Therefore, fundamental to Ford and Goodwin's "left-behind" thesis and later works such as that by Evans and Tilley (2017) which are inspired by their findings, is a vehement belief that structural characteristics – namely class, ethnicity, education levels, occupation type, age, gender – are the most successful variables when modelling UKIP support. So assured in their variables are they, they introduce the reader to what they see as the archetypal, yet fictitious, UKIP voter who embodies these most vital factors determining UKIP support. Indeed, *John* left school at 15 to

become an industrial worker but then became unemployed when his workplace closed and failed to adjust to the post-industrial economy. Henow feels forsaken by the political establishment, concentrating much of his anger towards uncontrolled immigration. It is the structural characteristics which John embodies and which underpin all of the arguments Ford and Goodwin make which this paper seeks to somewhat challenge.

The greatest point of contestation with the models provided by Ford & Goodwin (2014) and Evans & Tilley (2017), however, is their apparent ignorance of the disparity within the fundamental structures they use to explain UKIP-voting in recent years. Structural characteristics, such as education and class, alone cannot be expected to present an accurate picture of the success of UKIP. That is to say, to return to their own narrative, while Ford & Goodwin can use their model to demonstrate that a significant number of them have shifted to UKIP, they cannot show how, or why, some *Johns* have made such a switch while others have remained loyal to the Labour Party. It should be argued that the largest gap in the literature surrounding the nascent political power of UKIP is the ability to identify and explain these variations between those voters within these structural characteristics. Current studies, with the use of large-N aggregate data studies, have, to great avail, exposed the structural mechanisms which have created a meta-narrative of UKIP voting patterns, namely of low educated manual workers vulnerable to globalising pressures who feel abandoned by traditional party politics. However, such sociological frameworks then fail to address the forces below their theories which mean that the structural characteristics they identify will not have a constant and universal outcome across the country. It is the intention of this paper to begin to address this deficiency in the literature in starting to describe and then explain these variations.

This paper aims to consider these variations through the paradigm of political geography. Indeed, its core argument is that incorporating the concept of place into models commonly used to explain voting behaviour is central to a more developed understanding especially with regard to the competition for votes between Labour and UKIP. As differentiated by Thrift (1983), the models currently adopted rely on a *compositional* approach, arguing that a voter's decision is predominantly dictated by their societal status or their personal evaluation of their political-economic situation.

Such an approach leads them to conclusions based on sociological structures which, as discussed above, are extremely useful but have their limitations (Agnew & Duncan 1989; Muir 1975). Political geography seeks to complement such studies with a more *contextual* approach, "according to which, people making voting decisions are influenced by elements of the milieu within which their daily lives are engaged" (Johnston & Pattie 2006: 40). National categories cannot explain individual choices and as such, we must consider the contexts within which each individual voter finds themselves in and the local social mechanisms which determine how different geographies relate to notions such as class (Agnew 1987). Electoral geography argues that compositional models for voting behaviour are extremely important but they must be implemented alongside a consideration of the contextual factors which translate national structures into individual actions. (Agnew 1990). As they see it, local contexts count but are too often ignored as spatial variations which are *explained away* with non-spatial factors (Agnew 1996). As such, this paper proposes conflating the ideas currently accepted within the literature on UKIP with aspects of electoral geography in identifying localised trends and then placing emphasis on the contextual over the structural in its explanations for such a localisation of political competition.

Current studies on electoral geographies stress the importance of *regional* divisions in the UK. For instance, the seminal work by Johnston, Pattie & Allsopp (1988) on Thatcherite Britain not only identifies a very distinct North/South divide in Britain, but also points to regional strongholds such as the industrial towns of the North of England – the focus of this paper – for Labour. However, due to lack of access to data, their methodologies have limited them to such broad patterns and have not been able to fully study the most local of factors, with the smallest spatial divisions which they have been able to use being constituencies (Muir 1985). It should be said that there are aspects of electoral geography which require revision in order for it to be an appropriate tool to improve our current voting behaviour models. To properly account for the true impact of local contexts, electoral geographies need to boil down to the smallest denominations possible, namely political wards, data for which is now more readily available paving the way for a new wave of electoral geography. While recent studies have been able to utilise this increasingly detailed data, with a growing literature being able to point to factors such as the impact of a local candidate (Evans et

al 2017; Arzheimer and Evans 2014), perceptions of the local economy (Auberger and Dubois 2005; Auberger 2012) and the role of familial conversations about politics (Schaffer 2014), these studies are still few and far between. It is the intention of this paper, thus, to take advantage of ward-level data and contribute to this new wave of electoral geographies in order to begin fulfilling the absences currently within the literature on the rise of UKIP among the working classes.

4. Methodology

The purpose of this study was to explore variations in levels of UKIP voting among communities with the archetypal characteristics of the "left-behind" thesis. In turn, it sought to understand whether place and local context played any substantial role in explaining any such disparities in responses to UKIP in the polling stations. Such research could then speak of the localisation of political competition in the United Kingdom, rejecting broad political geographies and demonstrating the declining value of national and regional election strategies for parties. The section which follows specifies the methodologies undertaken to explore this with detailed descriptions of the research design as well as justifications for the selected approaches.

Before detailing the methodological processes behind this paper, it is important to explain the delimitations of this research, namely the choice of region and the choice of election. Geographically, both regions – the North West and South Yorkshire, as defined by the Electoral Commission – act as possibly strong examples for the phenomenon discussed by Ford and Goodwin in representing some of the most predominant areas of the Labour heartlands of the last forty years yet are largely poor, formerly industrialised towns which have struggled to transition to a modern economy. The potential for swathes of disenchanted, "left-behind" voters resulting from this can be seen to be high in these areas making them fertile ground for the narrative of UKIP brought forward by Ford and Goodwin and hence, makes them excellent cases to illustrate the apparent variation in electoral support for UKIP among these "left-behind" voters.

Local council elections were chosen to be the proxy to represent support for either political party as they show levels of such support in the smallest geographic units possible. As discussed earlier, this is vital to properly account for the impact of

local place. Meanwhile, the near-annual occurrences of these elections allowed the most detailed tracking of local trends in political support. While local elections are more likely to be captured by local issues than general elections, the work on the use of local elections to predict the outcome of the 2015 General Election by Rallings et al (2016) suggests that the swings in local elections do tend to then translate into similar swings in national elections. This suggests that the local factors emphasised by the paper can be used in relation to preferences for national as well as local government.

The initial stages of this research lay in exploring whether it was the case that there existed major variations in support for UKIP among low socioeconomic groups in order to challenge the current sociological models as being insufficient to fully explain why a person chooses to vote for UKIP or otherwise. The vote shares for UKIP and the Labour Party in elections held in the last ten years in every ward of the selected regions were collated from data from the Local Election Archive Project. These election results were then mapped against Census data on the sociological makeup of each ward. The variables selected were education levels, class and occupation as all were argued by Ford and Goodwin (2014: 172) as being core factors to explain the UKIP vote. As they see it, the "left-behind" voters, and, in turn, those voting UKIP, were to be found among those with low level (if any) qualifications, those in classes DE on the NRS scale and those who hold (or used to hold) elementary, skilled manual or industrial jobs.

Given the very sharp ethnic divisions between levels of UKIP support – according to British Electoral Study's Continuous Monitoring Studies between 2004 and 2013, 99.6% of their voters were white – adjustments to the dataset were made. Inclusion of these ethnic minorities who often live in the poorest wards within a council would artificially inflate the degree of variation by placing a substantial number of wards, who do not represent the "left-behind" voter, far below the line of regression. As such, wards which were less than 70% white were removed from the dataset. Regressions between the vote share and each independent variable were then conducted to ascertain whether wards with high levels of these x variables consistently voted for UKIP or whether there was enough variation to suggest that these characteristics, alone, are not suitable models.

Driven by the results of this exercise, the second half of this research focused on attempting to explain any variations discovered by exploring the role of local contexts. At this point, it was decided to move to a more qualitative approach, with the remainder of the study centring around interviews conducted with local party activists – councillors, election candidates and board members of local party branches – in selected case studies to understand what they perceive to be helping or hindering their party locally and, crucially, whether this was specific to their own experiences or was shared by other areas. The interviews were semi-structured, with the participants directing the conversations, which was important given that they were much better equipped to discuss what was important about their home towns.

Much of the reasoning behind the selection of methods for this research was driven by the existing literature and the methodological reasons behind the gaps which currently exist within it. If current studies have successfully drawn out the larger national patterns of UKIP voting – the evolution from Conservative Euroscepticism to a broader class base encompassing the "left-behind" voters – then, as discussed above, where the current literature is left lacking is in exploring the more localised nature of the growth of UKIP. It can be argued that the inability to capture such local variations can be explained by the methodological paradigms which have been chosen to study UKIP voting patterns thus far, namely, the use of quantitative data. Large-N data studies have successfully extracted the key structural factors required to discuss the electoral success of UKIP but these are clearly not enough.

Where such quantitative studies fall short is in exposing the context-contingent factors which are driving the localised nature of UKIP support. This rationale leant authority to the integration of qualitative methods into this paper. Alongside this assessment of the existing literature, the logic of the enquiry was also key in determining the research methods used. The inductive nature of this research supported the use of qualitative research methods. Rather than trying to test existing theories, this paper sought to explain previously unconsidered phenomena;such a discovery-focused form of research leant itself well to the use of qualitative research methods (Brannon 2005).

Within this framework of a qualitative approach, a case study design was deemed to be most appropriate for the research. As a methodological genre, case

studies act as tools for intensive analysis of a phenomenon bounded by time and space where, "the interest is […] in context rather than specific variable, in discovery rather than confirmation" (Mariam 1998: 19). Given the ambition of this research lies in trying to identify such contexts of each specific town, the employment of case studies appeared extremely suitable. The case study approach however, means that the generalisability of the findings of this paper are limited. This is, however, the exact intention of this research; to stress the importance of the local and the unique. The case studies used are not aimed at identifying uniform local factors which can be applied elsewhere but instead seek to demonstrate the significance of each town's specific set of local factors in explaining the voting behaviour of their own community.

The case studies used in this paper were selected with a strategy of "off-the-line" criterion (Lieberman 2005). That is to say that the cases selected were councils which consistently went against the model provided by Ford and Goodwin, whose wards had high levels of the explanatory variables yet consistently fell either significantly above or below the expected levels of the dependent variables in the initial research. The rationale behind such a sampling procedure is relatively straight-forward: an attempt to explain deviance from an existing model requires consideration of those cases which deviate. The generalisability of conclusions from such extremes-based samples is challenged in the methodological literatures (Geddes 1990). While, as stated previously, the intention of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of local contexts over universal structures, reducing the need for generalisability, the selected case studies were areas where groups of wards showed consistently similar patterns rather than concentrating on apparent one-off wards. This was done as an attempt to broaden conclusions to town-level rather than produce extremely narrow results on very particular, if not anomalous, wards.

5. Findings and Analysis

5.1 Variation Patterns

Figures 2-4 display the results of the preliminary aggregate studies mapping UKIP support in the local elections of 2015 against the key structural factors eulogised by the current models in the literature. Fundamentally, they signify that there is enough consistent variation in the y variable – UKIP support in the 2015 local elections – as the

independent variables increase to suggest that such sociological factors are insufficient to properly explain defections (or lack thereof) from traditional parties towards UKIP. Such variations also indicate the potential relevance of local contexts to compliment these current studies.

The first thing to note from these results is the lack of evidence of a parabolic-shaped regression with the data portraying, instead, a very linear pattern. There is extremely little support for UKIP in wards at the lower end of the x-axes and thus little backing from wealthier voters. In the regions of the country covered in this study, UKIP has clearly been very successful in its transition from Conservative Euroscepticism and these results imply that they are now able to predominantly make electoral gains off the backs of working class citizens. Such findings add further evidence to show that Labour and UKIP are, therefore, in direct competition in these regions for the same working class share of the electorate.

Figure 2 *UKIP vote share in 2015 Local Elections against proportion of ward of C2/DE class*
Source: Local Election Archive Project; UK Census (2011)

Figure 3 *UKIP vote share in 2015 Local Elections against proportion of ward with employment in* Skilled trades occupations, Process plant and machine operatives *or* Elementary occupations
Source: Local Election Archive Project; UK Census (2011)

Figure 4 *UKIP vote share in 2015 Local Elections against proportion of ward with Level 2 or below qualifications*
Source: Local Election Archive Project; UK Census (2011)

However, what is far more interesting than such a confirmation of what is already recognised in the literature is what can be found at the other end of the x-axes.

These points can be seen to expose the deficiencies in the sociological models which currently direct our understanding of UKIP. There is an evident linear trend between these structural characteristics and voting for UKIP – as indicated by the strong R2 values between 0.11 and 0.17 – showing that these structures play a significant role in our understanding and by no means ought we dismiss their relevance. Nevertheless, the variation in dependant variable outcomes at the upper bounds of these independent variables is extremely significant. They show that while the statement, "*if a ward votes UKIP, then it has a high proportion of working class citizens* (or equally high proportion of low-educated or elementary skilled workers)" clearly holds to a great degree, the reverse statement that, "*if a ward has a high proportion of working class citizens, then it votes UKIP*" does not. There are a substantial number of wards on all three *Figures* who exhibit very high levels of the independent variables yet do not vote UKIP to any noteworthy extent. Instead, some of these very low socioeconomic wards are continuing to vote along traditional cleavage lines, having stuck with Labour.

These findings demonstrate that the current voting models seeking to explain why people vote UKIP thatlay heavy emphasis on the role of structural properties are very much imperfect. While telling a very important meta-narrative of the rise of UKIP in the country as a whole, these works fall short when you try to apply them to more focused geography. As shown by the regions of the North-West and South Yorkshire, the variation found in this paper demonstrate that on a more local scale, structural factors, such as class or education, alone, certainly do not instruct whether someone will vote for UKIP or not. Indeed, they have a role to play but they must be complimented by other theories and models which are able to explain why some working class, low-educated, manual workers will vote UKIP while others will not.

The second intention of this paper, after showing the need for additional non-sociological models, was to investigate whether the variations shown in *Figures 2-4* can be explained with use of the principles of electoral geography, namely the importance of place and context. To do this, councils and towns were considered in isolation to observe whether their constituent wards responded similarly to the independent variables or whether they were heavily dispersed across the y-axis. *Figure 5* take the wards with the highest levels of the "left-behind" characteristics in selected towns and councils in the regions and highlights them in comparison to the spread of

the entire dataset. What can be noted from these results is that, in the large majority of cases, wards of the same council had very similar levels of UKIP support and towns were certainly situated in around one point on the y-axis.

What this suggests, first of all, is that there appear to be fundamental characteristics about these towns which mean that their wards behave similarly. This lends great authority to the notion that geography plays an important factor in explaining these voting behaviours. Rather than just variation between wards, we are actually looking at distinct variation between towns suggesting that their own particular contexts explain why they find themselves in a different location in the original *Figures 2-4* than their neighbouring towns. That is to say that there is something particular about a town like Oldham, which when controlling for class, education or occupation type, has a significantly higher degree of UKIP voters than a town like Wigan and needs to be uncovered. As such, it is vital to ascertain a thorough grip on the geographies and contextual factors of these towns and councils if we are to properly understand why some of them have seen their constituents flock in their masses to support UKIP while others have witnessed very little evidence of the "left-behind" thesis.

Figure 5 *UKIP vote share in 2015 Local Elections against proportion of ward with Level 2 or below qualifications with the five highest proportion wards in selected councils highlighted*
Source: Local Election Archive Project; UK Census (2011)

6. Case Studies

Following from this validation of the need to consider geographical contexts to understand the Labour-UKIP competition in the North West and South Yorkshire, case studies were selected to begin to explore what exactly these "particular characteristics" of each town or city are. The section which follows is an analysis of the results of a series of interviews in the councils of Liverpool, Rotherham and Manchester. Using the "off-the-line" selection process discussed earlier, these were chosen as their results were significantly different than the expected pattern in the regression, with Liverpool falling appreciably below the line and Rotherham showing levels of UKIP support far higher than anticipated as shown in *Figures 6 and 7*.

Manchester was selected as the final case, in part, because it represented a council whose wards were relatively near the line of regression and, as such, could be used as a comparison between the other two more extreme examples. However, it was also selected because, as shown in *Figure 8*, it was one of the few areas whose wards spread significantly more notably across the y-axis. Closer consideration showed that those wards that were above the line were those situated in the North of the city and those below the line were in the South. As such, Manchester represented a potentially valuable case suggesting an even more focused distinction between geographies which was not just inter-council but also intra-council.


Figure 6 UKIP vote share in 2015 Local Elections against proportion of ward with C2/DE class and the wards of Rotherham highlighted
Source: Local Election Archive Project; UK Census (2011)

Figure 7 *UKIP vote share in 2015 Local Elections against proportion of ward with C2/DE class and the wards of Liverpool highlighted*
Source: Local Election Archive Project; UK Census (2011)

Figure 8 *UKIP vote share in 2015 Local Elections against proportion of ward with C2/DE class and the wards of Manchester highlighted*
Source: Local Election Archive Project; UK Census (2011)

6.1   Rotherham

Seen to be at the vanguard of the UKIP revolution, Rotherham is one of the party's best success stories not only in the region but in the country as a whole (Helm 2016). *Figure 9* shows how, locally, UKIP have been recording double-digit results in council

elections for nearly a decade. In 2014, not only did they gain the most votes across the council, but the party also managed to break the majoritarian threshold and to enjoy winning its first seats. Three years on, UKIP are represented by 18 councillors: the most in any metropolitan council in the country.


Figure 9 *Vote share of Labour, UKIP and BNP in Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council elections, 2002-2016*
Source: Local Election Archive Project

The first thing to note when discussing why Rotherham has witnessed an explosion in votes for UKIP in comparison to its surrounding towns is, of course, the Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) attacks which devastated the town from at least 1997 to 2013. The scale of the abuse, which was first made public in The Times in 2012 (Norfolk 2012), had profound impacts on the town and evidently impacted residents' views of the Labour-dominated council (Jay 2014). Increased xenophobic tensions, while not directly exploited by the party, and an anti-establishment sentiment engendered by the scandal provoked large numbers of defections away from Labour to UKIP according to nearly all respondents. While this in and of itself is an example of the importance of local context, it can also be seen to challenge any argument that there existed a "natural" strength of the "left-behind" vote in Rotherham.

Nevertheless, it should be seen that we should not dismiss Rotherham as a case for this study. Firstly, as we can see in *Figure 9*, UKIP showed potential to enter the political mainstream in Rotherham long before the scandal emerged – their strength in 2009 and 2010 was significantly higher than elsewhere in the study – demonstrating the need to understand the situation prior to the scandal. Moreover, while they naturally

attracted votes from xenophobia, there is nothing to suggest that UKIP was destined to benefit from the CSE case; what caused them to be able to take advantage of the situation needs to be studied. In this way, therefore, it should be seen that a study of local factors other than the CSE scandal is required.

Beyond the CSE case, then, what emerged from interviews with local political figures from both Labour and UKIP were two main strands of arguments explaining why the radical right party have managed to occupy a significant part of the political space in Rotherham: the lack of political competition in the town in the 2000s and the particularities of local branch of UKIP.

6.2   Political Monopolisation

Labour officials, when interviewed, were quick to mention the impact their previous dominance in Rotherham had had on contemporary politics in the town. As shown in *Table 3*, prior to UKIP's ascent, Labour had held huge majorities in local elections ever since the turn of the century, meaning that there was little space for viable opposition and, in turn, competition. One councillor described the situation of the mid-2000s as being a "*one-party state*" while another admitted that, at the time, Labour could have "*put a red rosette on a donkey* [and still win]". The impact of this monopolisation of the political arena was neglect by the party to interact as much with the electorate as previously required; one experienced interviewee confessed how the Labour Party had started to "[take] *support for granted*", increasing the prospects for a frustrated and disenchanted electorate to succumb to populism.

Boston Castle*	40.4	Rother Vale	38.4
Brinsworth and Catcliffe	35.3	Rotherham East*	40.8
Dinnington	35.0	Rotherham West	36.4
Hellaby	6.4	Silverwood	8.3
Holderness	30.5	Swinton	44.8
Hoober	35.3	Valley	46.1
Keppel*	49.2	Wath	29.1
Maltby	22.8	Wingfield	33.5
Rawmarsh	45.3	* Seats contested by the Liberal Democrats	

Figure 9 *Majorities, in percentages, held after the Labour Party in the 2012 Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council elections*
Source: Local Election Archive Project

When UKIP did begin to emerge then, if a voter wanted to use their vote to protest against Labour and demand change, they became the only viable option to vote for as there was no effective opposition from the traditional parties. As shown in the *Table 3*, the Liberal Democrats only contested three seats won by Labour in 2012, and there still existed a strong stigma among working class communities to vote Conservative. Such a problem was emphasised when the CSE scandal erupted as voters no longer trusted Labour but had nowhere else to turn but UKIP. The possibilities for UKIP were then exacerbated as they came in competition against a stale Labour party. Having taken victories for granted for years, the party's local membership had become completely inactive leaving candidates unable to use the strongest campaign weapon of social democratic parties. UKIP successfully filled the vacuum left by Labour's previous supremacy and were then able to use this space to become effective competition when voters were looking to move away from the incumbents.

6.3   Effectiveness of Local UKIP Branch

It became apparent through the interviews that the agency of UKIP in Rotherham is a vital element in this narrative which must be stressed. Decisions made by the local branch have made a significant difference to their prospects in recent years. A member of the branch's board stressed how they sought to "*buck the trend of UKIP*" and felt it necessary to defy many directives from the party's central organisation. Given that UKIP are fighting on two very different grounds – one in working class industrial towns and another in Conservative leaning suburbs in the South – UKIP officials said that they felt that much of the manifesto pledges in recent years had been irrelevant for Rotherham, if not outright damaging to their chances in the town. For example, one UKIP member recalled how he had criticised former leader, Nigel Farage, on three separate occasions insisting that he "*stop talking about* [Margaret] *Thatcher in the North*!" As such, and despite consistent berating by the centre, UKIP Rotherham chose to dramatically alter the UKIP message to cater for their audience, removing damaging aspects of the party's policy preferences. This agency by the branch has clearly been successful and demonstrates that local party actions are significant – we cannot attribute electoral outcomes solely to the actions of those at the centre. Those which

translate the party's message, and how effective they are at doing this, play a principal yet often-overlooked role in a party's successes.

One huge barrier which is endemic to UKIP and which it needs to overcome to be successful are the stigmas which are often affiliated with them. Indeed, their stances on Europe and immigration are often slanted as being racist, which is exacerbated by unhelpful comparisons to the more overtly racially-orientated BNP, as well as controversial statements spread through the media (Mason 2013). One of the most important reasons behind UKIP's success in Rotherham – and their ability to gain votes following the CSE scandal – has been the local branch's abilities to ameliorate their image among voters as well as candidates.

One prominent local activist said that this has been achieved mainly from getting into office, which allowed them to prove that they are a much more credible outfit than the rest of their radical right counterparts. Such improvements were also noted by Labour representatives who acknowledged that the party, who had previously had to be asked to leave meetings, had become much less aggressive both in their campaigns and also in council work. This improvement in image was equally as necessary to being able to get candidates to stand for UKIP. While admitting that they still had great difficulties – something which will be highlighted in greater detail in the discussions on Liverpool – UKIP officials felt that they were much better at finding enough quality candidates than their counterparts elsewhere in the region. This ability to stand decent candidates is obviously imperative for electoral success but is certainly not a given for UKIP. As such, this cleaning up of the image of UKIP in Rotherham has been an extremely important factor behind their recent successes locally.

All in all, therefore, we can see that the extreme support for UKIP in Rotherham compared to many of its neighbouring towns can be attributed to a very unique set of factors which have led the town down their own independent path. The interviews conducted created a narrative of a town with a status quo which had created a very stale brand of politics. Monopolisation was, however, blown apart by a major local scandal and then taken advantage of by an effective local branch of the opposition party.

6.4 Liverpool

If Rotherham has been a bastion of UKIP successes, Liverpool can easily be seen as the villain of the piece, with the party failing to make any real inroads in any stratum of elections. The city was one of the few formerly industrial areas in the North West to vote Remain in the EU Referendum. In the 2015 local elections, UKIP only received 6.7 percent of the popular vote despite contesting all but three of the seats. Equally noteworthy, the wards in the city have as high if not higher levels of the original variables on education, class and occupation as their counterparts in Rotherham yet record 25-30 percentage points fewer votes for UKIP. Clearly, Liverpool is a very strong counterexample to the class-based "left-behind" thesis, which demonstrates that how local contexts interplay with these more structural explanations are key. Following from the interviews with local candidates, several elements of the context of Liverpool emerge which demonstrate why they defy the trend projected by many of their neighbouring towns: greater levels of political participation and an integrationist culture generating stigmas attributed to UKIP.


Figure 10 Vote share of Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP and BNP in Liverpool Metropolitan Borough Council elections, 2002-2016
Source: Local Election Archive Project

6.5 Political Competition

One key difference between Liverpool and Rotherham is that while Labour have, in the long-run, enjoyed great popular support, as shown in *Figure 10,* they have also been forced to compete alongside another effective traditional party – the Liberal Democrats. In this way, therefore, voters have more easily been able to transfer their votes if they

wanted to protest the actions of an incumbent party without the need of reverting to a more extreme party to do so as in Rotherham. Indeed, such a situation occurred in the late 1990s, when Labour lost control of the council as participants accepted that the party had become "*cocky*" in their campaigns. This forced the local party machinery to overhaul their approach and spend a lot more time in close connection with their electorate, with respondents indicating heavily that this time period made the party much more effectual not only in winning future elections, but also in hearing the demands of the people of Liverpool. UKIP can be seen to have struggled in Liverpool because of the greater degree of competition which was already in place when they tried to enter the fray. Such competition gave them much less space in which to compete and also forced their opponents to become more responsive to their electorate than in Rotherham.

6.6   Importance of Culture

When asked why they felt that Liverpool had managed to resist UKIP, the first response of the majority of those interviewed was that the answer lay in the culture of the city. That is to say that the history of the city as a major international port means it is characterised as being a "*city of immigrants*" where migrant communities had settled for generations and have, in turn, established themselves much more effectively into local society than elsewhere. This diversity has institutionalised a more inclusive and welcoming attitude to migrants. Though they make it clear that they are not heralding the city as a utopia of multiculturalism (racism, they accepted, is still present in the town's poorer areas) Labour councillors repeatedly expressed sentiments similar to this example: "*I think our tolerance for strangers, being a port city, is much higher than other parts of the U.K*". This tolerance can be perceived through the lack of progress made by the BNP prior to UKIP's attempts, as shown in *Figure 10*. It can be seen that people in Liverpool are much less responsive to the anti-immigration, anti-EU rhetoric of the radical right parties because of their history and the attitudes it has entrenched, which should be seen as crucial reason behind UKIP's lack of progress in the city.

This culture of tolerance can also be seen in the city's ongoing boycott of the Sun newspaper, which has recently re-entered the news cycle following a ban on the paper's sales at the Everton football stadium, Goodison Park. In this way,

Liverpudlians have a proud tradition of defying unabashedly hostile rhetoric making progress in the city even more unlikely for UKIP.

6.7 Stigmas attached to UKIP

As discussed earlier in the case of Rotherham, the stereotypes attributed to UKIP are a major stumbling block for the party and while the Yorkshire town has been successful in overcoming these problems, in Liverpool, such stigmas have proven very stubborn. Such image-related problems were also exacerbated by the Labour Party – one campaigner for the party indicated that they had successfully associated UKIP with the Conservatives giving them very little appeal among voters. While it was initially hoped that new leader, Paul Nuttall, a native of the city, would ameliorate the party's image, false statements on his relations with the Hillsborough disaster were taken with great disdain in the city. provoking the Chair of the party's Liverpool branch, Adam Heatherington, to resign (Parveen, Mason and Cobain 2017). The result of all of this has not just been damaging for their prospects with the electorate. Party membership dwindles in the area as people are reluctant to join what is seen as a corrosive party and the quality and quantity of candidates they can stand is extremely low as, according to one respondent, they fear "*character assassinations*" from being associated with UKIP. Indeed, when asked whether they perceived UKIP as a future threat in the city, many Labour representatives responded negatively believing that, currently, the party does not have the grassroots base from which to launch a significant platform because of its damaging image.

While representing the two very extremes of the variations, comparisons of Liverpool and Rotherham can be seen to be highly informative on the importance of local factors in determining how what is all too often seen as a standardised trend in electoral behaviour occur in each individual town. In Liverpool, Labour is buoyed by greater competition from traditional parties making them more robust to the whims of UKIP a party who, while viewed in a good light in Rotherham, must fight against a culture of tolerance, negating much of their rhetoric as well as a public profile which makes them somewhat toxic to voters and potential candidates.

6.8 Manchester

Manchester was selected as a case study to be considered for two reasons. Firstly, it exhibits much greater levels of support for UKIP than Liverpool despite having similar degrees of competition with Liberal Democrats. Indeed, while its vote share across the city is very similar to that of Liverpool as shown in *Figure 11*, such city-wide statistics mask their true support as it is concentrated only in poor white wards where they poll at around 20%. In comparison, UKIP's most successful ward in Liverpool saw them win just 11%. Respondents in both cities attributed this difference primarily to the increased degree of a culture of inclusion in Liverpool, as discussed earlier.


Figure 11 *Vote share of Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP and BNP in Manchester Metropolitan Borough Council elections, 2002-2016*
Source: Local Election Archive Project

More interestingly, however, support for UKIP appears to be geographically split across the city. As shown in *Figure 12*, among the wards which exhibit strong levels of the "left-behind" variables, support for UKIP is considerably stronger in the North of the city than in the South. Such a split gives great evidence to the importance of the local milieu in determining how the "left-behind" thesis works in any given place. It is clear that support for UKIP in Manchester lay not in local factors attributed to the city but to an even more concentrated context of their area of the city, a concentration which could only be noted through the use of ward-level data. During interviews, two key factors were drawn out: the geographic spread of the most recent

waves of immigration into the city and the imbalance of economic development in the areas in recent years.


Figure 13 *Majorities, in percentages, held by Labour over UKIP in each ward after the 2015 Manchester Metropolitan Borough Council elections*
Source: Local Election Archive Project
Note: Wards left white either did not have a UKIP candidate standing for them or did not exhibit high enough levels of the "left-behind" characteristics.

6.9   Immigration Patterns

While both wards in the North and South have similar levels of ethnic minority communities of around 10% of the population, the rate of change in areas such as Moston in the North of the city have been substantially higher in recent years. It was suggested in the interviews that the more rooted ethnic minority communities meant that the white working-class communities in the South felt much less threatened with regards to competition for public resources such as social housing, as well as producing a *"greater sense of "cosmopolitanism", as it were".* On the other hand, a noticeable influx of migrants into the North of the city raised tensions in increasing competition. It also provided a scapegoat who white working class residents who are not gaining access to these resources could blame raising conspiratorial tensions that the local

council is biased against the established community. While there is absolutely no evidence available to prove a bias towards housing migrants, the perception of one is enough for people to move towards the anti-migrant, populist rhetoric of UKIP. Such a strong belief of a rigged system towards migrants was noted in Barking, East London resulting in a similar surge to UKIP (Smith 2010). It can be said that the disparities in recent waves of immigration between the two ends of the city can help to explain the varying responses to UKIP in Manchester.

6.10 Economic Development

Equally, an imbalance in new development projects between the two areas of the city was highlighted as being a potential area of explanation in the divergent prospects of UKIP. The majority of major projects outside of the city centre have occurred in the South in particular the creation of Airport City Manchester, a Chinese-funded business development, and Medipark, an expansion of Wythenshawe Hospital, both of which are thought to create over 25000 jobs for South Manchester (Bell 2014; Daily Mail 2013). Equally, the expansion of the city's major tram system, Manchester Metrolink, ventured South before North - only having connected Moston in the last 5 years - meaning that job creation prospects in the centre have been much more accessible for Wythenshawe constituents than those in Blackley, for instance (Pidd 2014). This massive imbalance in development was argued to have had great consequences for the UKIP/Labour competition. In the South, while deprivation is still very high, competition for jobs is much lower, while large physical projects in the vicinity gave a sense that they are part of a prosperous economic situation, boosting attitudes towards the Labour incumbents. Meanwhile, competition for jobs, combined with the increased levels of migrant communities in recent years, increases a sense of a rigged system pushing white working class voters towards UKIP. In this way, therefore, the imbalance in economic development in Manchester can be seen to have created somewhat politically polarised working class communities in the North and South of the city; while the latter enjoy the fruits of investment the latter is pushed into competition with ethnic minorities increasing racial tensions and xenophobic attitudes.

In this way, therefore, the two most prominent factors raised to explain varying levels of UKIP support in Manchester, namely economic development and immigration

levels, can both be seen to be intrinsically geographic in nature. Both explain how divergent changes to the environments of voters in the North and South, whether economically or socially, have had profound impacts on their attitudes to Labour and UKIP. Thus, it can be said that Manchester as a case study provides a great deal of evidence for the importance of local contexts to explain voting behaviours and, by extension, the importance of the integration of local geography as a factor in modelling such behaviours.

Overall, therefore, these case studies have successfully exposed some of the local factors in these three councils which have meant that while structurally very similar have had very divergent responses to the new Labour/UKIP competition line. Patterns of economic development or the attitudes of the local community – in this case the degree of stigma associated with UKIP – for instance, can be seen as factors which are very much dependant on the local situation, demonstrating the importance of considering these geographies when studying the rise of UKIP but also other competition dimensions in the UK. It is important to stress once again that these findings do not represent local factors which can then be extrapolated from these three areas and tested elsewhere. Rather, the point is that these qualitative methods can be replicated in other areas of the region and the factors which define their locality would be lifted out. While there may be some degree of crossover, it is the unique nature of each place, and hence the unique environment in which to compete politically, which ought to be stressed. All in all, though, it can be seen that by pointing to such uniqueness, this paper has found evidence of variation within structural characteristics in the North-West and South Yorkshire and then gone on to demonstrate the importance of integrating *local* geographies into analyses to explain such variations.

However, this suggestion of the necessity of electoral geographies has broader implications. Indeed, these findings provide evidence to suggest that we are witnessing a very distinct localisation of British politics. While the industrial towns of the North West were viewed thirty years ago as the bedrock of Labour support and constituency victories, it hardly seems appropriate, looking at *Figures 5-9*, to describe the region as a single political geography. Trying to conflate the actions of the people of Bolton, for instance, with those of Manchester appears completely jarring. As we can see, these towns and cities now react to political phenomena – as in this case, the rise of UKIP –

in much more unique fashions. As such attributing one single label and assuming a uniform voting behaviour across these towns is outdated. We need to begin to focus the geographies we use to discuss the electoral map of the UK. Voting patterns have now gone way beyond the North/South divide or other very broad geographical frameworks, meaning that if voters are becoming more influenced by the very local, then so must our studies on such behaviours.

If regions no longer vote dependably across the region according to certain sociological consistencies, as shown to be the case here in the example of the Labour/UKIP battle in the North of England, then it would appear that voters have increasingly de-aligned from traditional structural cleavages. Such a de-alignment appears to have been replaced, to a certain degree, by a growing influence from the place in which the voter finds themselves not because of the structural characteristics which define it, but because of the particularities and contexts of the town which make it unique compared to its neighbours. In this way, therefore, the major finding of this paper, following from observations indicating a greater role for electoral geographies, is that in the North-West and South Yorkshire regions there is substantial evidence to suggest a localisation of political competition in the UK. Such a finding, as discussed in the concluding chapter, has profound implications academically, as well as for the nature of political competition during elections should further study suggest a nationwide shift towards the local.

7. Conclusions

The findings of the research undertaken for this paper have provided evidence to suggest the integration of electoral geography when modelling voting behaviours within competition between Labour and UKIP. Structural characteristics, while clearly important, are insufficient variables to portray a true depiction of the changes which have resulted in the radical right party's arrival in the North of England. Ford and Goodwin's "left-behind" thesis is an extremely important narrative not only in this but also in explaining much of the British political landscape. However, its arguments should not be taken as a given nor should it be seen that its impacts occur homogenously across place.

Improvements in these current sociological models lie in the conflation of their ideas with those of political geography. Discovered in initial regression data and then supported by case study evidence, this paper has found that place – and its idiosyncrasies – have vastly altered how the "left-behind" thesis evolves in each town or city within the region. Within the three case studies, a wide array of contextual factors are found to help explain each unique place including economic development patterns, local attitudes (and conversely stigmas) and historically institutionalised patterns of political competition. There was also evidence to suggest that there is a space for the agency of local party activists in helping in these explanations. All such factors cannot merely be explained away by structural factors but are wholly defined by their place and its histories. This paper was preliminary and exploratory by nature, meaning that further investigation is encouraged in order to truly ascertain the degree of involvement of such contextual factors within the regions in question here, but also to investigate whether such a phenomenon has rooted itself in other areas of the country and along other lines of party competition.

However, it should be said that broader conclusions can be made from these findings. The need to consider such local electoral geographies can be seen to indicate that we are witnessing the localisation of political competition in the UK. The nation does not vote unvaryingly according to meta-structures such as class, but, as shown in these findings, neither do regions. The devolvement of de-alignment now means that political competition is defined by the local, meaning we can no longer look to "safe" regions such as North-West for Labour. It seems absurd, for instance, to try and conflate areas such as Bolton and Oldham with Manchester as one singular bloc of seats which can be fought for with one singular line of policy stances.

Perhaps, it could be observed that such localisations are, currently, more prominent in Labour-supporting areas than in Conservative ones. The *Paper Stones* electoral dilemma of the social democratic left would mean that Labour are more susceptible to such a de-alignment and localisation of their former strongholds as they spread themselves too thinly and fail to find the point of maximum utility in their trade-offs. However, further investigation is required to substantiate this point.
The findings of such a localisation of political competition – should further study provide evidence of a similar shift to the microcosmic in areas outside of the bounds of

this research – are significant not only academically, altering how we approach modelling voting behaviour in this country, but also for the future of political campaigning. If there are no longer such things as regional strongholds as each constituent town of the area now votes along unique, personalised lines, then competition in elections cannot focus down to marginal regions, such as the infamous "Middle England" in the 2010 General Election. Equally, such localisation spells impending difficulties to Labour as they must now direct funds to protect their own (former) bases before trying to reach out enough to obtain a majority. Such difficulties are an even worse version of the doom forecast by Przeworski and Sprague nearly thirty years ago.

In short, therefore, the findings of this paper suggest that researchers ought to further explore the extent to which we are witnessing the regional de-alignment of voting behaviours. While sociologies will continue to represent a crucial element of electoral studies it is vital that we find a valued position for geography in our research if we are to truly understand the confused political landscape which Britain finds itself in today.

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From Waterloo to Wembley: A Comparison of International Football and International Warfare in Building Nationalism

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1. Introduction

At the 57th minute of the game, Michel Platini, the mythical French number 10, sends Battiston towards the goal. The French player is violently hit by Harald Schumarrer, the brutal German goalkeeper, who came out of his box and collided with Battiston in a desperate defensive move. The Frenchman is knocked out and taken straight to hospital. This is the paroxysm of tension in the *"Third World War"*, as described by the French Press (So Foot 2016): the semi-final of the 1982 World Cup between former secular enemies, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The bitter defeat for the French side generated, in the country, a resurgence of anti-German feelings, unprecedented in the post-war era and embodied by Schumarrer's demonisation, forcing President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl to publish a common appeasement press release.

This game, still very present in the French collective imagery, shows how much international football can tickle national sentiments. French people were united behind eleven players, seen as the representatives of their nation. They lived the game as a common experience, shared by the whole community. They were defended by mythical characters, such as Platini, against the Germans, an external threat, of which the stereotypes (brutal and mechanical game) were emphasised against the supposed French virtues of beautiful football. The references to war are not fortuitous. Just like football, war is associated with nationalism. While both sides of the relationship have been discussed (Hutchinson 2017), a whole body of literature convincingly studies the nationalist-builder power of warfare (Hutchinson 2017; Comaroff and Stern 1995; Hutchinson and Smith 2000; Hall and Malesevic 2013). International football offers an arena in which national teams face each other for glory. It has often been referred to as a soft way of going to war, a peaceful substitute for conflict-prone nations that would otherwise confront on the battlefield (Marks 1999). *"Football is war without the dead"*, as summed-up by Giroud (1999) in Ghemmour (Ghemmour 2013). This analysis

provides a starting point, but appears frustratingly simplistic. In a time where the rise of nationalism and nationalist political leaders is pointed out as a widespread and potentially worrying phenomenon, it is important to understand precisely what we mean by nations and nationalism, and, crucially, what their key determinants are. This is all the more topical in a time of globalisation, which is thought to bolster nationalism (Keating 2001). As the world becomes more interconnected, with increasing international flows of goods, services and people, deep changes and apparent threats to traditional identities fuel the opposite reactionary phenomenon of willingness to come back to national roots. Under that respect, football is both the most globalised sport and an arena of traditional, national confrontation, and perfectly embodies this tension between globalisation and nationalism.

Therefore, this dissertation will answer the following question: to what extent is international football comparable to international war in building nationalism?

It will argue, adopting an ethno-symbolist perspective, that under the framework of the nation-state, international football is very similar to war in the way it builds nationalism; and that, in times of globalisation, football may have the potential to go even further than war, to build a new form of nationalism beyond borders. The first part of the answer studies elements of myths, shared experience, rituals and symbols that both war and international football forge to foster "*imagined communities*". The second, more hypothetical, explores football's capacity to build imagined communities within diasporas and between diasporas and homeland, while allowing diaspora members to construct their complex, multi-layered identities, both in relation to their country of origin and of residence. The "new" aspect matters. While war can also build nationalism for people living outside their homeland, it will be very comparable to the one I analyse under the framework of the nation-state. That is, implying territorial and political claims, following the idea that a nation must have a corresponding political and geographical unit – the state. On the other hand, football can allow for a less conflictual form of nationalism, not necessarily negatively built on the opposition to another group, and not based upon the idea that members of a same national group must necessarily share the same territory, enabling the diaspora to gain a sense of themselves as both part of their new country of residence and proud of their

origins. In short, nations evolve with globalisation and football could be a way to make nationalism change accordingly.

While further definitions and conceptualisations will be made in the main body of this dissertation, it is useful to offer some precision now. A nation is a group held together and animated by a national consciousness. I borrow, here, the definition used by Hutchinson (2017, pp.7) for it is representative of a widely accepted view among scholars: "*nations are considered as named communities, resting on conceptions of common descent, regulative customary practices, the possession of a homeland, and a distinctive culture, that claim or aspire to be self-governing.*" Other recurrent elements include a single-economy and common rights and duties for its citizens. The self-governing element of the definition hints towards our definition of nationalism: the idea that nations are distinct groups that should have a corresponding political unit. In Gellner's words, it is "*the principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent*" (in Hobsbawm 1992). To be clear, nations should have a state. Nationalism requires the nation-state, which further bolsters nationalism (Kohn 2000).

On a different note, because this dissertation explores nationalism, it is exclusively interested in international football – where national teams play against each other, especially in big tournaments such as the World Cup. It will thus use "football" and "international football" interchangeably.

This dissertation proceeds as follows. The first part deals with academic conceptualisations of the nation and conceptual distinctions. It presents different theories surrounding the rise of nations and nationalism, examining, in particular, the debate between primordialism and instrumentalism, and adopts an ethno-symbolist view, considering nations and nationalism largely as modern constructions and inventions, nevertheless rooted in pre-existing cultures and ethnic groups. The second part explains how, under such a perspective, warfare and football are very similar in the way they build nationalism within the framework of the nation-state, essentially being two alternatives using the same nationalism-builder elements. It uses a case study based on the Netherlands and Dutch national identity, made of a limited set of detailed interviews. The third part explores how, in times of globalisation, the role of football can evolve into building a new form of nationalism linking the increasing number of people living outside their homeland, thus forming diasporas, amongst themselves and

with their home country. It illustrates its point with a case study made of a questionnaire conducted with the Portuguese community in France.

2. Nations as Modern Inventions, Rooted in Previous Ethnic and Cultural Traditions

Most people feel attached to a nation (Hutchinson and Smith, 2000). Most states' policies are based on national criteria, used to prioritise some people over others: allocation of welfare benefits, right to vote in local elections, right to reside in the country (Beitz 1983). Nation-states have become the norm, especially in the wave of decolonisation following World War II, to the point where the United Nations (the very name is not accidental) formally uses the word in its texts (Vertovec and Cohen, 2002). Given its importance in current politics, nations and nationalism have become a large body of studies.

The field is so dense that various schools of thought have emerged. While the space of the dissertation impedes a detailed exploration, a detour to present them and adopt the one that I consider most adapted is indispensable, in order to better analyse, in the subsequent sections, the roles of war and football.

The first school of thought is primordialist. It essentially believes that nations are natural, primordial, part of human condition (Hutchinson and Smith, 2000). They represent a naturally given sense of nationhood (Conversi, 2000). Nations evolve differently throughout history as they are "biologically" different: they are some kind of big family in which people's sense of belonging is fostered by a sense of recognition of common culture, affinity, and similarity. The ethnic myths of origin supposedly reflect real lines of descent. This last point is very much empirically false, notwithstanding the fact that no real argument can explain why there would be natural family-like ties between the members of a same nation in the first place. An evolution, thus, is perennialism. According to this school, while nations are not natural, they have existed at every period in time. However, for centuries, there was no real sense of belonging to a same community, apart from within the aristocracy of a country (Anderson, 2006). It is, indeed, hard to think that the 15th century serf working the land in the South of current France thought of himself as French or even belonging to a community wider than his village. Even the concept of language, which is central to the

idea of a nation, is, in part, the product of nationalism, as Billig (1995) convincingly argues. This is not to say that people did not communicate in the old days, but that the notion of language implies a degree of conscious separateness between people that did not make very much sense for most of history. It is possible to acknowledge that, to a certain extent, a fraction of the population had a sense of national identity prior to what modernists would concede (18th century and revolution). However, as it did not concern the majority of the population and was not followed by the political project of uniting the nation under a single body politic, it can hardly be considered as universal and atemporal manifestations of nationalism.

Therefore, this leads to the opposite view: modernism. It gained importance under the influence of heavyweights such as Hobsbawm (1983, 1992) or Anderson (2006). While the views about what exactly has brought about the rise of nations diverge, there is one agreement: they are recent, modern era (late 18th century) inventions. Some link it to the rise of capitalism (Gellner, in: Hutchinson and Smith, 2000), and the destruction of traditional kinship that creates the necessity of new forms of social ties. Others apply a top down approach with intellectual agitators spreading the concept of nationalism to the masses. Sometimes it is seen as state-led (elites trying to homogenise a nation to legitimate their rule), sometimes as state-seeking, with people looking for a state corresponding to their group (Tilly, 1995). In any case, the emergence of the desire for nation-states is, in all those views, characteristic of the modern era.

While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to arbitrate between those competing theories, a striking point about nations is that they lack an objective criterion that would allow anyone to identify them at first sight (Billig, 1995). Nations differ in size, geography, population, number of languages, number of ethnic groups. This clearly hints towards the idea that subjectivity is a key element of nationalism (Calhoun 2007; Billig, 1995) and gives weight to the notion of imagined community as the principal basis for nations and nationalism.

The idea of imagined communities was pioneered by Anderson (2006). The point is that a "nation is an imagined political community, imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." (Anderson 2006, pp.6) The idea behind "imagined" is that most people will never meet each other and be aware of each other's existence, yet they feel

part of the same community, believing they share common elements, mostly cultural. The limitation aspect is crucial to nation-building: a nation constructs a sense of itself because it knows it differs from other nations, which begin beyond its own borders. The political sovereignty is also important to make it different from any kind of group organisation that existed in history. Nations are cultural artefacts. They developed with the end of classic languages such as Latin, progressively replaced by vernacular languages that, thanks to the massive diffusion of print capitalism (books and newspapers), developed each community's sense of distinctiveness and fostered people's sense to belong to the same community as those who read in the same language. Notably, a sense of simultaneity and homogenous timeframe emerged.

For Hobsbawn (1983, 1992) those imagined communities were fabricated artificially by elites, as a way to channel and discipline masses. He believes that nationalism is such an unprecedented phenomenon that it had to construct from scratch its own historical continuity. Traditions, myths and semi-fiction build the sense of imagined community. Those invented traditions are defined by their vagueness and broadness (concepts such as patriotism or loyalty to nation) which employ emotionally charged symbols (flags for instance), and a set of acceptable practices (singing national anthems) that contribute to the universality of the concept. National flags, anthems and emblems are the way a country shows its independence and sovereignty, and allows it to command respect and loyalty. Those traditions enable to awake one's consciousness of the community.

These theories share the idea that nations are cultural artefacts. They hint towards an accurate depiction of nations, but need to be nuanced. Anderson gives too big a role to the literary word, which is often disconnected from the masses' way of communication, and thus needs to be completed by more elements of popular culture. A variant of this criticism applies to Hobsbawm, who overlooks the role of popular myths and traditions, in a purely top-down approach that wrongly leaves people entirely passive (Hutchinson and Smith 2000). For example, the myths of the Gaulois as the ancestor of French people, albeit promoted by public officials referring to the "hero" Vercingetorix, was very much popularised by the best-selling cartoon Astérix et Obélix, depicting Gaulois as churlish, undisciplined but fiercely independent ancestors of the French nation.

This is where ethno-symbolism comes in (Hutchinson and Smith, 2000; Smith 2000, 2005). It does not deny that nationalism is a modern invention, nor that nations in the sense of a majority of people seeking national sovereignty is also recent. Both are grounded in pre-existing cultures and ethnic groups. The sense of ethnic identity, defined as a shared culture, history and language, is the basis of national identity. There are cultural elements of myth, symbol, memory, value and tradition, that explain modern nations' emergence and shape. Nationalists often resurrected them but they existed. It seems that those views are, in general, not necessarily contradictory and complement each other rather well. Once we acknowledge the fact that myths and ethnic groups were not invented in the late 18th century, which explains why some embryonic national identity emerged before that period, we can still believe that nations are imagined communities in Anderson's sense, with traditions that evolve constantly, and, if not totally invented, take a selective look to history to pick up elements most likely to build national cohesion. Moreover, both approaches (Smith, 2000; Anderson, 2006) emphasise the fact that nationalism acts as a secular substitute for religion, for people to make sense of themselves, of mortality, and of the continuity between the past and the future, in a time where rationalism partly discredits religious totems.

This is, therefore, the vision of nations and nationalism we shall adopt. This detour was necessary because, as I will show in the next section, the importance of war and football through myths, rituals and tradition building is crucial. This corresponds to a vision of nationalism where the ethnic group is the basis and where symbols play a key role in fostering the sense of the imagined community.

3. Warfare, Football, and Nationalism

Now that we have established our conception of the nation, let us turn to the core of the topic: how warfare and international football are comparable in the way they build nationalism. Most nation-states, nowadays, have been, at least in part, forged by war (Howard, 1994). This section will focus on two points: nation building via myths, symbols, selective history and common experience, which give the nation the power to demand citizens to sacrifice for it, and nation building via the opposition to other nations.

A nation's consciousness comes from shared meanings and visions based on myths (Hutchinson 1994, 2017; Smith 2000, 2005). Miller (2001: Introduction) defines them in the following way:

> *"Myths are not total delusions or utter falsehoods, but partial truths that accentuate some versions of reality and marginalise or omit others. They embody fundamental cultural values and character-types and appeal to deep-seated emotions. Myths depoliticise social relations by ignoring the vested interests surrounding those stories that become ascendant in a given culture. And critically, myths disavow or deny their own conditions of existence: they are forms of speech that derive from specific sites and power relations, but are passed off as natural and eternal verities."*

Those myths can be genealogical - biological filiation with founders or ancient people, which implies the community's roots are found in old, almost family-like kinship - or, cultural – where the spiritual proximity with those ancients is emphasised (Smith, 2000). As Smith explains, those myths are often based around a founding time (for instance, the Rutli oath in Switzerland first uniting cantons), a founding place (to legitimise the control over land), some ancestors which give society a sense of filiation and provide it with a justification for primordial links and kinship (again, the Gaulois for French people, despite lack of historical evidences about Gaulois in the way French people picture them). Crucially, nationalism also uses myths of grandeur and decay, forging heroes that embody the nation's values and raising the spectre of decline if those virtues are forgotten. Those are used to foster the myth of regeneration, the nation becoming again true to itself.

The importance of myths explains why war is crucial for building nationalism. Memories and myths of war are key elements of national discourse. In particular, the commemoration of the war dead becomes central (Hutchinson, 2017). As emphasised by Anderson (2006), there is nothing more representative of the imagined community building power of war than the tomb of unknown soldiers. As a mix of anonymity - thus making it universal and appropriable by everyone - and heroism, hence building virtues of courage and sacrifice into people's mind, it speaks to everyone in the national community.

Wars provide heroes, which act as moral models of virtues and values for subsequent generations, emphasising the qualities that should inspire every member of the nation (Hutchinson, 2017). Those heroes, and wars, take an almost sacred character. A clear example is Jeanne d'Arc, seen as a martyr and almost a saint by the French, in addition to a supposed decisive role in beating the "English" in the Hundred Years War, despite historical evidence for her to be nothing more than a religious fanatic with reckless military tactics, who at best improved the soldiers' mood (Minois, 2010). This war is symptomatic of the narrative building of nationalism insofar as it is nowadays presented as the English versus the French, despite national identities not being really developed at the time, and wars fought essentially by mercenaries on a territory (France) over which the "national" king mainly lacked control and that looked nothing like France's current shape (Minois, 2010). Moreover, wars can refer to periods of golden age or decay that are crucial to myth, and therefore, nation-building (Smith 2000; Hutchinson 2017). References to times of military splendour stimulate the national sentiment and incentivise people to seek ways to come back to those times of glory. Of course, those elements are carefully selected to fit the national narrative: not only are they preferred to less glorious historical facts that also constitute a country's history (e.g. the French prefer to emphasise their role as Republican enlighteners, during the French Revolution, rather than the role of collaboration during World War Two), but they are also deprived from their most controversial elements: the Spanish cheerfully celebrate the Reconquista of their country, despite the expulsion of Jewish people that happened at the same time. However, and perhaps less intuitively, defeat memory can also bolster nationalism (Kissane, 2013), if this defeat is suffused with moral values that honour the losing side, marks the beginning of the nation's regeneration, or if nationalists can use it as an illustration of what happens when a nation loses its moral values.

This is where the first link to football comes: national mythmaking through sports, among which football is the most popular, is common (Miller, 2001; Cronin and Marall, 1998; Maguire, 2009). Sports help glorify, mainly through media coverage, national heroes that represent and battle for a larger body, the nation, in stadiums all around the world. We naturally cheer in sporting competitions for our fellow countrymen and women: Wimbledon is made more memorable when British players

are through to the second week, football game victories are a matter of national pride (Billig 1995). Individual players become national icons, like Zidane in France (Ghemmour, 2013). When national teams win, they win for the homeland. The 1966 World Cup-winning team in England is still seen as heroic, with legendary figures such as Alf Ramsey or Bobby Robson. Its importance has increased over the decades, since at the time, England's mood was characterised by national decline discourses, nostalgically looking back to the Empire, the domination over the world and a flourishing economy (Porter, 2004). While nationalists emphasised the progressive disappearance of English virtues of courage, organisation, determination to overcome obstacles, the national team precisely won using those supposedly English qualities, which was a crucial factor in building national pride again (Porter, 2004). Moreover, Hutchinson (2017) emphasises that war myths, albeit in part elite-driven, are also rooted in popular culture (songs, cartoons, movies). This, again, relates to football, which follows exactly the same pattern. For instance, in the 1998 World Cup won by France (1999), the myth of the united Black-Blanc-Beur country (Black-White-Arab) was exploited by President Chirac to assert his popularity, but also expanded through popular cultures (books or documentaries, such as "Les Yeux dans les Bleus" narrating the exploit). Finally, even defeat can be praised as part of national identity, as shown by Dutch beautiful losers, considering themselves as moral winners (Lechner, 2007).

Warfare also builds nationalism through the memories and rituals it inspires (Hutchinson, 2017). There are formal elements – remembrance days, monuments and places, national anthems, national symbols. The end of both World Wars constitute holidays in France. Trafalgar Square commemorates the exploits of Nelson. Obviously, football has less formal powers – nobody gathers every July 12th in France to celebrate the final against Brazil. However, it still constitutes an arena in which nationalism is celebrated to a degree that has little equivalent (MacClancy, 1996; Bradley, 2002). Military brass bands playing the national anthem in front of a crowd waving the national flag, often under the eyes of the nation's political representatives (Presidents or Prime Ministers), are ostensible displays of nationalist fervour at international football games that parallel formal war commemoration ceremonies.

In general, football, just like wars, forms part of the traditions that underpin nationalism. Nationalists, indeed, are seeking to adapt to modernity by grounding it

into its past: modern practices are naturalised in reference to former myths. Football plays a similar role as war in that respect. Nationalism in the Basque country is rooted in Athletic Club Bilbao which constantly claims to be faithful to its (British and Basque) founders in terms of game identity, and operates a strict Basque player only policy (McClancy, 1996). This shows how football is part of the invention of tradition, of the modern embodiment of past values. Football allows people to cling tighter to what they believe is their identity. It becomes an anchor of meaning for a nation, found in the national myths surrounding the national team. For instance, uniform kits often have a meaning rooted in invented tradition, carrying the national colours in stadiums around the world, with the national emblem on the chest. An example, easily applicable to national football kits, is the New-Zealand rugby All Black shirt, implying an appropriation of strength, mystic, and in general of Maori symbols, equally perpetuated by the Haka performed by all players, whatever their skin colour, giving the image of a nation transcending ethnic differences (Smith, 2005).

Nevertheless, critiques argue that war loses its nationalist power because of people being increasingly disinterested in those nationalist high masses. This point is moot, and, even accepting it for the argument's sake, disregards the everyday power of nationalism, an ideology so strong that we end up forgetting it. Billig (1995) shows ostensible national celebrations (what he metaphors as flag waving) are only the visible part of nationalism. What really maintains nation-states is banal nationalism, which we do not notice. It consists of everyday expressions such as "we", without even mentioning it, refers to the nation, "the weather" without referring to where (as it is obvious that we are talking about our nation) etc. Banal nationalism can be as insidious as leisure parks, which tend to promote selective visions of each country's history (Sangiorgi, 2014). Warfare shaped the long-term collective goals, and more importantly, thinking framework of nations (Hutchinson, 2017), and also forms part of the unconscious process of nationalism. It becomes a national secular "religion", that makes sense of mortality and generates a continuity between the alive and the dead, and defines shared collective meanings that bind people into a nation. Arguably, football does not have such a power, but it still very much corresponds to Billig's point because of its inherent duality between being an entertainment and a highly politicised activity. Most people boisterously singing the national anthem before football games are not

thinking consciously about the nationalist dimension of their act, but do it as part of a football ritual. By being both an ostensible display of nationalist ideology – just by the very fact that it is nations, and not, say, continents, facing each other - and part of the unconscious process of banal nationalism, football has a nationalist building power that echoes the one of war.

Moreover, nationalism is often built in opposition to another nation. It is as much a negative concept – emphasising what the nation is not – as a positive one (defining what it is). Nationalism is built on interactions with others (Harrison, 2003). For instance, Scottish Nationalism is very much based upon the idea of not being English (McIntosh et al, 2004; Bradley, 2002). Nations rely on otherness, on boundary creation and maintenance, whether physical (for instance, territorial frontier), or symbolic (Conversi, 2000), which allows for the development of self-stereotypes of national identity and stereotypes about others.

Warfare is a crucial determinant in the building of nationalism based on opposition (Hutchinson, 2017). War polarizes different populations, enhances stereotypes and national self-perceptions (Hall and Malesevic, 2013). It emphasises the sense of national difference. The "we versus them" stereotypes are created by competing national propaganda, and this turns into self-image built in contrast to the enemy. Moreover, as armies progressively switched from mercenaries to massive conscriptions, not only did we witness the emergence of proper nations fighting each other, but this also favoured the development of clichés about the enemy coming right from the front and spread by the conscripted, who were normal citizens, to the rest of the country (Smith, 2000). In France during World War I emerged the image of the brutal and heartless German soldier, symbolised in the collective imagery by the spiked-helmet they wore, which became a symbol of brutality. This reflects the mix of official propaganda and clichés from the front that turn into general stereotypes. Napoleonic wars, too, were key in forging national identities among those nations who fought him fiercely, not least in England: their soldiers started differentiating themselves from the French, and in turn this became part of the national self-imagery, based on this contrast with Napoleonic armies. Polarised images progressively became part of a repertoire of national antagonisms (Hutchinson, 2017). In fact, the England-France rivalry is emblematic of this way of building nationalism. Centuries of wars led

to clichés that are still very much used nowadays. Recurrent key-words coming back in English mouths to describe French organisations are indiscipline and mess, whether it is to describe yet another strike or the Azincourt battle. On the other hand, the "nation of shopkeeper", idea which emerged during Napoleonic wars, is still alive when it comes to describing English people on the other side of the channel, while actually having been adopted by some English as a motive of pride.

Again, football clearly uses similar determinants to build nationalism. As nations face each other, oppositions and stereotypes (both about "us" and "them") flourish. By definition, a football match is the embodiment of the "we versus them" logic. It provides an arena for the expression of national identity. Sport is, in general, a powerful identity marker, the concrete embodiment of an imagined community (Hobsbawn, 1983; 1992). The idea that English people are "battling" is very much constructed and perpetuated through their style of play (McClansy, 1996). Maguire (2009) shows how sports contribute to the emergence of distinct national identities in the British Isles, each constructed in opposition to other nations. By distinguishing how the Welsh play in comparison to the English, the distinctiveness of both national identities is reinforced. Traditionally, in sports, the English are depicted as brave and gentlemen, the Welsh as gifted, the Irish as combative and having flair, the Scottish as less creative, and in general, the Celtics as more tribal than rationally organised. There is a mutually reinforcing process where pitch performances are described according to stereotypes nations have about themselves and others, which in turn are maintained by the very description of sporting performances in those terms. The way a national team plays is seen as reflecting the national lifestyle (Lechner, 2007), a point we shall return to in our case study on Dutch national identity. This style of play is contrasted with that of other teams, in a rather exaggerated fashion, which, nevertheless, corresponds to nation-building, a sense of itself in relation to others, just like in war.

Consequently, caricatural clichés have become the norm to describe national teams, especially opponents, in mainstream discourses. It is worth quoting Dutch journalist Kuper, describing a 1988 Euros game (in: Miller, 2001) at length, as an illustration of this:

> *"Holland vs Germany. Good vs Evil. Our shirts were bright, if unfortunately striped; the Germans wore black and white. We had several coloured players,*

including our captain, and our fans wore Gullit-hats with rasta hair; their players were all white and their fans made monkey noises. Our players were funny and natural; A thousand Years of German Humour" is the shortest book in the world."

A similar text was written by a French journalist after the 1982 loss against Germany, contrasting French "poetry, imagination, finesse, inspiration and humility" to the Germans "blind brutes", making use of "stupid force" and being nothing more than a "mass of muscles" (Ghemmour, 2013). The power of football in building nationalism relates to its popularity, and widespread media diffusion. The media, in general, are very auto-centred, using words such as "we" or "the nation" without further precision (implying everyone knows what the nation is), seeing the world under the national prism, and having categories such as foreign news which clearly separate "our" nation from others (Blain, 1993; Billig, 1995; Roosvall, 2014). The press has a key role in perpetuating those stereotypes, just like it spread the official demonisation of enemies during World War I, for instance. Maguire (2009) describes the coverage, in both countries, of an England-Poland game before the 2006 World Cup, as stereotyping, especially with regards to the opponents, combined with an assertiveness in terms of group identity. The English journalists stressed on the Cold War history and legacy, describing the Polish city where the game took place as gloomy and depressing, the supposed backwardness of Polish society and culture, and the hostility of the fans, supposedly tribal and primitive. Polish newspapers seemed to recognise the English cultural superiority, professionalism and wealth, but emphasised the arrogance and undue pride coming with it. Similarly, Alabarces et al (2001) describe the coverage, in Argentina and England, of the 1998 World Cup game opposing those two teams, as full of references to the antagonistic past of those countries, in addition to their diametrically different way of playing football, supposedly reflecting cultural differences. Implicitly, antagonising the opponent means that "we" are their complete opposite. The media reinforce the myths of specific characters associated with each country, and football is a privileged way of doing so. In the European press, there hardly is a football game which is not described, for the French, as characteristic of their "flair", as tough and contact-based for the Spanish, as suffused with fighting spirit for the English, and as mechanic and efficient for the Germans (Crolley et al, 2000).

Note that each of those stereotypes perfectly apply to those country's supposed lifestyle or primary moral qualities in general. Football, via national press, contributes to constructing nationalism, in contrast to other nations. Finally, note that rivalries are not devoid of links to the idea of tradition creation or resurrection by nationalists, analysed earlier: a rivalry is not natural and nationalists portray games between antagonistic nations as "not to miss" dates on people's calendar, as illustrated by the case of Australia and New-Zealand (Smith, 2005).

Before turning to our Dutch case study, it is necessary to provide answers to some objections. The first one is basic but intuitive: football is nowhere as serious a matter as war, and therefore, the comparison is silly. This dissertation is not trying to argue that football is of the same historical importance as war, but that it can build nationalism using the very same mechanisms. Being a world-wide phenomenon, common to almost all societies, gathering billions of viewers when national teams face each other in the World Cup, and being important creators of a feel-good factor in a nation when it wins major trophies (Porter, 2004), such as England in 1966 or France in 1998, up to the point where, in France, the suicide rate had sharply declined after the World Cup triumph (Encrenaz, 2012), is enough not to dismiss it under the pretext that it is, at first, a sport and leisure.

This leads to a subtler, and more robust, criticism. Nations are defined as communities of self-sacrifice (Hutchinson, 2017), that is, a sentiment powerful enough for citizens to sacrifice their welfare for the nation – the ultimate illustration being young people willing to die on battlefields. This willingness is not the result of a rational choice, for people often stick to it in times where the costs are high and the defeat likely (Stern, 1995). It is, additionally, striking, given those kinds of self-sacrificial behaviours are normally reserved to kinship relations, primordial links (for instance, a mother sacrificing herself for her daughter). It must therefore be that the emotional appeals of nations are strong enough to generate this kind of primordial links between fellow members, and that, while memories of collective sufferings, myths of national heroism in times of war, remembrance of the dead are powerful enough to do so, football is not. A young French soldier could go to the front to perpetuate Vercingetorix's virtues, but not Zidane's memory.

This argument underestimates the sense of national duty related to sports, both for players and citizens. National press, as Billig (1995) shows, is full of sacrificial vocabulary to describe a player's performance, and praises above all those who put their body in danger for the team's sake. Players defending their national jersey in Wembley are very much seen as representative and defenders of the nation, like soldiers. Cristiano Ronaldo's willingness to keep on playing at the last European Championship finals, despite being severely injured, is enough to understand the commitment a national team game represents. This very same Cristiano Ronaldo, despite winning all major club and individual trophies, being a multi-millionaire and a worldwide icon, was never as happy as the day after the Portuguese triumph, which he described as the best moment of his life (Europe 1, 2016). Playing for the national football team is commonly referred to, by players, as the highest moment of a career and the highest duty that can ever fall on their shoulders. The public sees it very much the same way and witnesses with incredulity those players who refuse to play for the national team. I obviously do not mean that playing with an injured knee is as sacrificial as dying on a battlefield, but that we can at least consider football as an alternative system to the sacrifice-based nation. Marvin and Ingle (1999) themselves, having developed the idea that the nation's survival is based on sacrifice and memory thereof, to keep people cohesive, believe an alternative sacrificial system could challenge that kind of nationalism, and under this perspective, there is no reason to dismiss national football.

The last objection is that football is becoming every day more capitalist and globalised, participating in the destruction of local identities (Miller, 2001). While this is true for club football, where indeed a team like Chelsea often does not play with anybody from the London borough, or even from the United Kingdom, national football still remains very impermeable to globalisation (despite the case of bi-national players, strictly regulated), and is an arena where nation-state representatives face each other.

Let us now turn to our case-study. Lechner (2007) describes how the Dutch imagined community is partly shaped by football and the national-team. Memories of great teams, such as that of 1974, still remain, alongside myths embodying the whole nation (Cruyff, mainly). The Dutch also emphasise a unique, distinct style of play (total

football - a very offensive and revolutionary game based on technical quality, short passes and versatile players) which stresses the distinctiveness of the Dutch nation in general, in addition to being one of the teams most strongly associated with its colours. I conducted 6 detailed interviews with Dutch people from diverse backgrounds, found amongst my contacts, with written answers to the document I sent them, to study that claim further.

When asked whether the Dutch national team had a distinct style of play, Patrick, a student based in London, answered: "Yes, the whole distinction with total football sums up Dutch football. No other team, other than Spain recently, has nearly as distinctive a playing style". Mirroring Remmert's answer, a 29 years old man who arrived in the UK three years ago answered: "a very distinctive football style, characterised by playing very offensively, with right - and left wing backs who basically play as left - and right wing strikers. Dutch football, is, together with the Brazilian, Italian, and Spanish football styles, one of the most famous ones." While most respondents acknowledge this style has fluctuated, and that, especially in recent years, the team has not always been able to live-up to that standard, all of them reckon there is or at least has been a very strong distinct Dutch way of playing football, which dates back to the 70's, and the invention of Total Football. Most respondents also think there is some truth to the idea that the way the national team plays reflects in part the wider Dutch lifestyle, in particular, the capacity to organise and manage life in limited spaces, and that there is a distinct type of Dutch player. So in general, there are close links between football and the idea of a nation's uniqueness, which fits our general analysis well. Another very interesting aspect is the mythical character of Johan Cruyff and the 1974 national team. It is worth quoting, again, Patrick at length:

> *"He is a national hero. He brought us so many finals and won Euros for us. Then when he retired he did so much for Dutch football and football in general (…). He created total football in Holland and made the Netherlands what they are today - probably the best team ever to win the world cup in my opinion."*

Other respondents have similar enthusiasm: Isabel, a 19-year-old Dutch woman says "Johan Cruyff was the talent of the Netherlands. I cannot think of a player that can beat him in that aspect.". Samuel, 26 years old, who moved to London 8 months ago, thinks that "Cruyff is the greatest Dutch football player of all time, and played a very strong

role in shaping the [footballing[identity of the Netherlands, but also football in general". For Maarten, a 26 year old man, "Johan Cruyff is most definitely a national hero to me and is probably one of the greatest football minds the world will ever know". Cruyff is thus a mythical figure Dutch people can refer too, even after his death, as having done a lot, not only for Dutch football, but for the country in general. His virtues (not only his talent, but his embodiment of Dutch creativity and willingness to privilege the style of play over raw results) are akin to what nationalists use when they refer to heroes of the past to build national sentiment. He shares this mythical aspect with his 1974 team, narrowly defeated by the Germans in the World Cup Final, despite playing one of the most beautiful and revolutionary football to this day. This team's story is narrated from generations to generations as a source of national pride, in families, the press and via documentaries and clips. Patrick, who heard it via his father and video clips, reckons it is "still very present in Dutch people's imagination", as "our greatest team". Isabel, similarly, learnt the story from her dad: "we had an amazing national team who played very well together." All the respondents think it is still very present nowadays in the Netherlands. It is striking to note that none of them were even born when this team played! However, they had all heard of its story, a sign that this team is really part of a national narrative.

Moreover, football in the Netherlands, just like in our main analysis, bases its identity not only positively but negatively, in opposition to another team/nation, the Germans. All the respondents emphasise the rivalry with Germany and how important it is for them to win those games, compared to confrontations with other nations. Maarten, when asked whether beating the Germans is better than beating anyone else, answered: "Yes. Without a doubt! Beating Germany in an important game is the best". Michiel, a Dutch man in his 20s, replied "absolutely" and Isabel said "Yes, of course!". The opposition in style of play is mentioned too, between the traditional Dutch creativity and the German efficiency, but less than I could imagine. However, all the respondents are very young and the clichés associated to Germany's mechanical game were a lot stronger in the 80's and 90's, while, under the impulse of coach Low and the integration of sons of immigrants in the squad, their game has diversified a lot.

Finally, all the respondents say that when they talk with non-Dutch people, football is mentioned almost immediately: great Dutch clubs, players ("Marco van

Basten's volley against USSR, or Robben according to Patrick), and the national team. Football is a clear marker of Dutch identity for foreigners, according to our respondents. Isabel says that after people learn where she is from "the first reaction that I get is: Sneijder, Van Persie, Robben [Dutch players]. Yes, when they think of the Netherlands, the first thing they think of is football.". Samuel thinks that "We're a very small country, and the things we are most known for are clogs & windmills, our tolerant mind-set, and football.". All my respondents were self-declared football fans, so when asked whether football was part of their identity, they said yes. When asked whether this was part of Dutch identity more generally, responses were more divided. Patrick says yes ("it brings people together"), but others are more nuanced, emphasising the point that not everyone is a football fan. That being said, all but one mention the fact that during World Cups, everyone is interested in the national team's performance, which means the analysis of football as nationalism-builder is still robust, as, despite an uneven interest from the population, it generates a nationalist fever at least once every four years, that clearly binds people behind the eleven representatives of their imagined community.

Overall, this case study illustrates how football, via myth building and the development of stereotypes of opposition and rivalry, builds nationalism, corresponding to our main analysis and to the comparison we made between football and war. This overall comparison has proven robust in the framework of the nation-state: a national group occupying a delimited homeland under the rule of a corresponding political unit. We now turn to the cases of diasporas to see how, in times of globalisation, with many national groups leaving behind those borders, football has the potential to play a role different from that of war.

4. Football, War and Nationalism In Times of Globalisation: A Case Study of the Portuguese Diaspora in France

In this section, I analyse the case of the Portuguese community in France. After a brief reminder of the context, I present evidence from the French press showing that Portuguese people generally have a positive image in their country of residence. I then analyse results from a questionnaire I conducted online and with a Portuguese association in Gentilly (Val-de-Marne, Paris suburb) to show the role of football in

building an imagined community and the Portuguese identity. The key takeaway from this more hypothetical and empirical section is that football, in a time of globalisation, can foster a type of nationalism beyond the homeland borders, not limited to the nation-state, that links diaspora members amongst themselves and the whole body of nationals (diaspora and homeland citizens).

Before turning to the main arguments, because this dissertation is about comparing football and war, it is useful to consider the objection saying that war also has the power to build nationalism within diasporas. The point is, indeed, valid. There is no conceptual reason to believe that myths, traditions, rituals, emerging from war and linking a national community, should not apply to the members of this community living abroad. However, this fosters a kind of nationalism that primarily links diaspora members to their homeland and the memory and celebration thereof, rather than amongst themselves: it is very much the same type of nationalism analysed in section two, praising a national group and legitimising its right to have a homeland. This leads to the second point: football can build a type of nationalism that shapes an imagined community within the diaspora as much as with the homeland members, that is less conflictual - less based on opposition to other national stereotypes, and that has an integrative potential for diaspora members in their new country of residence, which in the end allows them to make sense of their double identity. This very last aspect clearly lacks with war which celebrates the national community and its legitimacy to occupy their homeland, but does not have any integrative potential for the diaspora in their new country. Football seems to accommodate the necessarily multi-layered identities of diaspora members. Finally, at least in Western Europe, where peace between nation-states has been established for more than half a century now, and where values of cooperation and fraternity between nations are very much at the heart of state-building in the post-war era, it is not unreasonable to think that war commemoration increasingly fulfils a "never again" educational mission, emphasising the need of peace as the basis of prosperity, as much as a nation-building purpose (witness the recurrent presence of German officials at French World War commemoration days). In that case, non-war myths will be increasingly relevant, in a world where traditional nation-states evolve under the influence of globalisation and the need for peace and cooperation

(again, in Western Europe at least), and I contend that football has the power to be one of them.

The world is increasingly globalised (Keating, 2001; Held, 2003). The nation-state, while still very relevant, is weakened in its traditional form (Mann, 2005). International flows, including migrations, have constantly increased throughout the second half of the 20th century, to such an extent that today almost 3 per cent of the world population are migrants (190 million, OECD). In particular, World War Two belligerents used immigration significantly in order to rebuild after the conflict. France is an example of this, having witnessed massive arrivals from its former colonies and poorer European countries in the early post-war decades (McDonalds, 1969).

In general, international flows lead us to consider the mechanics of attachment to a territorial space or unit that is not ours, or no longer ours. Famously, in club football, it is very possible to have a deep sense of belonging to a team that does not represent one's own city. Such de-territorial supporters are common in Europe and in the world: Londoners supporting Liverpool, Celtic Glasgow fans in the US, or Marseille fans in Paris (Lestrelin and Basson, 2009). It is therefore logical to extend that reasoning to national teams: they form a vector for imagined communities and identity building for diasporas.

Those flows multiply people's possible senses of belonging (Waters, 2000; Pultar, 2014). It is very possible to feel an attachment to both the country of origin and of residence. Football allows a form of nationalism exportation, beyond the original state's borders. Haitians in the Dominican Republic provide an illustration (Wise, 2011): they constitute an important community, often facing deep prejudices and problems of integration. Football is a way, for them, to build their sense of community and keep their national roots alive. It is a genuine catalyser of imagined community for a diaspora: not only does it build the links between immigrants in another country, but it also preserves a form of relation between them and their fellow citizens who stayed at home. A similar case is made about Croatians arriving in Australia after World War II (Hay, 1998). Croatian football clubs there allowed them to build their identity and preserve their pride in their origins, but also provided them with places of socialisation, and helped them integrate the Australian society at large, the social link given by those clubs not only helping materially (support to find friends, a home, a job) but also

contributing to gaining a sense of oneself, and to making sense of the dual identity between homeland and country of residence.

The Portuguese in France (or French with Portuguese origins) represent a very interesting case for us. They fulfil most criteria to be considered a diaspora (dispersed in many countries, strong ethnic consciousness, collective memory; see Ibrahim and Ibrahim (2014) for more precision). The Portuguese constituted a significant share of the post-war newcomers. Most came between 1970 and 1974, escaping from Salazar's dictatorship and seeking better economic conditions. From 50.000 right after the war, the community grew to 700.000 in the middle of the seventies. Today, they are between 800.000 and 1.2 million people (Mediapart, 2010; Le Monde, 2016). In general, the Portuguese represent a very important community, around 600.000 or 700.00 in Ile de France (Paris region), thus constituting the largest foreign community there. This is more than Lisbon's municipality (Le Parisien, 2002).

A quick analysis of the French press confirms a widely-shared view in France: the Portuguese are well integrated and seen positively. Let aside the clichés on their so-called traditional jobs – construction industry, cleaning services – they are seen as "hard working, brave" (Mediapart, 2010), and making their way up in the French (rather fossilised) society (Le Parisien 2002). In general, their double-culture is seen as "peaceful" (La Croix, 2016), and even their celebration of Portugal's victory over France in the last Euro final was calmly accepted by French people. This hinted to a form of rare happiness between France and its diversity (Challenges, 2016). Not only are the Portuguese respected, but they also see themselves as part of France: many of them feel, at least in part, French, love their country of residence (which for many is their country as much as Portugal), while keeping an affective attachment to Portugal.

However well integrated, the Portuguese community massively and unambiguously supported Portugal during the last Euro, rather than France (La Croix, 2016). The final victory triggered demonstrations of joy all around the country. This is why I wanted to study this particular community: football constitutes the main vector of nationalism for them, the main builder of their imagined community and link with their home country. In the words of the historian Victor Pereira, at Pau university, quoted by Le Monde (2016), football and the Portuguese national team is:

"a mean to assert themselves in their host society, a link constantly refreshed with the Portuguese imagined community, and, finally, a support of transmission of a Portuguese identity across generations, especially masculine. For the past decades, the National Team and the main football clubs in the country have been bearing the role of ambassador, of link between the Portuguese nation and the diaspora".

I thus conducted a questionnaire at the Paroisse Portugaise de Gentilly (Portuguese Catholic Church in Paris suburb), then online, to increase the number of answers to 46 overall. A key question was how the respondents self-evaluated their integration in France. 30 of them (65 per cent, an overwhelming majority) said they were "perfectly integrated", 12 that they were "well integrated" and 3 that they were "integrated". Interestingly, none of them said they were not integrated. This illustrates the point made above: Portuguese people manage to make their way through French society and feel comfortable there. However, they still feel very attached to their culture: a vast majority (around 70 per cent) say that Portuguese culture is at least important, if not very important, for them, especially in very closed circles such as family. In this cultural aspect, football is undoubtedly crucial: nearly half of the respondents (22) said they were playing and following the game closely, while almost everyone else either plays or follows closely. All respondents had, under that respect, a favourite club, most of them in Portugal (23).

Here comes the interesting bit. While the fraction of respondents saying they feel more Portuguese than French (59 per cent) and that saying they feel more or equally French (41 per cent) is roughly balanced, all but three respondents say they support Portugal when both national teams play against each other. This shows the importance of football for Portuguese people, a result bolstered by the fact that more than half of the respondents consider that this sport plays an important or very important part in their pride of being Portuguese. Imagined communities are also about building myths that hold the nation together, and, under that respect, nearly 40 per cent of respondents reckon Eder, the striker who scored the winning goal at 2016 Euros, is a national hero, while roughly 30 per cent believe Cristiano Ronaldo is more important than the Prime Minister. Obviously, those results, limited in sample and confounded (by education for instance), shall not be taken as representative of all the Portuguese in

France. However, they nonetheless provide a snapshot of their spirit, and illustrate the arguments made above. The Portuguese are well integrated, and balance their identities between their roots and their country of residence. But, when it comes to football, national feelings take over: they massively support Portugal and Portuguese clubs, which provide a way to assert their identity, and, more importantly, build imagined communities, both with fellow immigrants in France and with the nation in general. Importantly, this support for Portugal does not come as a rejection of France, an expression of unease towards the French society, of desire not to be identified as French, because, as we saw, the relationship between the Portuguese community and France is rather happy and smooth. It implies that this form of nationalism is less conflictual and oppositional than the one analysed in Section II. It is a way for Portuguese people to gain a sense of themselves in the French society. This more appeased nationalism is confirmed by the fact that no clear result emerged to the question "do you have a team that you prefer beating in particular". While, as we saw, the Dutch dream to beat the Germans, there is no such rivalry and oppositional construction here. It is still, though, nationalism and not merely national identity, for the Portuguese still defend the legitimacy of their nation, and its right to be represented by a national team.

However, the most interesting part comes from the interaction with people at Gentilly, allowing to ask more detailed and specific questions, and react to the respondent's answers. This meeting was also particularly stimulating because it provided a snapshot of Portuguese immigration in France. Gentilly is, indeed, a suburb in the heartland of the Portuguese community in France, the Val-de-Marne département (Le Monde, 2016). The Portuguese are catholic and quite religious. There, I met all the generations of Portuguese immigration, from those born in France to those who arrived at adult age to find better jobs.

In general, the results are very similar to the entire questionnaire ones. Interviewed people feel very integrated, but support Portugal in football, a sport which gives them pride and builds their link with the rest of the Portuguese community. Interestingly, most respondents (53 per cent) were born in France, which means football acts even more powerfully in their collective imagination of Portugal, as they never actually lived there. They mostly stopped education before university: I talked to

construction workers, nursery employees, secretaries. Interestingly, many of them smiled at the question of whether Eder was a national hero, or Ronaldo more important than the Prime Minister, answering spontaneously "oh no, let us not exaggerate their role". This is the reverse of what one could expect intuitively, that, is, less educated people being more prone to following myths. In a similar fashion, those who arrived recently are actually less likely to place France among the countries they prefer to beat in football. The rather high fraction of people who said they love to beat France (36 per cent) was actually mainly constituted of people born there, who, on the other hand, define themselves as perfectly integrated and, having gone through the French education system, speak the language perfectly. This, again, shows the importance of football in the assertion of their identity as a community, and their link with Portugal: fresher immigrants perhaps need football to lesser extent when attempting to gain a sense of national belonging, while those who are born here use football as a means to build it. Finally, a useful precision is that I talked to almost as many women and men, and that most women were also very interested in football. It would thus be simplistic to say it acts as an imagined community builder for a masculine sub-sample of the community only, as often implicitly thought. It has a universal community-building power.

To finish this section, let us focus in more details on two cases - the only two people I met at Gentilly who completed higher education. One is a woman, born in France, who went to university there and now has an executive position. She defines herself as perfectly integrated, and, despite the Portuguese culture being "very important, with Portuguese being spoken as much as French and most of her relatives being of Portuguese origins", she feels as much French as Portuguese. However, her relation to football clearly exemplifies my point: she follows the game closely, supports a club in Portugal and not in France, and supports Portugal over France when both countries face each other. Football, she says, "plays a very important part" in her pride of being of Portuguese origin, while she considers Eder as a national hero, and Cristiano Ronaldo as more important than the Prime Minister. This illustrates the idea that football as identity builder is crucial for second generation Portuguese people in their relation to their nation, and that this is not the case for less educated people only. Similarly striking is the case of this man, born in France, educated in French

universities and now a manager in the private sector. He also thinks he is perfectly integrated, feels as much French as Portuguese, and, goes as far as saying that Portuguese culture only has a "moderate influence" on his everyday life, being "important but not more than culture and social relations" of the country where he lives. Again, football is important for him: he "plays and follows closely" the game. He has a favourite club in both countries, and football, albeit still playing a role, is only moderately important in his Portuguese pride feelings. And, yet, despite this very balanced record, he supports Portugal against France when both countries face one another, and reckons Ronaldo is more important than the Portuguese Prime Minister. The national myth of the Selecao captain and best player thus has an influence on him, and the national team is his main, if not only, powerful link to his country of origin and national community.

Summing-up, this case showed that football, in time of globalisation and international human flows, might build a form of nationalism beyond the borders of the nation-state, that allows diasporas to form an imagined community and be part of the national imagined community, while integrating into their country of residence, and building their double identity. This has the potential to differ from the type of nationalism bred by warfare.

5. Conclusion

This dissertation explored the question of whether international football is comparable to international war in building nationalism. To answer, it first took the time to define what perspective to adopt on understanding nations, picking-up an ethno-symbolist view - seeing the nation as a modern invention rooted in pre-existing cultures - as the most accurate. This led to the emphasis of the role of war in building nationalism, since what matters is culture, traditions, rituals, myths, commemoration, and an idea of distinctiveness of the nation, warfare plays a crucial part in building heroes, virtues, history that binds the nation together, as well as in developing national stereotypes, both positively and negatively defined (in opposition to another nation). Under that perspective, football builds nationalism in a strikingly similar way. As illustrated by our Dutch case-study, myth-building, national narrative history, fierce rivalry and opposition to the enemy are all part of football. However, globalisation means nation-

states are evolving. In the post-war era, at least in Western Europe, they are increasingly emphasising peaceful values, hence the importance of appeased national myth-making, and often host large diasporas, thus the need for a nationalism that accommodates multi-layered identities. The case study on Portuguese people in France provides a first idea of how football can play that role. Larger sample sizes and control for confounders can test that claim empirically more robustly. Due to space limitation, this dissertation could not address all the issues related to the topic. Just like the relationship between warfare and nationalism is studied in the other direction (how nationalism causes war), it is possible to approach the nationalist influence on football. It would also be interesting to consider football, nationalism and immigration from the perspective of the home country. Many players do not represent their parents' nations nowadays, and the effects on national cohesion, varying in times of success and defeats, are worth exploring.

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Brexit, Agenda Setting and Framing of Immigration in the Media: The Case of the *Daily Mail*

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1. Introduction

On June 23rd 2016, members of the United Kingdom voted in a referendum to determine whether their nation will continue to be a member state of the European Union. The movement termed Brexit - a portmanteau of British and Exit - was decided upon by a state-wide referendum that drew over 40 million voters (Wheeler 2017) and was divided into two camps: 'Leave' and 'Remain'. The majority's decision to leave not only offered new insights on the voter motivations, but it also highlighted the power of media to set political agendas and shape the public perception of relevant issues. Communication scholars have argued that the national newspapers in the UK played a large part in shaping public opinion and in some ways distorting the truth (Deacon et al. 2016; Levy et al. 2016). This paper seeks to determine the veracity of these claims by analysing portrayals of both the economy and immigration in the *Daily Mail* before and after the referendum. While this paper speculates that journalistic measures may have affected the outcome of the referendum, further data and investigation would be required to warrant such a conclusion.

In the United Kingdom, the public's major concern during the campaign initially concerned the issue of the economy however, mid-way through the campaign immigration issues became the most concerning to the public. I argue that this change in opinion is due to newspapers on the 'Leave' side of the campaign placing emphasis on the issue of immigration by devoting more newspaper space to the issue and employing negative frames in the portrayal of current and prospective immigration levels. The frames utilised were created with the use of exaggeration and the rhetorical 'othering' of immigrants. This paper attempts to understand how the *Daily Mail* framed the issue of immigration during the Brexit referendum to advance the 'Leave' agenda.

Liberal theorists from Milton and Madison to John Stuart Mill have argued that the democratic right of freedom of expression requires the existence of an unfettered and independent press within each nation (Mueller 2014). These theories have been built upon by modern day theorists who emphasise the role of an informed citizenry as

a key necessity in the maintenance of democratic processes, as is evident in the works of Weber, Schumpeter, Dahl, and Amartya Sen. Amartya Sen suggests that a free media is essential to democracy because it acts as a guarantee of government transparency in making them accountable to the people (Sen 2001). This refers to the obligation of elected representatives to be answerable to the people and to comment on and give reasons for the results of their political decision making (Mueller 2014). The underlying idea amongst these theorists is that media aids in the creation of an informed public and an informed public is one of the most important factors in a democracy. In the case of a newspaper such as the *Daily Mail*, on the 'Leave' side of the campaign, political bias influenced how the agenda was set to focus on the issue of immigration and it also affected the framing of issues, to the effect of misinforming citizens.

2. The British Media and Agenda Setting

Agenda setting is not inherently bad. It acts as a system of prioritising one thing over another and such prioritisation is necessary in a functional society (Dearing & Roger 1996). Agenda setting can fall into three categories: the 'media agenda', the 'public agenda' and the 'policy agenda'. For each agenda type, salience is key. With regards to media agenda setting, the focus is not only on the positive or negative aspects of an issue, but on the emphasis placed on one issue over another. The extent to which people regard issues as being important as a result of the emphasis on these issues in the media is the central focus of media agenda setting theory (Dearing & Roger 1996; McCombs 2014).

Strictly speaking, the Brexit campaign pertained to the UK's exit from the EU. The main arguments for or against leaving the EU quickly became about three key areas of concern: immigration, sovereignty, and the economy (Wheeler 2014). In May 2016, respondents to an Ipsos poll cited the economy as being an important topic in their decision to vote 'Remain' or 'Leave'. During the last two months of the campaign, however, immigration became the most important issue for voters. In another poll conducted by Ipsos on June 16th 2016, 33% of respondents mentioned immigration as one of their most important issues, up from 28% in May. In comparison, only 28% of respondents mentioned the economy as their most important

issue in June, down from the initial 33% (Skinner et al. 2016).

This shift did not occur randomly, but instead because of media agenda setting. Media exposure, such as reading the newspaper, results in a mediated view of the world, which means that the priorities of the media strongly influence the priorities of the public (McCombs 2014). Media priorities can be deduced based on the emphasis that is placed on a particular issue. To identify the amount of emphasis placed on the respective issues, it's important to look at the number of articles written on the topic between the time the first and second poll were conducted, as well as the length of the titles and articles.

3. Agenda Setting Analysis

The top three newspapers in the UK affirmed their stance as being on the 'Leave' side of the campaign, these newspapers include the *Daily Mail, The Sun*, and *The Daily Telegraph*. This suggests that readers in the United Kingdom were more exposed to the 'Leave' campaign rhetoric. The *Daily Mail* newspaper is chosen as the focus of this analysis on agenda setting because out of the five highest ranked newspapers, it is ranked number one in the UK in terms of readership, with over 29 million readers (Newswork 2017).

The official campaign period lasted ten weeks, starting on April 15th 2016 and ending on the day of the vote on June 23rd 2016, therefore all news articles analysed in this paper fall within this time frame. The key political figures were divided into two camps: the more popular 'Leave' camp spearheaded by Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, and the 'Remain' campaign spearheaded by David Cameron and Theresa May. The election had a turnout of around 46 million voters, a 72% turnout, per the BBC. Overall, 53.4% of citizens voted 'Leave' and 46.6% voted 'Remain' (Wheeler 2017).

The articles examined will be in the 2-month period from mid-April to early June, from when the first audience poll was taken, up until June 14th, when the second audience poll was taken. This allows for the determination of changes in media focus and the correlated change in public opinion based on the amount of emphasis on a given topic.

Half way through the election period from June 11th to June 14th, a poll by Ispos showed that public opinion had shifted from the economy to immigration, with

many considering it to be the most important issue. This may indicate that the public agenda was inspired by a media agenda that placed emphasis on the issue of immigration over other topics. To substantiate this claim, this paper takes the approach suggested by McCombs in studying the agenda setting theory. McCombs' approach suggests that to analyse this theory one must look at the headlines, lead stories, frequency of words, phrase citations, and so on (McCombs 2014).

To analyse the agenda setting of the *Daily Mail* over a particular period of time, this analysis was conducted by examining articles written before the campaign from April 5th to April 10th 2016, and articles from three periods leading up to the June 14th poll (see appendix A). The three periods analysed were April 15th to 20th, May 10th to 15th and June 10th to 15th. The weeks were chosen to be representative of the months in the campaign period leading up to the polls.

After determining the time frames to be examined, the second aspect of the analysis consisted of going through the archives of the *Daily Mail* for each period and focusing on using two search terms 'Brexit, immigration' and 'Brexit, economy'. This served to illustrate the salience the *Daily Mail* gave to the topic based on the increase or lack thereof in the number of articles written on the given topic. These search terms also tried to take into account variations of each word used and tried to account for these variations with searches of such synonymous terms as 'immigrant', 'migrant' and 'economics'.

The analysis of the number of articles written on each topic is displayed in appendix B. In the period before the campaign B1, there were a total of 7 articles written about immigration and 22 written on economy, this did not include the total number of articles on immigration written without the context of Brexit, as that total would be 16. For the purpose of this paper, only immigration articles written in the context of Brexit are examined.

In the C1 period there is a slight increase in both the number of articles on immigration and economy. The total number of immigration related articles during this period is 28 and the total number of articles on the economy are 36. In period C2, there is a decrease for both articles on immigration and economy. That said, there is an almost comparable number of articles written between the two topics, with 26 articles on the economy and 21 on immigration. In period C3, there was a spike in articles

regarding both topics with a total of 86 articles on the economy and 84 articles on immigration within the 5-day span. Although articles on the economy are consistently more frequent than articles on immigration, from period B1 to period C3, there is a significant increase in the overall number of articles written on immigration. From period B1 to C3 there is an 88.5% increase in immigration-centric articles compared to the 77.4% increase in economy-centric articles.

The increase in the number of articles on immigration related topics is not the only factor to take into consideration in determining the *Daily Mail*'s influence on increasing the salience of immigration related topics. The number of words that comprise an article also indicates another dimension of the salience afforded to a given topic (McCombs 2014). The analysis on word count is conducted on articles written only in period C3 as it has the highest number of articles written on both topics. The word count analysis looked not only into the average word count in each article but the average word count in the titles of the articles as well and this was conducted with a random selection of 10 articles in this time frame. With regards to the length of the articles on each topic, articles on immigration averaged about 807.8 words, which was 19% more words on average than articles on the economy, which had an average of 699.3 words per article. Immigration articles therefore had more content and therefore can be safely assumed to take up more space in the print version of the newspaper, thus attracting more attention.

Newspaper titles also play a part in agenda setting as well. Given that agenda setting is used to shape what the public views to be important, media can use a variety of tools to relay that emphasis. For cable news, emphasis can be conveyed by utilising breaking news banners and using selective repetition (McCombs 2014). Print newspapers also employ similar tactics, such as the use of bold fonts and capitalisation, as well as the use of selected quotes in the title and the length of the titles themselves (McCombs 2014).

The articles utilised for this analysis were the same as those used to determine the average words per article. The analysis showed that, on average, the titles of articles about the economy averaged about 16.6 words while the titles of articles on immigration averaged 23.8 words. The amount of emphasis placed on an issue can also be determined by the amount of words that are put in bold and the amount of quotations

used.

Still using articles in the C3 period, 50 articles were analysed for this section, mostly because the archive shows 50 articles at a time. The analysis took into account and eliminated bolded abbreviations such as EU or PM because these words are popular abbreviations, but instead focused on seemingly random words that the paper chose to emphasise. For immigration related articles, 17 out of 50 articles used bolded words in the titles. Other articles falling under the topic of immigration used capitalised words like "exclusive", "kill", "another", "help", "out", "turks". This is in contrast with the 8 out of 50 words that are capitalised in article titles under the topic of the economy.

To relay emphasis or draw the reader's attention to a subject, the newspapers made use of quotations as well; the quotes used were often extractions from key political figures in either the 'Leave' or 'Remain' camp. The quotes often served as shock factors or attention grabbers in the titles. From the analysis of articles on immigration related articles, 19 of 50 made use of quotes in the title, a sharp contrast to 3 of 50 articles under the topic of economy which made use of quotes.

 A limitation to this analysis is that with the use of a digital archive, it is difficult to determine which articles were on the front page of the newspaper, a factor that could contribute to ensuring that one topic is perceived as more important than others. However, based on the analysis of the word lengths of articles on each topic, the measures taken to create emphasis, and the overall amount of space in the newspaper ascribed to immigration issues, the media evidently began to place more emphasis on immigration and this in turn could explain the change in public opinion from viewing economics as an important issue.

By providing more coverage on the issue and placing emphasis on the topic, it can be assumed that the *Daily Mail* contributed to the change in people's opinion on the issue that was most important. While it has been established that the *Daily Mail* participated in agenda setting by shifting the focus to immigration issues and thus inspiring changes in public opinion on the salience of immigration issues, they contributed in shaping how people perceived the issue as well. Although framing is often described as second level agenda setting, these two concepts are different (Weaver 2007). Agenda setting acts as a way to make people think that an issue is

important, while framing is how news media shapes our view of the issue (Entman 2007). So, while newspapers like the *Daily Mail* help set the agenda in emphasising immigration issues, they can make people think about immigration in a negative or positive light depending on the frames employed.

4. Framing Analysis

To understand how the issue is framed in the media, it is important to look at the word choice and tone of the articles to determine how immigration issues are intended to be perceived by the audience (Boydstun et al 2014). To study the frames created around immigration, an analysis of 10 randomly selected articles in the period C3 was conducted. This period was chosen because it contains the highest number of articles written about immigration in a 5-day span in comparison to other campaign periods and because it is closer to the time of the second poll conducted on June 16th 2016. The analysis was conducted by first extracting key terms from the speeches of popular 'Leave' campaigners. Speeches from key figures in key campaigns tended to frame immigration in a negative way and because the *Daily Mail* took a stance as being on the 'Leave' side of the campaign, it was important to examine if the media employed a similar frame.

An analysis of four randomly selected speeches made by Boris Johnson, spanning the entire campaign period, several key words proved to be recurring in the speeches with regards to immigration which can be construed as signals of 'Leave' rhetoric. The key words were determined to be 'control', which appeared 65 times, whereas 'borders' appeared 9 times and 'crisis' appeared 13 times (Johnson, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d). The articles written by the *Daily Mail* in period C3 were then analysed for their use of these 'Leave' rhetoric. The framing analysis revealed that articles on immigration were framed in a way that engenders a negative public opinion of increased immigration. The rhetoric utilised by the newspaper employed terminology implicitly supportive of the 'Leave' campaign such as 'control' in the context of borders and immigration, which appeared 44 times in the 10 articles analysed, The word 'control' appeared either directly before or directly after words like 'EU immigration', 'immigration', 'borders', and 'Britain's borders'. Instances where the word control did not come directly before or directly after these words but where

mentioned in the same sentence were included in the analysis. Further analysis for 'Leave' rhetoric showed that 'borders' was mentioned 33 times and 'crisis' 11 times in the 10 articles.

An analysis of these articles in terms of their content and headlines revealed five framing themes. These themes were 'us vs. them' rhetoric, immigrants having negative impacts on the economy, border invasion, islamophobia, and exposing corruption.

5. The Other

The *Daily Mail* referred to non-Britons in a way that homogenised and dehumanised them, thus creating the spectre of 'the other'. While the newspaper explicitly identified Britons as 'citizens of the UK', immigrants were usually referred to by the nationality they are perceived to been identified with initially, such as 'Turks' and 'Syrians', irrespective of naturalisation. Given that the paper could have framed these people in neutral terms such as 'British immigrants', the use of foreign classifications serves to create a divide between those who are 'true' Britons and those who they perceive to be a threat to 'true' British society. These choice of words contributes to the 'us vs. them' narrative by creating the perception that the other does not have the same moral values and are - in a simplistic sense - bad people. For example, an article published on April 17th 2016 by the *Daily Mail* read: '72 per cent of struck off doctors are from overseas: Cases include an Indian GP who ran an immigration scam and a Malaysian medic who secretly filmed female patients'(Adams 2016) The article makes sure to refer to the struck off doctors not as fellow Britons, but by their initial nationality, so as to amalgamate them into the ominous spectre of the 'other'.

6. Islamophobia

Most articles on the issue of immigration also contain a subtle thread of islamophobia. According to a survey, the British public think that one in five British people are Muslim when in reality it is one in twenty and that 24% of the population are immigrants when the official figure is 13% (Fenton 2016). The *Daily Mail* utilised existing islamophobia to add further salience to the issue. This is especially evident in the emphasis they place on the Middle East and immigration from majority Muslim

countries in comparison to that which they place on immigration of other EU and Anglosphere countries. While immigration from anywhere is seen in a negative way, immigrants from majority Muslim countries are referred to by mononyms of their nationality only, for example 'Turks' and 'Syrians', whereas those from European countries are referred to as 'foreign workers' or 'Polish workers'. For example, an article published on April 21st 2016 read 'Britain will take 3,000 MORE refugees from the Middle East as ministers admit previous promises did not go far enough' (Sculthorpe 2016). The word 'more' is capitalised by the newspaper, suggesting outrage at the precedent immigration, let alone further immigration. This anti-immigration sentiment is further evidenced by the use of 'already' in the sub-heading 'New group is on top of the 20,000 refugees promised new homes already' (Sculthorpe 2016).

7. Immigrants and the Economy

Another propagandistic manoeuvre by the *Daily Mail* consisted of stories that implied that immigration was bad for the economy because it took resources away from deserving citizens and gave them to 'jobless' migrants. For example, an article published by the *Daily Mail* ran with the headline: ''It's a sham': IDS says the chances of kicking out jobless migrants after six months were 'close to zero' – and claims Cameron KNOWS it.'(Slack 2016) The newspaper strengthened this frame with stories that gave credence to the idea of resource scarcity was becoming a problem due to immigration, although they never actually provided proof that such scarcity exists. For example, use of words like 'handout' and 'poverty' when referring to immigrants as opposed to a neutral word like 'benefits', which was often used when referring to poor Britons (Seaton 2016). Similarly, when discussing Britons, words such as 'entitled' and 'hardworking' were used to establish ownership of hard earned resources, while the outsiders are asking for handouts or wanting to take their resources from them. The theme often focused on the pressure immigrants place on the system, be it on job opportunities, access to health care or access to public education. An article published by the *Daily Mail* on April 19th 2016 ran with the headline stating: 'Thousands of children miss out on a place at all their chosen primary schools: Up to a tenth in some areas did not receive a spot…Councils are struggling to provide enough places after

years of migration' (Harding 2016).

8. Border Invasion

In the speeches of 'Leave' campaign leaders and in newspaper articles, the issue of control with regards to the UK's borders was given increased salience through repetition. As mentioned earlier in an analysis of 10 articles, 'control' with regards to borders was mentioned 44 times. The articles implied that millions of migrants will be coming to Britain illegally because of the UK's membership in the EU. This is evident in their use of words like 'sneak', and phrases like 'migrants will push', or 'open the floodgates to more refugees'. An article published on June 10th 2016 states: 'Revealed: migrants sneak into Britain at a rate of one every six minutes – official figures show' (Dathan 2016). Similarly, another article published on April 5th 2016 stated ''Staggering' number of European jihadis: EU's own border agency admits terrorists are exploiting refugee crisis and lax controls - but has no idea how many illegal immigrants there are.' (Slack 2016) However, it is important to note that although the paper claims to have received the information from officials, they never mention what official figures or reports are used. The newspaper tended to use startling figures to represent the number of people supposedly coming into the country and then attributing these figures to supposed experts but never revealing the source of the data. By utilising these methods, the *Daily Mail* presents the idea that the only way to curb this invasion is to 'control' Britain's borders and keep immigrants out.

9. Liberation from Corruption

The *Daily Mail* conveyed the impression that immigration is a bigger issue than people think and that the current leaders of the 'Remain' camp were all in a conspiracy with other EU leaders to open up the UK's borders for profit. The framing of immigration issues by the *Daily Mail* also suggested that those supporting the 'Remain' camp was part of a conspiracy to bring in more immigrants. It perpetuated the idea that voting to leave the EU would be the only way to liberate people from this corruption. This is evident with the use of dramatic words like 'revealed' and phrases like 'lifted the lid' in articles about the policies being put forward by 'Remain' campaigners. For example, two articles published on June 10th 2016 stated: 'We DO meddle too much, says EU

boss: Juncker finally tells the truth on bloated Brussels and admits many laws should have been left to national governments.' (Stevens 2016) The use of the word 'finally' implies that they had been telling lies or half-truths up to that point and now the people will finally know what is really happening. The second article read: 'Greediest snouts in the EU trough: Not sure how to vote? Read about the stinking wealth and hypocrisy of those Brussels fat cats the Kinnocks and it may help you decide' (Pendlebury 2016).

10. Conclusion

Through the content analysis of the *Daily Mail*, the most popular newspaper in the UK in terms of readership, it is evident that articles aimed to inspire readers to vote 'Leave' focused on immigration. Over the periods examined, there was an 88% increase in the amount of articles written on immigration, in comparison to the 77% increase of articles on the economy. While both topics increased in coverage, by writing increasingly about immigration and dedicating more newspaper coverage to the issue through longer articles and headings, the *Daily Mail* contributed to the shift in public opinion from viewing issues of the economy as being the most important to viewing issues of immigration as being most important during the Brexit campaign.

According to Lippmann, the media is in charge of creating the pictures in our heads when it comes to public opinion (Lippmann 2014). Thus, not only did the *Daily Mail* raise the salience of immigration, they also shaped how people viewed the topic. The issue of immigration was framed by the Daily Mail in a negative manner focusing on five themes, namely the 'us vs. them' narrative, liberation from corruption, islamophobia, border invasion and the negative impacts of immigrants on the economy. All five themes suggested that immigration was bad for the UK and was robbing hard working citizens of benefits that were rightfully theirs. By setting the agenda and framing the news coverage on immigration, the *Daily Mail* can be said to have acted in a manner that does not align with objective journalistic standards. Instead, using negative rhetoric with reference to immigration, the *Daily Mail* created frames that engendered negative associations with immigration.

The frames were effective because it fed into established stereotypes and created a sense of urgency. Their choice of words served to alienate immigrants, which resulted in presuppositions when it came to the Brexit referendum (Rowinski 2016). By

such means, they exaggerated an immigration crisis that could not be substantiated but seemingly required immediate attention. The solution presented was voting 'Leave'. By doing so, Britons would be regaining control of their borders. However, it is important to note that the newspaper rarely mentioned how the process of regaining control would work beyond voting 'Leave'. This false sense of urgency could have mobilised readers to vote on the ideological stance the newspaper had taken without having any other knowledge on the issue.

While agenda setting is not necessarily a bad thing (McCombs 2014), in the case of the Brexit referendum, the act of agenda setting by the newspaper failed to inform people in an objective manner. The *Daily Mail* was arguably biased in favour of its political stance and its rhetoric reflected this. A few hours after the vote and result of the referendum 'what is the EU?' became a trending google search in the UK and similarly, searches on 'what happens if we leave the EU?' had tripled (Fung, 2016). This implies that a sizeable portion of the United Kingdom's demographic - which might also include readers of the *Daily Mail* - were not duly informed on key matters that underscored the referendum. So, even though 53.4% of people voted to leave the EU many didn't really know what the EU represented (Fung 2016).

The role of the *Daily Mail* in not only setting the agenda for the referendum but also framing the key issues such as immigration detracted from the capacity of its readers to act in an informed manner. With all the emphasis on immigration and taking back control, it is important to note that most of the articles never explained how voting 'Leave' would curb the perceived immigration problem or impact the future of Britain economically and socially. Instead, newspapers like the *Daily Mail* focused on sensationalism and poorly substantiated claims. A potential area of further study would be to examine the extent to which all other newspapers acted in a similar manner.

This paper has sought to determine the role of news media in shaping public opinion on matters central to the Brexit referendum. While it has concluded that the *Daily Mail* failed to serve the public in an objective manner, it is also pertinent to consider other reasons for why public opinion took shape as it did. Perhaps it was the case that papers like the *Daily Mail* were simply reporting on sensationalist campaigners and relayed their misinformation with journalistic accuracy, rather than engendering it themselves. A further limitation of this paper is its exclusion of other

issues from the analysis, aside from Brexit and the economy, which may be of salience. For instance, the average Brexit article may well be longer than the average article on the economy, but how long are articles on other relevant political subjects? Moreover, while it was useful to examine the similarity of language employed by Boris Johnson and the *Daily Mail*, this comparison would be all the more informing if we had the context of contrasting language employed by 'Remain' campaigners and their media allies.

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